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Introduction 
 
“The first lesson the student of international politics must learn and never forget 
is that the complexities of international affairs make simple solutions and 
trustworthy prophecies impossible. Here the scholar and the charlatan part 
company [...] The best the scholar can do, then, is to trace the different tendencies 
that, as potentialities, are inherent in a “certain“ international situation. He can 
point out the different conditions that make it more likely for one tendency to 
prevail than for another and, finally assess the probabilities for the different 
conditions and tendencies to prevail in actuality“ (Hans Morgenthau 1948).1 
 
Through the following introductory words, it shall be clarified, which subject this 
thesis seeks to address, how the necessity of addressing this subject can be justified 
and its scope delimited, finally along which lines it will be tackled. 
As the People’s Republic of China’s (in the following: PRC or China) 
economic power and the resulting political weight continue to change dramatically, 
the PRC’s position vis-à-vis its neighbors and the international community has to be 
redefined. Researchers in the fields of International Relations (in the following: IR) as 
well as Chinese Studies will have to try and capture these constantly renegotiated 
relations. Such ventures have to take into account China’s changing relative power in 
the system, but also how China perceives other actors in the international system and 
the latter itself, how the PRC perceives itself, its awareness of others’ “China-images” 
and its intention to shape them. It will be presumed here, that the PRC’s most 
important bilateral relationships are those with the countries it has the biggest trade 
volume with, receives the most natural resources from or borders on. The Russian 
Federation (in the following: RF or Russia), although not yet among the top five 
trading partners of China, arguably fulfills all of those three requirements. Therefore 
the analysis of the evolving relationship between the PRC and Russia is to be 
considered an integral part of the reevaluation of the former’s position in the 
international system.                                                          
1 Morgenthau 2006:22. 
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The intention of this thesis is to contribute a sensibly delimited study of a 
certain aspect of China-Russia relations to the field of research explained above. It 
will thus be necessary to comprehensibly set a certain frame of time and place, as well 
as to determine an aspect crucial to the relationship and not yet exhaustively treated. 
As the Russian economy has come to depend heavily on energy export and the PRC 
considers securing a sufficient and sustainable energy supply its foremost priority, 
energy policy is certainly crucial to both nations’ deliberations on foreign and security 
policy. To further narrow the focus of this study, only energy policy towards and 
projects concerning Central Asia (in the following: CA) will be taken into account. In 
this study, Central Asia denominates the five ex-Soviet republics in central Eurasia (!) 
that gained independence in 1991, ie Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Furthermore, the scope of this thesis will be delimited to 
the time after the fall of the Soviet Union (in the following: SU). With Russia 
currently dominating the energy field in CA, but China decisively entering it, an 
analysis of this development’s effect on the bilateral relationship is certainly 
worthwhile. On the issue of CA energy in the framework of this bilateral relationship, 
it is specifically the Chinese foreign policy elite’s perspective that will be analyzed. 
This study will employ a “building block” approach (Shambaugh 1991:38). 
The first chapter will provide a historico-political contextualization, explaining the 
image2 of Russia that has arisen in the eyes of China’s elite and informs its perception 
of Russian actions. The second chapter will provide a factual narration of energy 
projects and the state of research will be accounted for in the third chapter. 
Subsequently an established research gap should provide for a sensible research 
question. In the fourth chapter a theoretical framework for this thesis, resting on the 
two pillars of neoclassical realism and perception research will be formulated. Based 
thereon, the methodology to be used – an analysis of Chinese academic discourse – 
will be explained and justified, and certain hypotheses as to possible answers to the 
research question will be established. In the fifth chapter, this methodology will be 
utilized to judge ramifications on the state of relations between the two territorial 
giants of Eurasia. 
                                                         
2 According to Allen S. Whiting (1989:18 as quoted in Noesselt 2008:35-36), perception means a 
selective intake of one’s counterpart’s actions that is based on a preconceived image. The latter, in turn, 
results from a selective interpretation of history and experience. 
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1. Historical Background and Political Contextualization 
 
Any analysis of recent developments in Sino-Russian relations has to devote some 
time to historical sources of current positions and conflicts. Lo Bobo underscores this 
need when he asserts that, “for both [China and Russia], the key to the rapprochement 
of recent years lies in their ability to transcend a dark and often tragic shared history” 
(Lo 2008:17). A brief analysis of this history, appropriate to the confines of this thesis, 
shall be provided in the following chapter, whereas different stages and patterns of the 
relationship are to be identified and relevance for the current situation to be 
highlighted. 
According to Chen Lulu (2010:88), relations between a Chinese and a Russian 
state entity always took one of four patterns: oppression, alignment, resistance or 
normalcy. In a variant of this analysis, Yu Bin (2007:59) describes a gradual 
evolution from hierarchy to equality, when he gives a historical perspective to this 
relationship. In Yu’s terminology, hierarchy can be equated with Chen’s stages of 
oppression, alignment and resistance, and equality with the stage of normalcy. The 
following chapter will argue that relations have been asymmetrical or hierarchical up 
until the process of normalization in the 1980s and 1990s, only then the balance of 
power has shifted and a phase of equality or normalcy started to take shape. During 
the last few years, however, intensified through the financial crisis of 2008, the 
balance has started to tip again, this time in China’s favor. 
 
1.1. Hierarchy – Oppression, Alignment, Resistance 
1.1.1. Historical Antecedents  
Going through the developments in this relationship, from the beginnings in the 17th 
century up until the Bolshevik Revolution, oppression emerges as the preeminent 
pattern according to Chen’s terminology, with Russia in a position to dictate terms 
(Chen 2010:88; Lo 2008:17-23; Wilson 2004:15-16; Yu 2007:59-60). Lo, though, 
describes the Mongol invasion of Russian city-states in the thirteenth century as the 
first historical “moment” to define Sino-Russian relations. The Russians thereby 
being – at least in their self-perception – the first to be in the position of the oppressed. 
  4 
Connected with the notion of a “yellow peril” or “yellow threat”, the fear of a 
possible return of an oppressor from the East is introduced by Lo as Russia’s 
“Mongol complex”. This fear still resonates today with parts of the Russian populace, 
amongst whom notions of an uncivilized, culturally inferior East have proven 
remarkably durable (Lo 2008:18-19). Notably though, the first sustained contact 
between Russia and China only took place in the 17th century. Russian explorers and 
settlers reached the outer frontier of the Chinese Empire. Delimiting respective 
interests led to China’s first treaty with a European country, the “Treaty of Nerchinsk” 
in 1689 (Wilson 2004:15; Lo 2008:20).  
 For a long time, the two expanding empires tended not to interfere with each 
other. As China’s Qing Dynasty became ever weaker though, as a result of the Opium 
Wars in the mid-19th century, the relationship began to change. In nineteen unequal 
treaties (e.g. Treaty of Aigun 1858, Treaty of Beijing 1860, Treaty of Tarbagatai 
1864) Russia extracted more than 1.5 million square kilometers of land from China 
(parts of northwestern Xinjiang and territories in the Amur and Ussuri river regions), 
thereby joining the fray of European powers carving up China in this period (Chen 
2010:88; Lo 2008:21; Schmidt-Glintzer 2001:17; Wishnick 2001:192).3 The Tsarist 
Empire took part in the military campaign against the anti-foreigner Boxer Rebellion 
in 1900 and secured rights to run railroads in Manchuria as well as the lease of two 
ports, Lu Shun (Port Arthur) and Dalian (Dairen). Through its defeat in the war 
against Japan in 1905, Russia lost some influence and rights in Manchuria and its 
expansive attitude towards China came to an end (Schmidt-Glintzer 2001:17; Wilson 
2004:15-16). Nonetheless, this first period of Chinese-Russian relations cast a shadow 
over the relationship. It was the root of numerous border disputes – which some 
Russians fear are still not resolved, despite formal demarcation –, the reason for many 
Chinese to perceive Russia as an aggressor and hegemon, and a persistent Russian 
assumption of superiority. This entailed continuous mutual distrust and racial 
prejudices (Chen 2010:88; Lo 2008:21-23). 
 
 
 
                                                         
3 See also: Yu 2007:60 and Wilson 2004:15, who put the number at 1.7 million square kilometers. 
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1.1.2. Sino-Soviet Relations: Bolshevik Revolution, Honeymoon, Break Up 
As China’s weakness carried on, so did the hierarchical nature of Chinese-Russian 
relations, the SU continuing Tsarist Russia’s role as the oppressor. Despite the 
support for the nationalist Guomindang (in the following: GMD) and the Chinese 
Communist Party (in the following: CCP) – both molded along Marxist-Leninist 
organizational principles – and the unilateral abandonment of its extraterritorial rights 
in China, the SU continued to infringe upon China’s sovereignty, retaining control 
over certain ports and railways, continuing to raise Tsarist claims and instigating the 
independence of Outer Mongolia in 1921 (Chen 2010:88; Lo 2008:24; Wilson 
2004:16-17; Yu 2007:60).4 According to Yu, “Russian/Soviet “intangible“ influence 
on China in the 20th century was perhaps unprecedented and unparalleled by that of 
any other power“ (Yu 2007:60). During the war against Japan, from 1937 to 1945, the 
SU provided financial, technical and advisory support, but after its end China felt 
treated as if it had been on the losing side, not only by the Western powers, but also 
by the SU. In China’s civil war, from 1945 to 1949, Soviet help for the CCP can 
hardly be overestimated, still Stalin – then “General Secretary of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union“ (in the following: GS of the CPSU) – had only reluctantly 
chosen this path, at first recognizing Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist government and 
calculating that a weak and divided China would serve Soviet interests. This 
reluctance and maneuvering on the Soviet side was another root for distrust between 
the two countries, even as the communist partners celebrated their alliance (Chen 
2010:88; Lo 2008:24; Marciacq 2009:15-16; Wilson 2004:18).  
The establishment of the PRC in 1949 was followed by what is often called 
the “Honeymoon Phase“ in China-Russia relations, a phase of alignment in Chen’s 
categories (Chen 2010:88; Yu 2007:58). Mao Zedong, Chairman of the CCP, adopted 
the „leaning-to-one-side“-policy, seeking security and much needed outside assistance 
for China’s post-war reconstruction efforts by whole-heartedly joining the socialist 
camp and proclaiming to adopt the soviet model. The relationship thus remained 
hierarchical, by making the SU the “big brother“ in Confucian terms (Wilson 2004: 
18). The “Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance Between the USSR                                                         
4 By splitting Mongolia from China to create a communist client-state, the SU inflicted further 
territorial losses on China. Moscow also refused to return any territories acquired by the Tsarist Empire 
in the 19th century. 
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and the People’s Republic of China“5, signed in February 1950, determined that the 
SU would return control over Manchurian railways and the ports of Dairen and Port 
Arthur to China, grant it enormous credits and help its industrialization efforts by 
transferring know-how and sending legions of technical advisors. Towards the end of 
the 1950s, though, cracks began to occur as Mao and the new GS of the CPSU Nikita 
Khrushchev grew to detest each other. The SU decided not to provide nuclear 
technology to the PRC, and Khrushchev was repeatedly criticized in Chinese 
publications as being obedient to the West and unfaithful to the principles of 
Marxism-Leninism (Lo 2008:25; Marciacq 2009:15-16; Wilson 2004:18-19).  
In 1960 the SU abruptly withdrew all its experts from China and broke off all 
economic relations. This delivered a severe blow to the Chinese economy, already 
ailing as the “Great Leap Forward“-campaign (1958-1961) – a massive 
collectivization effort – collapsed. Following this “break-up“, Soviet military threats 
replaced strong involvement in Chinese policy decisions, relations remaining 
asymmetrical under new circumstances and forming the pattern of resistance in 
Chen’s categories (Chen 2010:88; Wilson 2004:19). As the PRC was increasingly 
isolated in the socialist camp and its nuclear efforts hindered, the tension between it 
and the SU grew exponentially. A massive troop build-up along the border and 
several bloody clashes ensued. Mao, worried about a possible Soviet invasion and 
turned to the United States (in the following: US), with President Nixon visiting 
China in 1972 (Cheng 2009:146; Lo 2008:26; Wilson 2004:19). The phase from 1960 
to the early 1980ies can be considered the worst in Russian-Chinese relations. 
Prejudices on both sides were reinforced, be it that of the “yellow peril“ or that of the 
Russian imperialist aggressor. The expansive military build-up along the endless 
border with China, was one of the reasons for the SU’s eventual demise, and the 
image of one another as possible invading force still partly reverberates in the minds 
of the populace, especially in the border regions (Yu 2007:80). Many reasons have 
been given for the souring of ties, some listed above, but the most important one, 
according to Li Fenglin, China’s former ambassador to the SU, was very simple: “the 
substance of the issue is that the Soviet Union did not treat China on an equal footing“ 
(Wilson 2004:21). Given that China’s “century of humiliation“ – the time from the 
first Opium War in 1838 to the founding of the PRC in 1949 – had just ended, and                                                         
5 For the full text see: http://untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/6/27/00011314.pdf (03.04.2011). 
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taking into account Mao’s personal sensitivities, this was certainly unacceptable to the 
Chinese leadership (Lo 2008:25). 
 
1.2. Equality – Normalcy 
1.2.1. Normalization of Ties: From Brezhnev to Yeltsin 
Chen considers a stage of normalcy reached in the last years of the SU (Chen 
2008:88), whereas Yu inserts a phase of “mutual adjustment in the midst of dramatic 
changes in their respective domestic politics (1990-1995)“, and sees normalcy 
attained only with the formation of the “strategic partnership“ in 1996 (Yu 2007:58). 
As this thesis has equated Yu’s stage of hierarchy with Chen’s phases of oppression, 
alignment and resistance, which come to an end as the phase of normalcy is reached, 
the question arises as to whether Yu’s stage of equality – and factual equality on the 
international stage, indeed – has been arrived at. While not giving an explicit date, Yu 
implicitly considers normalcy and equality attained at the same time (e.g. Yu 
2007:58). The relationship certainly ceased to be hierarchical during these years, as 
Moscow’s power decreased rapidly with the end of the SU and throughout the 1990s. 
With Wilson it can be ascertained, that at the turn of the century at the latest, the two 
were at least at eye level, as “[b]y most conventional measures, Russia was weaker 
than China“ (Wilson 2004:37). 
 “[…] [T]he process of normalizing relations began with minimizing and/or 
neutralizing the ideology factor in bilateral relations“ (Yu 2007:63), which had 
exaggerated commonalities in the 1950s and differences in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
protracted process started in 1979 with first talks on demilitarization and the PRC 
ceasing to call the SU a “revisionist state“ (Wilson 2004:19) – soon after both 
admitted that the other side was socialist (Wishnick 2001:115). Contributing to this 
trend were certain changes in China’s foreign and security policy decision-making 
processes since the beginning of its “reform and opening“-policy in 1978. Under the 
PRC’s new supreme leader Deng Xiaoping the role of the military declined, while 
that of diplomats, foreign-policy experts and trade bureaucracies increased 
considerably. A new focus on economic development prompted a new direction of 
foreign policy, with the primary goal of creating a stable environment instrumental to 
economic growth (Cabestan 2009:64). This trend was reinforced when Deng retired in 
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1993, and Jiang Zemin became the first leader without a military background. A 
second trend setting in at this point – and continued after power passed to Hu Jintao in 
2002 –, was an increased “number of decision-making loci“, mostly through “adding 
bureaucracies within certain economic agencies“ and multiplied “leading small 
groups“ (Cabestan 2009:65, 91-93). Nonetheless talks were suspended again in 1979, 
shortly after they had begun, because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In April 
1982, then, GS of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev called for Sino-Soviet cooperation in 
an historic speech in Tashkent, prompting China to list as three major obstacles: 
Soviet troops along the border to China, Soviet troops in Afghanistan and Vietnamese 
troops in Cambodia (Wilson 2004:20). After Brezhnev’s death, no major progress was 
made under GS Andropov or GS Chernenko. In July 1986 the new GS Mikhail 
Gorbachev renewed Brezhnev’s push with a speech in Vladivostok, marking the 
departure point for Sino-Soviet rapprochement, together with his visit to Beijing in 
May 1989 (Chen 2010:88; Lo 2008:27-28; Wilson 2004:20-21; Yu 2007:64). The SU 
began to withdraw troops from Afghanistan and from the Chinese border, it also 
pushed Vietnam to leave Cambodia. Both regimes agreed to settle their border issues 
– with a first agreement on the eastern part signed in 1991 and ratified one year later 
by the Russian and Chinese parliaments (Wishnick 2001:116, 122) –, to reduce troop 
levels in border regions and to no longer use force in their interactions. 
Gorbachev was only able to achieve this turnaround in Soviet policy toward 
its neighbor “after eliminating the “anti-China“ coalition from the corridors of power 
in the Central Committee and the Foreign Ministry and installing a new team that 
viewed China’s reform policies in a distinctively positive light“ (Wishnick 2001:108-
109). Only at this point an equal relationship between the two major communist 
powers was developing, as Gorbachev strived for a new type of socialist community, 
not marked by Soviet leadership in ideology and international relations, but respect 
for different models of socialism and the sovereignty of every country over its foreign 
policy decisions (Wishnick 2001:113-114). Soviet officials and scholars stopped 
giving weight to a Chinese military threat, the relationship was de-ideologized and 
discussed in much more pragmatic terms (Wishnick 2001:110). This process of 
normalization was put to the test early on and through several developments. 
Gorbachev aptly avoided a first crisis after the PRC’s clampdown on protests in 
Tiananmen Square 1989, by treating it as an internal matter not to be commented on. 
Soon after though, he lost control over developments, as communism ended in the 
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countries of Eastern Europe, the SU’s economy collapsed and separatist movements 
and the reformists under Boris Yeltsin grew stronger and stronger. The Chinese 
leadership made Gorbachev personally responsible for the revolutions in Eastern 
Europe, internally denounced him as a “traitor to communism“, but still had no choice 
but to support him as they preferred him to his reformist rival Yeltsin and wanted to 
move closer to the SU to counter an ascending US (Wilson 2004:22; Wishnick 
2001:115). Military ties as well as party-to-party exchanges were established and both 
Premier Li Peng and GS of the CCP Jiang Zemin visited Moscow. After the abortive 
coup attempt in August 1991, Yeltsin’s rise was irrevocable and the dissolution of the 
SU followed in December. This rendered ideological uniformity between the two 
countries impossible and made sustained de-ideologization all the more important (Yu 
2007:64). 
The process of de-ideologization went “hand in hand with the return of the 
national interests as both the philosophical and operational principles in the 1990s. 
This, however, does not necessarily mean a complete switch to a Machiavellian ends-
justifying-means approach. Rather, prudence and practicality are the rules of the game 
in the pursuit of their respective national interests“ (Yu 2007:65). Despite their 
mistrust towards and distaste for Yeltsin and the democrats in Russia (Wishnick 
2001:122), the Chinese opted for pragmatism, treated the developments as an internal 
matter and swiftly recognized the RF and all other successor states of the SU on 
December 27, 1991 (Wilson 2004:24). Still relations were relatively cool at first, as 
China was still recovering from the reverberations of Tiananmen, and the Russian 
government turned wholeheartedly pro-Western and particularly pro-US, especially 
its foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev. This policy of a complete embrace of Western 
positions was termed “leaning-to-one-side“ by some Chinese scholars (Cheng 
2009:127; Gu 2009:27), in a reference to Chinese foreign policy in the 1950s and its 
utter dependence on the SU. Gu Yeli judges this foreign policy shift to be the logical 
conclusion from the Kremlin’s complete focus on domestic reconstruction, which was 
thought to be possible, only by imitating the Western economic model of a liberal 
market economy. At this point a mere extension of domestic policy, foreign policy 
had to be aligned with the West. Furthermore, a stable environment as well as 
Western aid was needed, and both the Russian leadership and its population believed 
in a swift entry into the league of developed nations, if this course was taken. 
According to Gu (2009:29), this course of foreign policy was detrimental to Sino-
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Russian relations, because it was again dominated by ideology, now pro-Western. 
This policy line lasted only about two years, though, – from late 1991 to late 1993 – 
and even earlier nationalist forces were pressuring Yeltsin “to formulate a “Eurasian“ 
alternative to Kozyrev’s “Atlanticist“ foreign policy“ (Wishnick 2001:123; Norling 
2007:35)6, as they saw their country disrespected by the West and economic reforms 
didn’t deliver quick success.  
Up until the beginning of its war in Chechnya in 1994, Russia kept criticizing 
China’s human rights record (Wilson 2004:25). The new Russian liberal elite 
considered the Tiananmen crackdown a symbol of the communist dictatorship one 
had just shed, but also as confirming the image of the “despotic East“ (Lo 2008:28). 
On the other side, the Chinese leadership considered Yeltsin to be somewhat 
unprofessional and prone to gaffs throughout his presidency (Wilson 2004:25). 
Nonetheless, both countries soon agreed upon continuing on the path set by the SU 
and the PRC and to respect each other’s different political systems. Yeltsin confirmed 
the RF’s recognition of the “one-China-principle“ – stating that Taiwan is an integral 
part of China and that the government in Beijing is China’s sole legitimate authority – 
after a brief flirtation with the Taiwanese (Lo 2008:30; Wilson 2004:25). Despite 
Moscow’s temporary foreign policy alignment with the West and its somewhat 
disorganized decision-making process, the Chinese leadership always kept patient and 
tactful, judging its interest in friendly relations with its neighbor and a stable 
environment for its economic rise more important (Cheng 2009:163-164).  
In 1994, Russian foreign policy shifted (Cheng 2009:148-149) to what Gu 
calls one of a “double-headed eagle“ (Gu 2009:28). The Yeltsin government, 
disappointed by the West, tried to rebalance its foreign policy and discovered many 
similarities with the PRC in positions on international issues. That year, Jiang Zemin 
became the first Chinese president to visit Moscow since 1957. During the visit, a 
“constructive partnership“ was declared, on the principle of non-alignment, with 
increased trade and border demarcation – now of the western part – as well as 
cooperation in the UN Security Council in mind (Wilson 2004:27; Wishnick 
2001:126-128). Problems persisted though, as regional politicians and media in the 
Russian Far East (in the following: RFE) wanted to amend border agreements and                                                         
6 See also: Wu 2009:120. Wu divides Russian foreign policy in the 1990s in two phases, a liberal pro-
Western one under Foreign Minister Kozyrev until 1996, and a “Eurasia-centered pragmatism” under 
Primakov and Ivanov. 
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complained about Chinese illegal immigration. Changed visa regulations lead to less 
immigration, but also a sharp decline in bilateral trade from 1993 to 1994, after a 
steep rise in trade volume from 1991 to 1993 (Lo 2008:31-32; Norling 2007:35; 
Wilson 2004:28-29, 62). Early in the Yeltsin presidency, energy was already 
considered a promising area for economic cooperation, and Russia agreed to transfer 
nuclear technology to the PRC as well as to assist in the construction of two nuclear 
plants (Wishnick 2001:125, 131). 
 
1.2.2. “Strategic Partnership“ and Common Opposition to “US Unilateralism” 
In the mid-nineties both countries felt somewhat threatened or challenged by the 
international environment, and at the same time comforted by the other’s restraint, 
steady repetition of the principle of non-intervention – coming to mean non-criticism 
– and support for one’s own core policy objectives. The PRC failed to intimidate the 
Taiwanese electorate in the presidential election of March 1996 – it had held 
extensive military training manoeuvers in the vicinity –, and was settled with the 
“difficult“ Lee Teng-hui (Wilson 2004:29). Russia on the other hand was strongly 
criticized by the West for the conduct of its war in Chechnya since 1994, and was 
increasingly worried about NATO expansion plans. At this point Moscow stopped 
criticizing China’s human rights record and reiterated its support for China’s policies 
on Taiwan and Tibet. The Chinese side reciprocated by supporting Russia’s Chechnya 
policy and criticizing NATO expansion (Lo 2008:30; Norling 2007:35-36; Wilson 
2004:29; Wishnick 2001:128-129).  
 Additionally, the rapprochement was facilitated by the good personal 
relationship between Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin, who had studied in Moscow and spoke 
fluent Russian (Lo 2008:30; Yu 2007:65). Relations had reached a point, where – 
although there was no official position – many in the Chinese leadership secretly 
favored a Yeltsin victory in the presidential elections of 1996, although his opponent 
was the Communist Party GS Ziuganov. Despite Yeltsin’s faults, he was believed to 
ensure better prospects for economic growth than his opponent, and he was „a known 
quantity who had proven his ability to develop relations with China on a favorable 
footing. In the view of many Chinese leaders, this was more important than 
ideological compatibility“ (Wishnick 2001:130).  
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Russia’s new foreign minister Evgenii Primakov, liked by the Chinese for his 
background in the intelligence services (Wilson 2004:30), pushed for more regular 
meetings and an increased trade volume. Primakov symbolized a further departure 
from Russia’s alignment with the West in the early 1990s, with a new emphasis on a 
multipolar world order and opposition to what was perceived as US unilateralism (Gu 
2009:28-29; Norling 2007:35). In Chinese eyes, Moscow thus returned to a self-
determined foreign policy, and started to strive for a restored big power image (Gu 
2009:28). Russia’s new assertiveness and broader foreign policy approach brought it 
closer to Beijing. However, what Gu, Zhou Hongbo and Huang You (Gu 2009:29; 
Zhou / Huang 2007:70) describe as Russia’s “great-power complex“, is considered a 
possible problem for future Sino-Russian relations by Chinese scholars.  
The new situation provided for the upgrade of the relationship to “strategic 
partnership“, proclaimed at Yeltsin’s visit to Beijing in April 1996 (Wilson 2004:29-
30; Wishnick 2001:128-129). The same month, the leaders of the PRC, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan met in Shanghai to discuss border 
demarcation and military cooperation in the border regions – this group was to 
become known as the “Shanghai Five“, later to evolve into the “Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization“ (in the following: SCO) (Lo 2008:29-30). Russia now 
showed a renewed interest in CA, trying to reestablish a sphere of influence 
encompassing the components of the former Soviet empire, which were more or less 
abandoned in the early 1990s (Gu 2009:28-29; Wishnick 2001:141).  
After the series of Russian policy adjustments described above, diplomatic 
relations were better than at any point in history. The years 1998/1999, though, saw a 
stagnation, caused mainly by the Ruble’s collapse in April 1998, a rapid exchange of 
several prime ministers in Russia and both Yeltsin’s bad health and erratic 
management of foreign policy (Lo 2008:33; Wilson 2004:32). What was very 
important for the nevertheless rather smooth development of relations, was Beijing’s 
pragmatic approach. It tolerated the Kremlin’s dysfunctional decision-making process 
and “accepted that the Russian establishment would, for all sorts of historical and 
practical reasons, look primarily to the United States and Western Europe“ (Lo 
2008:32). As long as Russia would back the PRC’s positions on Taiwan, Tibet and 
Xinjiang, contribute to China’s border security and provide it with advanced 
weaponry, the Chinese leadership was willing to put up with a lot.  
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Concerning economic relations, the trade volume between the two was 
actually lower in 1998 than it had been in 1992 (Wilson 2004:33, 62). Barring arms 
sales – which had been steadily rising throughout the 1990s (Wishnick 2001:144-146; 
Yu 2007:77-79) –, bilateral trade had drastically fallen short of what the two 
governments had envisioned. On international political issues though, Moscow and 
Beijing found themselves evermore aligned7. They both heavily protested US and 
NATO action independent of the UN, in Iraq 1998 and in Kosovo/Serbia 1999 
respectively. Further critique arose against the US’s national missile defense (NMD) 
system and the theater missile defense (TMD) system planned in cooperation with 
Japan. The rationale for these systems, North Korean or other “rogue nations’“ 
possible attacks, was rejected by the PRC and Russia, who criticized that they were 
not consulted, and that the “defense systems“ might be used to infringe upon their 
interests – eg to shelter Taiwan in a hypothetical confrontation with the PRC (Wilson 
2004:34; Wishnick 2001:147-148). Wishnick likens this development to PRC-US 
rapprochement during the Cold War, when she writes that “much as China joined 
forces with the United States in the 1970s and 1980s against Soviet hegemony, today 
Russian and Chinese leaders are attempting to coordinate their responses to what they 
view as U.S. unilateralism in world affairs“ (Wishnick 2001:132). Tensions remained 
though, with regards to border demarcation – the implementation of agreements was 
often hindered by regional governments in the RFE – and Chinese illegal 
immigration. Fears, along the lines of the “China threat“, were played up by local 
authorities, talking of mass immigration by “millions“ of Chinese and the danger of 
sinification of the RFE through Chinese economic and demographic influence (Lo 
2008:31). A further hindrance for faster improving relations, was the fact that, despite 
their alignment on international issues, both countries placed far greater importance 
on building up their relationship with the West than with each other (Lo 2008:31). 
 
 
 
                                                         
7 Primakov at one point even proposed an alliance between Russia, China and India, quickly rejected 
by the Chinese side, which claimed not to be interested in entering into an alliance with any country 
(Wishnick 2001:147). 
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1.2.3. The Era Putin (I): Intensification of Economic Relations 
In 2000 bilateral economic relations finally took off, with the bilateral trade volume 
rising from 8 billion US dollars in 2000 to 33 billion in 2006. As a share of each 
other’s total trade, though, the numbers more or less stayed the same, hovering around 
2 percent for China and around 8-10 percent for Russia. The RF became increasingly 
concerned over the deteriorating bilateral trade structure, with Russia turning into a 
mere raw material supplier for the PRC, but wasn’t able to effectively counter this 
trend (Yu 2007:72-73).  
 On the political side the “Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly 
Cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation“8 (in 
the following: Friendship Treaty) was signed in July 2001 by the countries’ presidents 
and the “Shanghai Five“ were upgraded to the SCO. Wilson and Yu attribute this 
upgrade to several developments (Wilson 2004:35-37, 39; Yu 2007:65-66). First, 
since Yeltsin resigned in December 1999, Russia was now lead by a – in stark 
contrast to Yeltsin – very organized, systematically oriented and healthy president, 
Vladimir Putin. This made progress possible, but the sudden changing of the guard 
also prompted the Chinese side to seek a formalized framework. The Russian 
government had its own reasons for pursuing the latter. With Russia’s historically 
weak position, equality between the two had already been reached and a safety-net 
against a further deterioration of the power-balance seemed desirable. Second, the 
PRC had become the RF’s biggest arms customer, accounting for more than two 
thirds of all external Russian arms deals. Third, both – although the Chinese side was 
initiating – wanted a legal basis for their relationship, to secure a stable environment 
for their economic ascendance or reconstruction and both profited from the resolution 
of border issues. Fourth, geostrategic deliberations lead them to present a more united 
front against what they perceived as US hegemonism – reinforced for the Chinese 
leadership through NATO’s bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 –, 
thereby seeking to gain leverage on the international stage.  
 Importantly though, this treaty is decidedly different from the “Friendship 
Treaty“ concluded between the SU and China in 1950, in that no alliance is formed 
and no mutual military assistance clause included (Wilson 2004:36). On the contrary,                                                         
8  For an analysis of the treaty, see Yu 2001:120-127; for the full text see: 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t15771.htm (13.04.2011). 
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it is reiterated that this relationship is not directed against any third party. Both 
governments have learned from experience, recognized the pitfalls of the 1950-
alliance and the “need for maintaining the “median“, or normal, relations of not being 
too close or too distant from one another. [There is also] a strategic reckoning by both 
sides to work with the existing international system [, which might be] the result of 
their painful and costly past pursuit of two alternatives: being a part of a separate and 
inefficient communist trading bloc controlled by Moscow and/or a self-imposed 
“splendid isolation“ in the case of China“ (Yu 2007:67). This time around, leaders on 
both sides want to remain much more flexible and independent in their foreign policy 
decisions.  
After the events of September 11th 2001 (in the following: 9/11), Moscow 
moved much closer to the US than Beijing did in the “war on terror“. It agreed to an 
American troop presence in CA and did not condemn Washington’s unilateral 
withdrawal from the “Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty“ (in the following: ABM-Treaty) 
as strongly as the Chinese side, and relations cooled down again (Chen 2010:89; 
Norling 2007:36-37; Wilson 2004:38). Already in early 2003, however, the 
constellation changed again, when Russia and China both strongly condemned the US 
invasion of Iraq. The Kremlin perceived its deepened engagement with the US not to 
deliver tangible benefits, therefore concentrated its efforts on strengthened Sino-
Russian ties instead (Norling 2007:38; Wilson 2004:38). According to Zhao 
Huasheng (Zhao 2008:17), this change in foreign policy of the Putin administration 
happened in two stages. First, after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Moscow began to 
loudly voice support for a new multi-polar world order – as it had done before, but not 
since 9/11. Then, in 20059, – emboldened by economic growth fueled by high oil and 
gas prices and reacting to Western encroachment (ie “colored revolutions“10, NATO 
expansion) – it started to much more assertively oppose US policy, retake the role of a 
major power on the international stage, vie for influence in its “near-abroad“ and 
propose a restructuring of the international system. Zhao considers this to be the 
second phase of the Putin government’s foreign policy strategy, which he divides into                                                         
9 See also: Wu 2009:125, who dates this major shift to mid-2006 and connects it, among other factors, 
to electoral politics. Putin, he argues, tried to boost his chosen successor in the presidential election of 
2008, Dmitry Medvedev, by assuming a more populist-nationalist posture. 
10 The “color revolutions“ denoted here, are the “Rose Revolution“ in Georgia 2003, the “Orange 
Revolution“ in Ukraine 2004-2005, and the “Tulip Revolution“ in Kyrgyzstan 2005. The names for 
these non-violent revolutions are inspired by Czechoslovakia’s “Velvet Revolution“ in 1989. 
  16 
a phase of “strategic defense“ and one of “strategic offense“ (Zhao 2008:17). 
According to him, there has been no change in conviction, but only a change in the 
RF’s relative power and confidence, resulting from renewed economic growth. As 
US-Russia relations consequently soured in 2006 and 2007, China stayed on the 
sidelines. It came to view unfavorably a return to Cold War-rhetoric, as it wants to 
avoid a situation where it would be pressed to decide between the two (Yu 2007:68).  
Although Russia’s machinations in trying to play China and Japan against 
each other on the issue of a pipeline project, possibly ending either in China’s Daqing 
or at the Russian pacific coast in Nakodhka vis-à-vis Japan11, somewhat irritated the 
Chinese leadership – seeing Russia as unreliable (Chen 2007:89; Kozyrev 2008:210-
211, 212-213; Norling 2006:33-34; Norling 2007:37-38)12 –, relations were further 
institutionalized and strengthened. In an effort to deepen understanding of the other’s 
culture in order to boost sympathies between the two peoples – so far lagging behind 
those between the respective regimes –, several programs were initiated and a “Russia 
Year” declared in China 2006 as well as a “China Year” in Russia 2007 (Chen 
2010:89; Kozyrev 2008:218).  
A new milestone was the “Treaty among Member States of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization on Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation“ (in 
the following: SCO Friendly Treaty), concluded on the seventh summit of the SCO in 
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, August 2007. This first multilateral political document signed 
among the SCO members went hand in hand with the first military exercise with the 
participation of all members, the “Peace Mission 2007“. The latter had been preceded 
by the  “Peace Mission 2005“ and smaller exercises. Despite some alarm among 
Western nations – particularly the US who was not allowed to observe the drills –, Yu 
considers a future military alliance very unlikely (Yu 2007:69-72). The “Peace 
Mission 2007“ was much more suited for the declared goal of countering terrorism 
than the one in 2005, which had included naval forces and strategic bombers. What is 
more, security affairs account only for a small part of SCO interactions. As the goals                                                         
11 In May 2003, it was agreed between the Russian company “Yukos“ and the “Chinese National 
Petroleum Company“ (CNPC) that the pipeline would end in China. After a generous Japanese 
counter-offer and the dissolution of “Yukos“ by the Russian state in 2004, Putin decided for the route 
to Japan, but has since shifted back to the Chinese option. 
12 see also Zhao 2008:20: Zhao considers the Putin administration to be very apt in making use of a 
tactical flexibility, but ascertains that rapid changes make partners feel uncertain and reduce 
trustworthiness on the international stage; and Lo 2008:95-100,147. 
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of Moscow and Beijing regarding the development of the SCO diverge – each striving 
to emphasize its strong suit, ie security and economic cooperation respectively – and 
they start to compete for influence in CA, „the SCO is at best an interface for Moscow 
and Beijing to adjust their respective interests in Central Asia“ (Yu 2007:72). In Yu’s 
analysis in 2007 (Yu 2007:79-80), Sino-Russian relations – as noted above – are 
considered to have reached a state of “normalcy“. This is defined as an equal, de-
ideologized and interest-driven or pragmatic relationship, wherein both countries have 
realistic expectations as to the behavior of their counterpart, use pragmatically the 
“SCO-platform“ and are “set to co-exist with one other for the long-haul.“ 
 
1.2.4. The Era Putin (II) – Medvedev: Georgian War, SCO-Leadership and Financial 
Crisis 
In March 2008, the RF witnessed a smooth and calculated transition of the presidency 
to Dmitry Medvedev, while Putin, still the man in charge, assumed the position of 
Prime Minister. Russia’s foreign policy, in characteristics and style, continued on the 
path Putin had set in the second term of his presidency. Sino-Russian unity in 
opposing Western influence continued, and in July 2008 a further border demarcation 
pact – settling the last stretch along the Amur River – concluded the resolution of 
border issues between the two (Wu 2009:152-154).  
On August 8th, 2008, while all eyes were fixed on the opening ceremony of 
the Olympic Games in Beijing, fighting broke out in Georgia’s break-away province 
of South Ossetia. Russia, stating that 2.000 people had been killed by the Georgian 
army within twelve hours, including Russian peacekeepers and citizens, acted fast, 
invaded Georgia, agreed to a ceasefire five days later and formally recognized South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia – another break-away province of Georgia – as independent 
states two weeks after that (Turner 2011:50). As the Chinese and Russian leadership 
had long come to agree – and stipulated in Articles 11 and 20 of the Friendly Treaty 
in 2001 as well as in the SCO Charter13 –, that they would uphold the principles of 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs, opposing all 
separatist tendencies, this clearly posed a problem for Sino-Russian relations. In its                                                         
13 For the Friendly Treaty see: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t15771.htm (30.03.2011); for 
the SCO Charter see: http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=71 (30.03.2011). 
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official statements, the PRC felt the “Olympic truce“, and with it the crown 
achievement of its accumulated soft power, violated, and – together with the other 
members of the SCO – declined to sign a communiqué endorsing Russia’s actions 
(Contessi 2010:103; Turner 2011:50-51). In order not to damage its strategic relations 
with Moscow, though, Beijing remained neutral in its evaluation of the conflict, only 
calling on the “relevant parties“ to come to a resolution. Susan Turner argues, that a 
comprehensive analysis of Chinese media coverage of the RF in the year after the war 
even „indicate[d] that, contrary to popular belief, China supported [emphasis in 
original] Russia’s invasion of Georgia and saw it as an appropriate response to 
NATO’s presence in the region“ (Turner 2011:54). Despite going counter to Chinese 
principles – as described above – and despite the West being ultimately more 
important for both nations (Cheng 2009:163; Lo 2008:194), the Chinese media did 
not refer to Russia’s actions as war, told the story strictly according to the Russian 
account and framed it as a legitimate political manoeuver to balance Western power 
and break through the US’s containment efforts of Russia’s resurgence (Liu 2010:28-
29).14 In another example of framing Russian conflicts in this matter, Chinese media 
did not criticize the RF in the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis for exerting pressure on 
another (smaller) nation or – as the PRC is a consumer of Russian gas as well – for 
doubling the price within one year. Instead it praised the RF’s resistance to Western 
geopolitical encroachment, symbolized in this case by the ”color revolutions“ in 
Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. As US and Russian interests are juxtaposed in 
these and other cases since then, Chinese media – the traditional official neutrality 
notwithstanding – have decidedly shown the latter in a more positive light. While US 
unilateralism is castigated time and again, the unilateral nature of Moscow’s move 
against Georgia is omitted completely. Instead, its “tough stand“ against US 
expansionism is lauded repeatedly (Turner 2011:54-56). 
At the 2009 SCO summit in Yekaterinburg, a socio-economic dimension was 
formally confirmed as the organization’s second mainstay. Nicola Contessi interprets 
this as the answer to a certain tension that had arisen between the two major powers 
within the SCO, regarding the latter’s future development (Contessi 2010:103).15                                                         
14 This echoes the Kremlin’s approach as analyzed by Dmitry Trenin, director of the Moscow Carnegie 
Center, see Bomsdorf 2009:5. 
15 See also Bosbotinis 2010:77-79.  
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Reacting to the PRC’s rising status in the region, the RF had been trying to limit the 
former’s influence by striving to strengthen the “Collective Security Treaty 
Organization“16 (in the following: CSTO), have it cooperate closely with the SCO, 
and thereby establish security cooperation as the sole focus of CA multilateral 
cooperation. This should reinforce Russia’s position as the preeminent force in CA, as 
its military capabilities surpass its economic ones by far (Contessi 2010:102; 
Kaczmarski 2007:CACI Analyst 10/17/2007). Endeavoring to cautiously rebalance 
power relations in the SCO, the Chinese leadership accepted Russian preeminence in 
this field. On the summit in Yekaterinburg the PRC opted for a “division of labor“, 
where China would in return be the leading power in the economic sphere, now 
established as a second field of cooperation. As an answer to the financial crisis in 
2008 and its consequences, the SCO decided that both pillars should be strengthened. 
Moscow and Beijing agreed to shelve more ambitious projects in their respective 
dominions – the Chinese stopped to push for a free trade zone – and, through a more 
flexible status for observer states, a consensus was also reached on a further 
enlargement of the organization (Contessi 2010:103-110). Although implementation 
problems still hinder a more effective cooperation within the SCO framework, power 
competition between the PRC and the RF has for now been alleviated. This once 
again allows for “long term coexistence of China and Russia and the further 
development of the organization“ (Contessi 2010:122-123).17 
Contrary to the expectations of many in the Russian capital (Bomsdorf 
2009:5), the financial and economic crisis beginning in late 2008 heavily hit the RF. 
According to Liu Yongwei’s reasoning (Liu 2010:27-28), an international 
environment altered in Russia’s favor and a hard hit economy led to an adjustment of 
Moscow’s China policy. The US and Europe focused on economic recovery and tried 
to reset relations with Russia. Washington cancelled a missile shield, which it planned 
to install in Poland and the Czech Republic, and NATO halted its eastward expansion. 
The Kremlin had long been aware of an excessive dependency on energy exports, but 
only the shock delivered by crumbling oil and gas prices made it develop a long-term 
plan for and actively strive for a diversification of the RF’s economy and its exports                                                         
16 The CSTO is an intergovernmental military alliance, founded in 1992 and currently comprising 
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the RF, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Other than the SCO, it 
includes only one dominant player, the RF. 
17 see also Yu (2007): pp. 79-80. 
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(Liu 2010:29-31). With less need for geopolitical cooperation, and economic 
development an urgent imperative, Sino-Russian relations took a new direction. 
Economic relations now took on an unprecedented centrality. Energy cooperation has 
become more efficient, as Russia is now interested in decisive steps forward – an 
agreement on a pipeline linking Siberia with China’s Daqing18 was signed in 2009 
after 14 years of negotiations –, to get its economy up and running again. The 
Kremlin is more open to and actively seeking Chinese investment and loans (Liu 
2010:35-36). In a second phase though, Russia wants to end its trade deficit with 
China and concentrate on the export of machinery and chemicals as well as 
cooperation in high-tech, electronics and aviation industries. Although trade disputes 
have increased, Liu does not consider a reversal of this trend towards closer economic 
cooperation with the PRC likely in the near future (Liu 2010:36). 
 
The deliberations on the history of Sino-Russian relations thus show, that they started 
with the mutual perception of being oppressed by the other. Herein, the Chinese 
perception is based on much more recent events (ie the unequal treaties of the 19th 
century) and has a factual foundation. It is the perception of a “yellow threat” in 
Russia, though, based on the Mongolian (!) invasion of the 13th (!) century, which 
might be reinforced now by the unfamiliar reality of being the weaker part. A 
hierarchy in Russia’s favor had shaped the relationship up until the 1990s. Oppression 
(eg through extraterritorial rights and economic colonization) by a Russian state entity 
of a Chinese state entity had lasted until 1949, when a still hierarchical relationship 
was then characterized by alignment, which abruptly changed to resistance in 1960. 
Reconciliation efforts, started in the 1980s, gradually brought about a normalization 
of relations, which Chen Lulu considers completed with the declaration of a “strategic 
partnership” in 1996. Yu Bin confirms the end of the relationship’s hierarchical nature 
for the turn of the century at the latest. An era of equality began. This era, however, 
might prove to be short-lived. There is much that unites Moscow and Beijing 
regarding international issues and economic complementarity. Nevertheless, a certain 
degree of friction is bound to result from the dramatic shift in the balance of power in 
the PRC’s favor – accentuated by the financial crisis of 2008.  
                                                        
18 See also FN 9. 
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Certain images19 concerning the other state and people have taken shape on 
both sides of the border, which inform mutual perception20. The image of China in 
large parts of the Russian populace, especially in the RFE, has been that of a weaker 
and culturally inferior country. As this notion becomes ever harder to square with 
reality, the Russian leadership might overreact to certain developments and 
complicate the resolution of upcoming issues. It is China’s image of Russia, though, 
that might prove more consequential. The former has changed over time from that of 
a colonial oppressor to that of the communist “big brother” to that of a traitor to 
Marxism-Leninism, and finally that of an erratic partner in a world of American 
unipolarity21. The Chinese elite’s perception of the RF’s actions is informed by this 
image. The altered relative power of both states within the international system gives 
the PRC certain options as to how to deal with the RF’s reactions to the new reality. It 
is said perception, though, that will determine China’s choice among these policy 
options. Therefore, some deliberations on which historical events shaped the 
underlying image of Russia have been judged expedient.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
19 See FN 2. 
20 See FN 2. 
21 See also: Lo 2008:95-100,147. 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2. Energy Policy and Major Energy Projects from 1991 to 2011 
 
“Energy, perhaps more than any other single factor, has come to symbolize 
the new geopolitics of the twenty-first century. At one level its prominence 
signals a profound change from the traditional reliance on military and 
political power. Yet at the same time it is no less an instrument of competition 
than nuclear weapons or large armies were during the Cold War. The means 
of international influence today are more diverse and sophisticated, but many 
of the goals remain as “old-fashioned“ as ever: national security, the 
projection of power, control over space, and the pursuit of strategic 
superiority or parity“ (Lo 2008:132). 
“Indeed, it is the stalled energy cooperation between Russia and China where 
Russia’s ambivalence about China’s rise and China’s concerns about Russia’s 
fickle international behavior clearly manifest themselves“ (Downs 2010:165). 
 
The history of Sino-Russian relations had to be taken into account before the 
following analysis of energy relations, because the two countries’ “historically 
developed mutual distrust and lack of understanding contributed to commitment fears 
in both countries“ (Downs 2010:146). As for the importance of energy policy for the 
two countries’ current relations, it is noteworthy that the RF’s foreign policy is indeed 
dominated by the energy sector. Regarding China, the preeminence of energy 
diplomacy in the PRC’s broader foreign policy strategy can be seen in the current 
scientific debate in Chinese language journals (Wesner/Braun 2006:1).  
 In this chapter, a factual narration of energy projects shall be provided, 
embedded in underlying policies as well as a description of the changing state of 
energy sectors in the PRC, the RF and CA. While the respective activities of the PRC 
and the RF in the energy sector of CA shall be the focus of this chapter, bilateral 
projects between Moscow and Beijing will be taken into account as well and utilized 
to provide a time frame. Such will be useful for the analysis of ramifications of the 
CA ventures on overall Sino-Russian relations conducted in the fifth chapter.  
 Crucial for phases of varying progress in Sino-Russian energy relations, was 
the level of interest in deepened ties on both sides. The latter leads Downs to discern 
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three phases in bilateral energy relations since 1991: one of Russian overtures in the 
1990s, one of Chinese interest after the turn of the century and one of major 
breakthroughs since the financial crisis of 2008 (Downs 2010:146-147). Yang Wenlan 
almost identically delineates the three phases (Yang 2010:10). Vitaly Kozyrev sets the 
start of the last phase earlier, already during the “color revolutions“ of 2003-2005, 
which in his mind have brought a new dynamic to Sino-Russian energy relations 
(Kozyrev 2008:217-223). Lo Bobo states that what contributed to these phases of 
varying interest, is an “imperfect complementarity“, where energy security22 means 
“security of demand“ for one side and “security of supply“ for the other. Additionally, 
Russia primarily intended to sell gas to China, while the latter was mainly looking for 
oil supply (Lo 2008:133). This leaves to specify which branches of the broadly 
defined energy sector will be included here. As oil and gas are front and center for 
both countries’ energy interests in CA, they will be primarily discussed. Nonetheless 
nuclear and hydro power as well as trade in electricity will also be treated.  
 
2.1. Setting the Stage: The Dissolution of the Soviet Union and the End of 
Chinese Energy Autonomy 
As a background for the following developments, the status quo around the fall of the 
SU has to be commented on. The latter had decided to primarily develop its oil and 
gas fields in Western Siberia, rather than Eastern Siberia, the RFE or the CA 
Republics23. The reason was, at least partly – as for the “East to West“ make-up of the 
SU’s pipeline network – a decision to sell oil and natural gas to Europe almost 
exclusively (Burghart 2010:83). As a result, the CA republics’ energy resources were 
underdeveloped and their transportation network tied them to Moscow when the SU 
was dissolved (Saurbek 2008: 83).  
                                                        
22 See Stulberg 2007:2 for a general definition of energy security. The author defines it as “protection 
against the loss of welfare that may occur as a result of a change in price or availability of a strategic 
resource.“ The price obviously effects the seller as well as the buyer, and the availability of a resource 
effects the price, the buyer’s ability to obtain said resource (or rather the conditions under which it can 
be obtained), and the seller’s ability to market his reserves of said resource (or rather the conditions 
under which it can be marketed).  
23 The notions “the CA republics“ or “the CA states“ will be used in this thesis, for the five “Soviet 
Socialist Republics“ (SSRs) in CA that were part of the SU – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan –, and their independent successor states. 
  24 
 Said resources are considerable and diverse, with the primary products being 
oil for Kazakhstan, gas for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and hydro power for 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan also has relevant oil reserves, and Kazakhstan 
also commands considerable reserves of gas (Bosbotinis 2010:71-72; Pomfret 
2010:1). All five states have sizeable uranium reserves, especially Kazakhstan, which 
holds about 20% of worldwide reserves – putting it second only to Australia 
(Kassenova 2010:222; Schmitz 2008:20).  
 The political turn to the West and Russia’s economic demise resulted in 
Moscow’s general retreat from CA in  the early Yeltsin years. This included a retreat 
from the energy sector. Russian energy demand fell as sharply as its financial means, 
causing a decline in imports from the region as well as Russian investment. This led 
to the entrance of new players, in the form of Western oil and gas companies, but also 
Turkey, Iran and, slowly, the PRC (Hall/Grant 2009:118; Schmitz 2008:6-9).  
Importantly though, up until 1993 the latter was, despite burgeoning demand, 
still self-sufficient in oil and gas (Downs 2010:148; Hall/Grant 2009:124; Kozyrev 
2008:202). China had ended imports of oil and gas in 1963 (Downs 2004:21). Taking 
advantage of the oil crisis in 1973, it even started exporting oil to several Asian 
countries – to Japan until 2004. Oil imports began in 1983, only in 1993 the PRC 
became a net importer of oil products, and in 1996 of crude oil (Zha 2006:179-180). 
Vast coal deposits contributed to very little imports in China’s energy mix (Hall/Grant 
2009:124). In 2000, the PRC was still the largest producer of coal worldwide, with the 
third-largest reserves after the US and Russia, and coal making up 75% of China’s 
energy mix (Andrews-Speed/Vinogradov 2000:384-385; Marciacq 2009:125).24 The 
small hydrocarbon imports to China at the point of the SU’s demise came mostly 
from Southeast Asia (Andrews-Speed/Vinogradov 2000:389). Rapidly declining oil 
and gas production levels in Russia made eventual exports to China improbable at that 
time (Downs 2010:150). Moreover, as a result of the complete lack of trade links 
between the PRC and CA in Soviet times (Bosbotinis 2010:70), China did not import 
whatever hydrocarbons CA was able to export at the time (Khodzhaev 2009:9-12). 
The new republics continued to be completely dependent on Russia as a market or 
transit state (Neff 2006:41-42).                                                         
24 Nonetheless, the PRC became a net coal importer in 2007, because of skyrocketing demand (Herberg 
2009:279). 
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Regarding hydroelectricity, they agreed to keep the Soviet “Central Asian 
Power System“ in place, where Kyrgyz and Tajik hydro power is exchanged for 
Kazakh and Uzbek coal, oil and gas. Only Turkmenistan has left this system and 
started exporting electricity to Iran in 1998 (Peyrouse 2007:133).  
Concerning nuclear energy, the RF inherited a well-developed nuclear sector 
from the SU, but suffered an acute shortage of funds when the latter collapsed (World 
Nuclear Organization 2011b:1). Nevertheless, Russia remained the key external actor 
in CA’s uranium production and nuclear sector. The PRC did not yet have a nuclear 
sector in need for uranium supplies (Marciacq 2009:126). It did, however, reach an 
agreement with Moscow in February 1992 that the latter would be building a uranium 
enrichment plant and a nuclear power plant in China (Wilson 2004:67,78). In CA, 
only Kazakhstan showed strong interest in nuclear energy and had the sole 
operational reactor until it was shut down in 1999 (Kassenova 2010:232,240-241).  
Of electricity in general, all five republics did not export appreciable amounts 
to importers outside CA at this point, as their production levels fell drastically and 
plans for new power stations were scrapped. Even the energy exchanges between the 
five republics fell by more than 50% between 1990 and 2000 (Peyrouse 2007:132). 
For a lack of infrastructure, the PRC did not import any electricity from Russia either 
(Yang 2010:13). 
 
2.2. The 1990s: Russia’s frustrated Eastern Dreams 
2.2.1. Oil and Gas: Buyer’s Market 
The status quo changed in the early 1990s, when China became a net importer of oil 
products in 1993. This was accompanied by a first wave of disappointment with the 
West among Russia’s elite and a desire to develop a “Eurasian”-foreign policy25. 
Moscow thus saw an opening for major energy projects in the East and had the 
political will to realize them. It proved problematic, however, to adequately raise 
production capacities and to offer a competitive price to the Chinese at a time of 
decidedly low oil prices on the world market. Consequently, the latter were not quite 
convinced of these projects’ economic rationale and chose other partners.                                                         
25 See FN 4. 
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 The RF had seen production levels fall to 6.1 million barrels per day (in the 
following: b/d) in 1996, compared to the SU’s 11.5 million b/d in 1987, making it 
harder to back up new export plans (Downs 2010:150). Nevertheless, there were talks 
about an oil pipeline to China since 1994, when cash-starved Russia was turned down 
by Beijing (Yu Yang 2007:34). Premier Zhu Rongji judged the investment not 
feasible at a time of low oil prices – between 1992 and 1998 oil prices stagnated 
between USD 12 and 20 (Pomfret 2010:1). Russian propositions for expanded 
cooperation, followingly met a Beijing determined to extract maximum price 
concessions and to refrain from any costly infrastructure projects, like pipelines 
(Downs 2010:146). The gas deliveries from Kovykta gas field near Irkutsk, which 
were also proposed at this point, could not even have been absorbed by the PRC. At 
this point, gas constituted only a slight portion of China’s energy mix and facilities to 
make use of it did not exist at a considerable scale (Downs 2010:154-155)26.  
 In this period, CA governments found themselves under increasing pressure to 
secure foreign investment in order to increase output in the energy sector and combat 
serious transitional recessions. Their economies shrank between 40-60% and trade in 
1996 was only 10% of 1991 levels (Dittmer 2007:12). One reaction was the adoption 
of rather market-friendly policies, which brought in many (mainly) Western investors 
(Pomfret 2010:1). The conditions of contracts concluded at that time with Western 
energy companies, reflecting the desperate situation on the CA side, were often very 
disadvantageous (Dodonov 2010:14). Still, the CA Republics were not able to harness 
their potential. Turkmenistan’s gas production levels in the 2000s were actually lower 
than in 1990 and Tajikistan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s hydro power potential had yet to be 
realized (Pomfret 2010:3-4; Sheives 2006:216-217). Under these conditions, relevant 
levels of exportation were not feasible. With Russian and CA oil not being 
competitive, the PRC opted to instead import ever larger quantities of oil per ship 
from the Middle East (Andrews-Speed/Vinogradov 2000:389).  
 In 1993, a reorganization of China’s energy sector brought about a sharp 
increase in energy companies’ freedom to manoeuver and political clout. The 
Ministry of Energy was abolished in order to stronger expose this sector to market 
forces (Li 2011:26; Zha 2006:186). At the end of the 1990s, the “National Oil 
Companies“ (in the following: NOCs) were transformed, to be motivated by profits                                                         
26 See also: Marciacq 2009:125. 
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instead of production targets (Downs 2004:37) and more competition was encouraged 
(Hall/Grant 2009:124). The three giants resulting from this development were the 
“China National Petroleum Corporation“ (in the following: CNPC), “China Petroleum 
& Chemical Corporation Limited“ (in the following: Sinopec) and the “China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation“ (in the following: CNOOC). These three rose to 
the bureaucratic rank of a ministry (Lang/Wang 2008:1782; Li 2011:26). These two 
stages of change in the Chinese energy sector thus lead to three giant energy 
companies motivated by profit and catering to an economy with sky-rocketing 
demand. As domestic production could not keep pace, Chinese oil companies began 
going abroad (ie buying concession rights in foreign oil fields). This process began in 
1993, when CNPC purchased the “Talara“-block in Peru (Zha 2006:180). Only in 
1997, though, did China adopt a veritable “going out“-strategy, seeking to secure 
imports (Saurbek 2008:81)27. NOCs, faced with increasingly controlled prices of 
domestic crude oil, had to seek profits abroad, and were granted the right to establish 
subsidiary companies for overseas exploration (Li 2011:26). The Chinese leadership 
now began to push for a diversification of its sources of supply (Hall/Grant 2009:124) 
– then largely situated in the Middle East – and sought pertinent projects with Russia 
and the CA republics.  
 Both the RF and the PRC came to see CA as a region of vital interest (again) 
over the course of the decade (Andrews-Speed/Vinogradov 2000:380, Kozyrev 
2008:205). This included a renewed interest in CA’s energy reserves.28 The Russian 
Premier Primakov said he wanted “to maintain (reclaim) [Russia’s] superordinate 
status in the near abroad“ (Hall/Grant 2009:119). Russian influence in the region 
should be augmented by using existing institutional structures, economic 
interdependence and security cooperation. This shift should lead to a stronger position 
in global politics, and a continued privileged access to CA resources (Hall/Grant 
2009:132). China’s strive for direct access to CA resources thus brought it into 
conflict with the RF’s interest in acting as an intermediary in the sale of those 
resources (Khodzhaev 2009:16).  
                                                        
27 See also: Mayer 2007:57 et seq. 
28 The PRC chose to ignore the enormous potential, yet unproven or hard-to-recover, reserves within its 
borders for the time being and instead focus on securing imports from CA (Dorian et al 1997:469; 
Khodzhaev 2009:14-15). 
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 Resulting from low production levels in CA and a lack of will or funds 
respectively in the PRC and Russia, however, only two larger energy infrastructure 
projects including these countries were started. The “Caspian Pipeline Consortium“ 
(in the following: CPC), with public and private shareholders from several countries, 
began construction on an oil pipeline from the “Tengiz“-oil field in Kazakhstan to the 
Russian port of Novorossiysk, which was opened in 2001 (Pomfret 2001:8). 
Secondly, the state-owned companies KazMunayGas and CNPC agreed in 1997 to – 
in several stages – construct the “Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline”, connecting the oil 
fields around Aktobe at the Caspian Sea with the Chinese border town Alashankou, 
and further with refineries near Urumqi (Dorian et al 1997:467; Kozyrev 2008:216; 
Marciacq 2009:130). This followed an “Agreement on Collaboration in the Oil and 
Gas Sectors“ concluded between the two governments earlier that year (Saurbek 
2008:87-88). CNPC also committed USD 800 million for two oil field development 
projects in Aktobe and Uzen (Andrews-Speed/Vinogradov 2000:389), acquired a 
60.7% stake in the Aktobe field (Ziegler 2008:146) and established a Sino-Kazakh 
JV, “AktobeMunaiGaz“, of which it initially held 60.3%, all in 1997 (Saurbek 
2008:81; Sheives 2006:215).  
 Apart from Sino-Russian involvement, a gas pipeline to Iran, put into 
operation in 1997, made Turkmenistan the first to break the complete infrastructure-
dependence on Russia. The dangers of such dependence were made clear to the 
leadership in Ashgabat earlier that year. During a dispute over prices, Gazprom 
refused to take anymore Turkmen gas from the old “Central Asia-Center“-pipeline (in 
the following: CAC) and caused the Turkmen economy to contract by 25% (Neff 
2006:41-42). Kazakhstan felt the disadvantages of this situation, when the RF refused 
to allow an expansion of the CPC’s capacity before its demand for an increased transit 
tariff was met. CA producers have since grown more weary of Moscow’s monopsony, 
and tried to diversify their customers. At this point though, before the “Kazakhstan-
China Oil Pipeline“ and the CPC pipeline opened, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan sold the overwhelming majority of their oil and gas to other CA 
republics or Russia and all the pipelines in the region were controlled by Russia’s 
state-owned “Transneft“ (Neff 2006:42). 
 Regarding Sino-Russian projects, several feasibility studies were conducted on 
a gas pipeline from the Kovykta field in the late 1990s, but lead to nothing. Large 
costs and a lack of infrastructure still deterred China, which instead opted to import 
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“Liquified Natural Gas“ (in the following: LNG) from Australia and Indonesia. In 
1999, as a reaction to the proposed “Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline”, the Russian 
company “Yukos“ started negotiating with CNPC about oil deliveries and a possible 
oil pipeline from the Siberian city Angarsk to Daqing in Manchuria (Lo 2008:144; 
Marciacq 2009:130; Wilson 2004:86). This project, though, did not progress beyond 
the planning stage either. 
 
2.2.2. Nuclear and Hydro Power: Tentative Beginnings 
In the nuclear sector, the RF – which also revived its domestic construction program 
in the late 1990s (World Nuclear Organization 2011b:1) – was able to make some 
headway in China. In December 1997, plans for the construction of a nuclear power 
plant in Jiangsu province were finalized. The latter project, called “Tianwan“, was at 
the time the biggest JV between the two countries and Russia’s largest international 
nuclear venture (Wilson 2004:79). Lacking the extraction capacity for its large 
uranium reserves, the PRC started to import uranium from Kazakhstan and the RF as 
well. However, China’s first nuclear reactors were completed with the help of French 
and Japanese companies in 1994 (Marciacq 2009:126, FN 324).  
 In Kazakhstan, uranium production facilities were resurrected from 
bankruptcy in 1997. The state-run “Kazatomprom“, the world’s fourth largest 
uranium producing company, came to manage all uranium and nuclear-fuel related 
facilities29. For Uzbekistan the main company in this field was “Navoi Mining and 
Metallurgy Plant“, for Kyrgyzstan it was “Kara Balta Ore Mining Company“, and in 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan reserves were still lying idle (Kassenova 2010:222-229). 
While Russia and China both imported Kazakh uranium, they were not involved on 
site at that time.  
 As for hydro power and electricity trade, Russian companies, to the utter 
consternation of Moscow, failed to win contracts concerning the construction of the 
“Three Gorges Dam“ in China (Wilson 2004:76-77). The Russian state-run “Unified 
Energy System“ (in the following: RAO-UES), though, succeeded in reconnecting the 
electricity networks of the RF and Kazakhstan in June 2000, then proceeding to do the 
same with the other ex-Soviet republics in CA. This enabled Russia to import cheap                                                         
29 See also: World Nuclear Organization 2011d:1. 
  30 
Kyrgyz and Kazakh hydroelectricity for parts of Siberia, while delivering electricity 
to parts of northern Kazakhstan (Peyrouse 2007:134). The PRC developed an interest 
in CA electricity exports as well, as it suffered regular shortages in neighboring 
Xinjiang. This region lacks coal and its rivers are not suitable for feeding power 
stations (Peyrouse 2007:135). Still, the Chinese had a late start in the CA hydro 
energy sector and electricity linkages, and in the 1990s only realized a small volume 
of interaction in this realm. A first agreement to supply electricity in exchange for oil 
was reached with Bishkek in 1995 (Peyrouse 2007:145). 
 
2.3. The 2000s: China’s Patience tested 
2.3.1. Oil and Gas: The Age of Oil 
The balance of power in Sino-Russian energy negotiations was inverted in the 21st 
century, when steeply rising oil prices made the PRC wary of a possible energy 
bottleneck and willing to settle down with its neighbor. The RF on the other hand – 
although President Putin declared oil pipeline construction to China to be a top 
priority in 2000 (Wilson 2004:69) – was now reluctant. Moscow felt that it could 
maximize profits in prolonged negotiations. Additionally, an “intersection of fears 
about China’s rise with the role that energy exports play in Russian foreign policy and 
domestic politics“ (Downs 2010:146) prevented any enthusiasm on the Russian side. 
Lo describes the respective energy diplomacy as one of creating “controllable 
uncertainty“ on the Russian side30 – where China serves as a geopolitical insurance in 
Moscow’s dealings with the West – and one of “strategic patience“ on the Chinese 
side (Lo 2008:138-141).  
 In addition to higher oil prices on the world market, several other factors 
contributed to the advent of a new phase in Sino-Russian energy relations, as well as 
Sino-CA energy relations. First, the PRC tried to reduce the share of coal – of which 
the pertaining industry in China is inefficient, uses outdated equipment and heavily                                                         
30 According to Vitaly Kozyrev, Russia remained ambiguous concerning its projects with China, 
because it was “unable to pursue a coordinated marketing strategy“. Different actors – major oil 
producing companies, the pipeline monopolist Transneft, the central government and competing 
ministries and agencies – had partly contradictory sales strategies. Producers focus on cheaper 
transportation means and transporting companies seek quick capital return, regardless of whereto the 
oil is sold. Only continuous pressure from Beijing led to the actual realization of certain projects 
(Kozyrev 2008: 214,233). 
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impacts the environment – in its energy mix. Second, domestic oil production in 
China could not keep pace with consumption. Third, the refining capacity of facilities 
in China was improved, making it possible to import more types of crude oil for 
refining. Fourth, domestic oil prices increased, as they were pegged to the 
international market (Zha 2006:180). All these factors led to a rapidly rising demand 
for oil imports throughout the 2000s (MacHaffie 2010:373; Marciacq 2009:125). 
 Fifth, although the PRC’s production of natural gas tripled between 1997 and 
2007, imports of natural gas became relevant as well. Not least because of a conscious 
decision to increase the share of natural gas in the energy mix (Downs 2010:148).31 
Sixth, Chinese NOCs had to increasingly engage abroad for profitable business, as 
domestic fuel prices – contrary to those of crude oil – are capped and domestic retail 
losses therefore common (Ziegler 2008:135). Seventh, Beijing became increasingly 
concerned with oil security – defined as “sufficient and normally priced oil supply to 
the world market“ (Zhang 2005-2006:2). As energy self-reliance was not an option, it 
tried to at least diversify both energy mix and supply sources. Continental options 
were prioritized, as land transport was viewed as more secure, and pipeline options 
preferred for their long-term cost effectiveness. Suppliers should be more reliable 
than some in the Middle East and a direct connection to the Chinese market was 
considered an important geopolitical advantage. All that made Russia (Downs 
2010:151; Kozyrev 2008:209; Marciacq 2009:128) as well as CA countries 
(Lang/Wang 2008:1781-1782; Wesner/Braun 2006:6) very interesting suppliers.  
 Eighth, Moscow was empowered around 2000, both by lower input costs for 
energy producers – resulting from the Ruble’s devaluation – and a dramatic rise in 
energy prices (Wilson 2004:84). It strove to utilize its resources for the “maximization 
of national wealth and private profit, recognition of Russia as a reliable energy 
supplier and power projection“ (Marciacq 2009:129)32. Ninth, oil production in 
Russia, which had been falling throughout the 1990s, rose steeply from 6.2 million 
b/d in 1999 to 10 million b/d in 2007, and exports doubled from 3.5 million b/d to 7 
million b/d. Already the largest producer and exporter of natural gas, the RF expanded 
its capacity in this sector as well (Downs 2010:150). Tenth, the new Russian                                                         
31 Although growing significantly, however, natural gas’s share of total primary energy demand still 
only accounted for three percent (Downs 2010:148), and most needs could still be met through 
domestic production at the end of the decade (Marciacq 2009:125). 
32 See also: Lo 2008:135-140. 
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leadership under President Putin was convinced that it needed to diversify away from 
its main customers in Europe, to gain more flexibility in energy trade and profit from 
the expanding Asian markets (Downs 2010:151).  
 
A short excursus on the PRC’s energy sector might be appropriate here, to explain 
why NOCs, which often have the bureaucratic rank of a ministry, are so powerful. 
The lack of any regulatory structure in the energy sector was perceived to be a 
problem in the 2000s. Several agencies were established, restructured and abolished, 
trying to deal with this problem. Erica Downs argues, however, that the energy 
institutions in the PRC themselves, in the form they were created in, are responsible 
for the country’s energy insecurity, because they are understaffed, underfunded, 
politically weak and represent a splintering of authority (Downs 2008:42). Under the 
control of the “National Development and Reform Commission“ (in the following: 
NDRC)33 the “Energy Bureau“ was created in 2003, without much practical authority. 
Then the NPC established the “State Energy Office“ and the “National Energy 
Leading Group“ in 2005. The latter, under the direction of the State Council had 
substantial power, but did not get involved in the day-to-day running of affairs. The 
former, at vice-ministerial level, was outranked by several heads of NOCs and utterly 
powerless (Downs 2008:42; Li 2011:26-27). Later on, the “National Energy 
Administration“ succeeded the “Energy Bureau“, and the “State Energy Commission“ 
succeeded the “National Energy Leading Group“, both in 2008. So far, although the 
reforms have been an improvement, none of the regulatory efforts have broken the 
power of NOCs, whose activism – not the fragmented energy policy-making – often 
drives China’s energy policy (Downs 2008:42-43; Li 2011:27-28)34. Of those energy 
authorities that are in place, the NDRC remains the most important one, as it retains 
power over those prices which are still set by the state. These include diesel fuel, 
gasoline and electricity, while the prices for crude oil and coal are set by the market 
(Downs 2008:44).  
  
                                                        
33  The NDRC is in fact the most important national level energy authority, but is responsible for 
general macroeconomic management, rather than the energy sector specifically (Downs 2008:42). 
34 For China’s energy administration, see also: Herberg 2009:281. 
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2.3.1.1. Sino-Russian Projects 
Two phases can be detected in energy cooperation between China and Russia during 
the Putin administration. One before the resolution of the “East Siberia-Pacific Ocean 
Oil Pipeline“ (in the following: ESPO) issue, and one after it. The first one was 
characterized by mutual mistrust and stalling tactics on the Russian side, the second 
one by cautious progress. 
 Next to diversification of customers, the second pillar of Russia’s new strategy 
was to regain state control over the energy sector (Wilson 2004:85). The Russian 
government became weary of foreign takeovers. Interestingly, it was especially the 
entrance of Chinese state-investors into the Russian upstream energy sector that 
worried the RF’s leadership (Yang 2010:11). CNPC was excluded from the 
“Slavneft“ asset auction in 2002, although it would have offered the best price, 
(Ziegler 2008:142), and its bid to gain a controlling stake in “Stimul Oil“ in 2003 was 
thwarted by the Russian side – led by Gazprom – as well (Marciacq 2009:129, FN 
332,333)35. Gazprom on the other side, was not able to purchase stakes in Chinese 
companies either (Kozyrev 2008:230), but was awarded a share of the “West-East 
Gas Pipeline“-project from Xinjiang to Shanghai in 2001, as part of an international 
consortium (Wilson 2004:86; Yu Yang 2007:34).  
The proposal of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to Daqing, now called 
ESPO, was further developed in the 2000s. Yukos and CNPC struck a deal in 2003. 
This, however, as Yang Wenlan put it (Yang 2010:10), would only be the start of a 
series of “twists and turns“, which seriously distressed the Chinese side. Shortly after 
the 2003-deal, Yukos’ CEO, Mikhail Khodorkovski, was arrested, the company 
dismantled, and a Japanese counter-offer concerning the ESPO project – having the 
pipeline end in Nakhodka at the Russian coast vis-à-vis Japan – became Moscow’s 
favorite36. Japan, however, withdrew its offer in 2005. The PRC improved its package 
and helped Moscow in its takeover of Yukos’ assets by having Chinese banks provide 
Rosneft with loans for its purchase of Yukos’ main asset “Yuganskneftegaz“ (Downs 
2010:157; Kozyrev 2008:219; Ziegler 2008:142). The Russian leadership then 
decided to, in an “integrative“ approach, still build a pipeline branch to the Pacific                                                         
35 See also: Downs 2010:162-163. 
36 For a Chinese outlook on Russian maneuvering between Japan and China in this project, see: Jian 
2009:2. 
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Ocean, but to precede with the branch to China (Lo 2008:144-146; Marciacq 
2009:130-131; Wilson 2004:89; Yang 2010:11). The ESPO pipeline was now to be 
jointly operated by Transneft and CNPC. Construction began in 2006, and China 
provided the loans to finance it (Kozyrev 2008:219).  
The PRC’s acceptance of Moscow’s view of one Asia-Pacific market fit into 
generally ameliorated relations since the “color revolutions“ in 2005/2006 (Kozyrev 
2008:211,216). General progress in energy cooperation ensued. In 2005, Rosneft 
agreed to jointly explore hydrocarbons off Sakhalin’s coast with a subsidiary of 
Sinopec, and in Eastern Siberia with CNPC. In 2006, CNPC successfully acquired the 
Russian “Udmurtneft“ from TNK-BP, sold 51% of it to Rosneft37 and later purchased 
USD 500 million of shares in Rosneft38. China in general supported the RF’s decision 
to renationalize its energy industry, perceiving it to be easier to negotiate with 
Gazprom and Rosneft than a plurality of private companies (Downs 2010:157; 
Kozyrev 2008:215). CNPC and Rosneft also set up a joint stock company for 
cooperation in oil exploration and production in Russia as well as refining and sale in 
China (Wishnick 2007:66). Importantly though, after all these developments the RF 
still only exported 3-5% of its oil to Asia (Blank 2007:98).  
Beijing looked for possibilities to import gas from the RF as well, since it was 
not able to satisfy all needs through domestic production. Large projected costs for 
the proposed gas pipeline from Kovykta field in Siberia39, though, caused the PRC to 
continue importing LNG from other suppliers instead. Although Moscow kept 
lobbying for gas exports from Yakhutia or Sakhalin to China (Wilson 2004:86-87), a 
price for acquiring natural gas from Gazprom has still not been agreed on (Kozyrev 
2008:230)40. 
 
                                                        
37 See also: Yang 2010:11 for the cooperation of CNPC and Rosneft in the Udmurtneft-purchase. 
38 See also: Ziegler 2008:141-142, who notes that these were the largest and second-largest Chinese 
investments in Russia up to that point. Of Rosneft’s shares though, CNPC had wanted USD 3 billion 
and in the end got only half of BP’s and Petronas’ USD 1 billion each. 
39 The project was also held back, by the fact that the private owner of the field, TNK-BP, was not 
allowed to export gas, as Gazprom holds the monopoly on gas export (Downs 2010:152-153). 
40 See also: Downs 2010:156; Ziegler 2009:139: China insists on a price for natural gas which is 
competitive with its low domestic coal prices. Gazprom on the other hand, wants to tie the price of gas 
to that of a basket of crude oil prices, like it does with its European customers. 
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2.3.1.2. The CA arena 
As has been suggested earlier, the need for CA energy and certain geopolitical 
considerations brought about a renewed Russian interest in the region (Schmitz 
2008:6,10-11) 41 . The RF still has the advantage of being institutionally, 
infrastructurally and culturally intertwined with the CA republics (Schmitz 2008:6,26; 
Rumer 2006:4)42. These, however, increasingly look to China as a promising energy 
partner, as they realize that Russia is abusing the control it has over the CA pipeline 
system to extract major short-term concessions on energy prices from them. To 
uphold this control, Russia has been continuously lobbying fiercely against any export 
routes that bypass it (Hall/Grant 2009:122). The RF needs to do that, and control CA 
gas flows, as it faces domestic production short falls and has to keep up the lucrative 
trade with Europe (Rumer 2006:4)43. According to Stephen Blank, control over CA 
oil and gas, which are cheaper to extract than the Russian reserves, provide the RF 
with enough energy rents to sustain its anti-market system. High cost, poor 
infrastructure and a wasteful monopolistic system make hydrocarbon production in 
Russia less efficient and competitive. Were it not for the cheap additional influx from 
CA, Russia couldn’t uphold the subsidized prices for domestic consumption.44 
Furthermore, CA energy could diminish Russian competitiveness on global markets. 
Russia “must [therefore] dominate CA energy and restrict its flow to other customers 
lest its own economy become unhinged“ (Blank 2007:120-121). Finally, economic 
actors with access to public resources were increasingly influencing Russian foreign 
policy in the 2000s, and they intended CA to be the basis for a competitive Russian 
venture onto world markets (Schmitz 2008:14-15).                                                          
41 See also: Buszynski 2005:546. 
42 See also: MacHaffie 2010:374, who lists as soft power elements, the Russian-educated elite, 
omnipresent Russian language, television and media as well as a joint pushback against American pro-
democratic influences, Dittmer 2007:12, who talks about Russian being spoken in government, 
business and schools and being the common language of the different CA peoples, and He/Li 2010:15 
who emphasize the size and importance of Russian minorities in the CA republics. 
43 See also: Hancock 2008:53-54, Nanay 2009:109-110, Neff 2006:42, Olcott 2007:14-15, Rumer 
2006:4, Schmitz 2008:26 and Ziegler 2008:153. 
44 „Central Asian gas, bought at cheap prices may be used to supply Russia’s domestic markets, 
thereby forcing those producers to bear the costs of the domestic subsidy and forego the profits they 
would accrue by selling on the open market. Accordingly, Russia’s drive for monopoly reinforces its 
drive for empire, while both these goals are attainable only at the cost of perpetuating Central Asia’s 
socio-economic backwardness, which most observers believe will sooner or later trigger a massive 
explosion of civil disorder there“ (Blank 2007:124-125). 
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It will now be delt first with Russian projects in and with the CA republics, 
before proceeding to the PRC’s involvement.  
Concerning Kazakhstan, the private CPC pipeline from Western Kazakhstan 
to the Russian port of Novorossijsk on the Black Sea was opened in 2001 (Pomfret 
2010:8). In Uzbekistan, Russia’s Lukoil concluded a USD 1 billion “Production 
Sharing Agreement“ (in the following: PSA) with Uzbekneftegaz in 2004, to jointly 
exploit the Kandym oil field (Buszynski 2005:562-563). The company has since 
secured a 90% share each, in the oil fields Kandym, Khauzak and Shady. In 2005, it 
also joined an international consortium, created for joint exploration of Uzbekistan’s 
oil and gas reserves. The members are Uzbekneftegaz, which holds 50%, “Lukoil 
Overseas“, “Petronas Overseas“ from Malaysia, “Korea National Oil Corporation“ 
and CNPC (Apelt 2008:14). Gazprom, which is still the most important foreign actor 
in Uzbekistan’s energy sector, acquired 44% of a pipeline allowing it to develop and 
transport Uzbek gas in 2004 (Fumagalli 2007:262). It also established a JV with 
Uzbekneftegaz for the construction of a propan-butan-processing facility in Mubarek 
(Apelt 2008:15). In 2007, Uzbekneftegaz concluded a PSA with Russia’s 
“Sojuzneftegaz“ for reserves in the country’s south (Apelt 2008:14). It should be 
noted, that, while security cooperation effectively ceased between 1999 and 2005, 
economic ties between the RF and Uzbekistan always remained strong. Large energy 
companies pursued profits despite strategic changes on both sides, and small and 
medium-sized enterprises, not being a part of strategic foreign policy, had no qualms 
about staying anyhow (Apelt 2008:3-5,8). In 2005, there were 400 Russian JVs in 
Uzbekistan and 267 Uzbek JVs in Russia (Fumagalli 2007:261-262). Regarding 
Turkmenistan, an agreement had been reached in 2003, stating that Turkmen gas 
worth USD 300 million would be delivered to Russia over the following five years 
(Buszynski 2005:563).  
Involving all three CA gas exporters, Gazprom concluded a deal with 
KazMunayGas to increase gas transit through the CAC pipeline from Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan through Kazakhstan to Russia in late 2005 (Blank 2007:118). On the 
summit of Turkmenbashi in 2007, the three countries concluded long-term supply 
contracts with Russia, committing to an expansion of the CAC-pipeline corridor 
(Apelt 2008:13). In May 2007 the Presidents of the RF, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan also agreed to an upgrade of the “Prikaspisky“-gas pipeline, which runs 
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alongside the Caspian Sea from Turkmenistan to Russia, despite ongoing price 
disputes between Moscow and Ashgabat (Ziegler 2008:155-156). 
  
Relations of CA countries with the PRC improved, when the former experienced 
islamist movements within their own borders and ended the small freedoms they had 
granted the Uighur émigré communities earlier on (Sheives 2006:210-212). Economic 
relations intensified rapidly, with the PRC propping up CA’s banking system with 
low-interest loans and exports to the region skyrocketing – even compared to the 
drastically improving bilateral trade with Russia (MacHaffie 2010:374). The troubled 
energy relationship with Russia, led the PRC to develop a stronger interest in 
cooperation with CA (Herberg 2009: 292)45. Beijing realized that its quest for control 
over assets “from wellhead to terminal“ – supposedly providing it with secure long-
term supply, stable in volume and price – was not realizable in Russia, as the latter 
was careful not to let Chinese companies enter its upstream market (Marciacq 
2009:129, FN 335). The Putin administration’s antics regarding the ESPO pipeline, 
then provided another powerful incentive for China to forcefully enter the CA energy 
sector – the rapid finalization of the Sino-Kazakh oil pipeline in 2005 might be 
considered a direct reaction.46 The PRC tried to gain additional continental energy 
sources, but also to play the “Kazakhstan card”/”CA card” in negotiations with the RF 
(Kozyrev 2008:216).47  Nonetheless, China was careful not to antagonize Russia in 
this region, being aware of a lack of enthusiasm on the Russian side, for stronger 
multilateral cooperation involving the economic power that can actually rival it in CA 
(He/Li 2010:16; Schmitz 2008:24). The PRC operated carefully through the SCO-
framework to gradually gain a larger voice, and left security issues in Russia’s 
domain (Khodzhaev 2009:14; Rumer 2006:5; Williams 2009:160). This kind of 
caution by the Chinese leadership is due to an ongoing need for Russia to help 
stabilize the region and push back against US influence (Khodzhaev 2009:16). 
Concerning the oil pipeline with Kazakhstan for example, the Chinese leadership,                                                         
45 See also: Sethuraman / Bierman 2011.  
46 See also: Sheives 2006:215; Karrar, however, holds that it was also fears of a possible disruption of 
oil supply from the Middle East on account of the looming Iraq War, that made the Chinese leadership 
renew efforts to build a pipeline to Kazakhstan (Karrar 2009:172). 
47 Earlier on, the project had been delayed many times, caused in part by major labor disputes (Wilson 
2004:88). 
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professing to be aware of a special relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan, 
sought and reached a three-way-agreement to integrate potentials and have the 
pipeline filled with oil from both countries (Kozyrev 2008:216).  
 With respect to concrete Chinese projects in CA, Kazakhstan certainly ranks 
first in quantity and quality. The Sino-Kazakh oil pipeline – with the route Atyrau-
Kenkiyak-Kumkol-Atasu-Alashankou – has been completed in December 2005 and 
went online in May 2006 (Downs 2010:157)48. Railroad deliveries of Kazakh oil 
increased as well, and in October 2005 CNPC purchased “PetroKazakhstan“, a 
formerly Canadian-owned production company, with assets, eleven oil fields and 
seven exploration blocks (Dittmer 2007:15; Kozyrev 2008:223; Sheives 2006:215-
216). This was the PRC’s largest acquisition of Kazakh assets, the purpose being to 
provide oil for the Sino-Kazakh oil pipeline. CNPC outbid Russia’s Lukoil in the 
process (Ziegler 2008:146-147). CNPC had to give 33% of this company to 
KazMunayGas though (Ziegler 2008:147), and Kazakhstan later passed a law, 
mandating a minimum 50% participation of the state-owned, vertically integrated 
company in every oil and gas venture in Kazakhstan (Neff 2006:46; Pomfret 2010:8; 
Ziegler 2008:160).49 Additionally, CNPC is a shareholder in the production company 
“CNPC AktobeMunaiGaz“, the joint stock company “Munaitas“ and aforementioned 
Sino-Kazakh pipeline with 49% and 51% of the shares respectively, and the PRC has 
acquired a refinery in southern Kazakhstan (Saurbek 2008:84-85, FN 19). Finally, 
CNPC purchased the rights to North Buzachi field at the Caspian Sea (Dittmer 
2007:15; Neff 2006:44; Ziegler 2008:146). On the other hand, Kazakh oil companies 
were invited to participate in Chinese projects in the South China Sea in 2004 
(Saurbek 2008:85-86).  
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan became willing to sell oil and gas directly to the 
PRC in the 2000s, regardless of the Russian position on these dealings (Khodzhaev 
2009:19). Ashgabat’s plan to alleviate its dependence on Russia found a ready 
recipient in the PRC. The latter, partly for commercial reasons, but also to gain 
leverage against the RF, began construction on the “Central Asia-China gas pipeline“ 
– which runs from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China – in                                                         
48 See also: Blank 2007:103 and Dittmer 2007:15. 
49 The PetroKazakhstan-deal has been likened to the Yukos affair, where China had aided Russian 
efforts to push out a private competitor (Pomfret 2010:9). 
  39 
2007. Earlier that year, CNPC had concluded a PSA with the Turkmen state and a 
purchase and sales agreement with “Turkmengas“. The pipeline was built by the 
partners CNPC, KazMunayGas, Uzbekneftegaz and Turkmengas and paid for by the 
Chinese side (Anceschi 2010:101-102; Downs 2010:158-159)50. It is filled with gas 
from all three CA countries, but mainly Turkmenistan (He/Li 2010:131). In order to 
ensure utilization of the pipeline’s full capacity in the future, the PRC has invested 
billions in the development of gas fields in eastern Turkmenistan, among them South 
Yolotan field, which is speculated to be one of the world’s largest (Anceschi 
2010:101; Pirani 2011:173).  
Regarding Uzbekistan, there have been a number of deals between CNPC and 
Uzbekneftegaz since 2004. Two years later, a PSA – which also included Lukoil, 
Petronas and the Korean NOC – was signed for exploration and development of 
natural gas deposits in the Aral Sea (Ziegler 2008:156-157). In 2008, China and 
Uzbekistan set up the JV “AsiaTransGas“ within the framework of the construction of 
the “Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline“ (Khodzhaev 2009:19; Kozyrev 2008:223-224). 
 China too, to be sure, is criticized by some CA scholars, for how it behaves as 
an investor. Compared with the Republic of Korea, observes Ablat Khodzhaev, it 
shows little interest in the development of CA’s domestic economies (Khodzhaev 
2009:24). CNPC has been criticized for discrimination against Kazakh workers 
(Ziegler 2008:149)51. Vitaly Kozyrev notes that, as a possible consequence, Chinese 
control of local equities in Kazakhstan is curbed at a much lower level than Western 
stakes in that economy (Kozyrev 2008:227). Additionally, Chinese NOCs have faced 
some hostility towards their investments by already entrenched international oil 
companies (in the following: IOCs). In 2003, CNOOC and Sinopec were blocked 
from acquiring a stake in the consortium developing Kashagan oil field off 
Kazakhstan’s Caspian coastline by the IOCs in the consortium, which exercised 
preemption rights (Neff 2006:44; Zha 2006:182; Zhang 2005-2006:7). 
 
                                                        
50 See also: Bosbotinis 2010:71 and China National Petroleum Cooperation 2010.  
51 It was alleged, that Kazakh workers were seperated from Chinese ones at the AktobeMunaiGaz JV in 
Aktobe, were provided with housing and food of a lower standard and had a worse safety record 
(Ziegler 2008:149). 
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2.3.2. Nuclear and Hydro Power: Enter China, (Re-)Enter Russia 
Before covering Russian and Chinese activities in CA’s pertaining sectors and 
eventual imports, the overall structure of the RF’s and the PRC’s electricity 
production should be noted. Russia’s electricity sources in 2007 were gas (48%), 
hydro (18%), coal (17%) and nuclear (16%) (World Nuclear Association 2011b:2). In 
2006, China got 80% of its electricity from coal, 15% from hydro power, 2% from oil 
and 1% from gas. This puts China’s nuclear sector, and the need for uranium imports, 
in perspective, despite the rapid development since 2005 and major importance for 
southern coastal regions, which are far removed from coal reserves and regions suited 
for wind energy plants (World Nuclear Association 2011a:1-2).  
 The PRC has, however, developed an appreciable civil nuclear sector in the 
2000s, and relied mostly on French, Canadian and Russian technology for its nuclear 
power plants (World Nuclear Association 2011a:2). The RF’s “Atomstroyexport“ (in 
the following: ASE) was the main contractor for the Tianwan I & II nuclear reactors, 
of which the first was connected to the grid in May 2006 and the second in May 2007 
(World Nuclear Association 2011a:7,14; World Nuclear Association 2011b:24).  
 Russian activity in CA, brought about an agreement with Kazakhstan in May 
2007 to jointly explore and process Kazakh uranium reserves, with the central 
processing plant situated in the Siberian city of Angarsk (Schmitz 2008:20). 
Kazakhstan has, however, realized the ability to establish a whole fuel cycle inside the 
country through a JV with Canada’s “Cameco“ called “Ulba Conversion LLP“52. 
Only uranium enrichment is still carried out in Russia exclusively – with sensitive 
technology unavailable to Kazakhstan. The pertinent facility in Angarsk has been run 
by a JV between Kazatomprom and the Russian “Tekhsnabexport“ since 2006 
(Kassenova 2010:223-224). Another Kazakh-Russian JV, “Akbastau“, was 
established to develop Budyonnovskoe uranium field. A Kazakh-Kyrgyz-Russian 
trilateral JV was created to develop uranium mines in Kazakhstan as well (Kassenova 
2010:225). Kazakhstan, the only country in CA to have an operational nuclear reactor 
until 1999, is planning to have a new one online in 2015. Russia’s “Rosatom“ and 
Kazatomprom agreed in 2008 to set up the JV “Atomnye Stantscii“, which will 
                                                        
52 See also: World Nuclear Association 2011d:14. 
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construct the reactor in Aktau beginning in 2012 (Kassenova 2010:232)53. Until then, 
all uranium is still exported, with Russia being the main customer (World Nuclear 
Association 2011d:14).  
 Nevertheless, Kazakhstan has also signed two strategic cooperation 
agreements with “China National Nuclear Cooperation“ (in the following: CNNC) in 
September 2007 and October 2008. Kazatomprom has entered into a strategic 
partnership with “China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group“  (in the following: 
CGNPG) in 2006, and has since become its central supplier of uranium and nuclear 
fuel. Late in 2007 Kazatomprom signed an agreement with both CGNPG and CNNC 
for them to take a 49% stake in two uranium mine JVs and purchase 2000 tons of 
uranium per year from them (World Nuclear Association 2011d:2-3; World Nuclear 
Association 2011a 2011:35).  
 In Uzbekistan, local Navoi Mining and Metallurgy Plant has set up a JV with 
the RF’s Techsnabexport for geological exploration in 2006 – but the Russian side 
withdrew from the project in 2010 (World Nuclear Association 2011c:3).  
 Regarding Kyrgyzstan, the Russian investment group “Renova“ purchased a 
72% stake in the state-owned “Kara Balta Ore Mining Company“ in 2007 (World 
Nuclear Association 2011c:1).  
With respect to hydro power and electricity trade, the PRC started importing 
rather small amounts of hydroelectricity from Russia in 2004 – the receiving province 
was Heilongjiang (Overland/Braekhus 2009:208).  
In Kazakhstan electricity production is now mainly in private hands, while 
distribution is controlled by the public “Kazakhstan Electric Grid Company“. 
Kazakhstan wants to be a transit country for Kyrgyz and Tajik hydroelectricity 
exports to Russia. It has also agreed to build a coal-powered electrical power station 
near Ekibastuz, financed by the PRC, whose production will be exclusively destined 
for China (Peyrouse 2007:136-137). In 2005, the two countries agreed to construct a 
hydroelectric station in the border town of Khorgos, the electricity of which is to be 
shared equally. The National Development Bank of China is also providing financing 
for a hydroelectric station in Moinak, Kazakhstan (Peyrouse 2007:138-139). 
 Tajikistan’s electricity is controlled by state-run “Barki Tojik“. Russia’s RAO-
UES is running Sangtuda-I hydroelectric station and, conjointly with Barki Tojik,                                                         
53 See also: World Nuclear Association 2011b:22; for the JVs between Kazakhstan and the RF see also: 
World Nuclear Association 2011d:1-2. 
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Rogun-I hydroelectric station. The operation of Rogun-II was awarded to the Russian 
Company “RusAl“ in 2004, but the latter left the project in disagreement later on 
(Peyrouse 140-141). A project for a hydroelectric station in Penjikent region has been 
awarded to “Sinohydro Corporation“ in 2005, and a loan from China will finance it. 
Additionally, Barki Tojik and “Chinese Theban Electric Apparatus Stock Company“ 
agreed in 2006 to construct two electrical lines connecting north and south Tajikistan. 
The project will be mostly financed by China’s “Exim Bank“ (Peyrouse 2007:142-
143), and will allow the country to start exporting electricity to Kyrgyzstan and 
Afghanistan (Ibraimov 2009:51).  
Both production and distribution of electricity have been privatized in 
Kyrgyzstan, only regulation is still managed by state-run “KyrgyzEnergo“ (Peyrouse 
2007:144). Until the financial crisis of 2008, the country was still exporting mainly to 
Kazakhstan and the RF. In 2004 and 2006, though, significant future exports to China 
have been agreed upon by the governments in Bishkek and Beijing – they depended, 
however, on the construction of new power lines. The PRC has also proposed in 2004, 
to co-finance two hydroelectric stations at the Naryn river with RAO-UES and RusAl, 
and negotiations got started on Chinese financing for stations at three cross-border 
rivers (Peyrouse 2007:144-146). 
 
2.4. The Financial Crisis and Current Developments: Sudden Solutions 
2.4.1. Oil and Gas: The Breakthrough 
Another shift in leverage occurred in Sino-Russian energy cooperation in 2008, when 
Russia was hit hard by the unfolding financial and economic crisis. The RF had to use 
up to a third of the foreign reserve fund it had set up in the 2000s within nine months 
(Burghart 2010:91-92,94). Oil prices were brought down significantly, as demand 
plummeted. The RF’s excessive dependence on oil and gas export, now resulted in 
drastically reduced revenues, huge deficits, capital flight and investment shortages in 
energy companies (Liu 2010:30,35; Yang 2010:10). This propelled the Russian 
leadership to actively get cooperation – which is now noticeably more efficient – with 
Beijing going, to seek loans and investment from China and its companies (Liu 
2010:35-36).  
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 After a period of long hesitance while energy prices skyrocketed, the RF 
consequently changed its conduct regarding oil and gas pipeline projects to China – 
Yang Wenlan calls the financial crisis a veritable “turning point“ for Sino-Russian 
energy relations (Yang 2010:11) –, propelling them forward in exchange for long-
term development loans of up to USD 1.6 billion (Burghart 2010:94). At this point, 
Beijing could achieve a final agreement regarding the ESPO pipeline, which 
subsequently commenced operation on January 1, 2011 (Helmer 2011). The 
agreement stated that “China [would lend] cash-strapped Russian energy companies 
US$ 25 billion in exchange for the completion of [...] [the] pipeline to China and a 20-
year oil supply contract“ (Downs 2010:147).54 CNPC agreed to pay for the pipeline 
branch from Skovorodino to the Chinese border (Downs 2010:157), and the RF was 
permitted to at least partly pay back loans with oil deliveries (Yang 2010:11). Chinese 
companies were now permitted to enter the Russian upstream sector more forcefully 
and Russian companies made inroads in the Chinese downstream sector. Rosneft and 
Sinopec established a JV to run a refinery and several gas stations in Tianjin (Yang 
2010:11-12). Gas pricing, however, is still an element of uncertainty, and there has 
been no tangible progress regarding gas trade (Yang 2010:12). Admittedly, the 
purchase of the rights for the Kovykta gas field by Gazprom on March 1, 2011 
removes an important obstacle for that project, as the Russian state had hindered any 
progress as long as the field was in private hands (RIA Novosti 2011). In a somewhat 
contrary development, however, Russia is now more likely to bind evermore 
requirements to its supply of oil and gas, namely a commitment to nuclear 
cooperation (Liu 2010:35; Yu 2007:76-77). 
Concerning Russian activity in CA, Gazprom agreed in 2008 to bring gas 
payments to CA countries up to world price levels by 2009 (Ziegler 2009:139; 
Perovic/Orttung 2009:138). On the other hand, Moscow withdrew subsidies at this 
point and began to demand market prices from all CIS countries as well (Burghart 
2010:92). Another gas crisis with Turkmenistan erupted in April 2009, though, when 
a branch of the CAC pipeline exploded and the leadership in Ashgabat accused 
Gazprom of sabotage to gain leverage in price negotiations. Gas traffic was reduced                                                         
54 “China Development Bank“ provided Rosneft with a USD 15 billion and Transneft with a USD 10 
billion loan, enabling them to pay back debts and make large-scale investments. In return Transneft 
approved the construction of the long-awaited spur from ESPO to China, and Rosneft agreed to supply 
CNPC with crude oil at a rate of 300.000 b/d for twenty years to fill this branch of the pipeline (Downs 
2010:157). 
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by 90%, the dispute went on for nine months and Turkmenistan again suffered a 25% 
loss in GDP. A deal was reached eventually in December 2009, wherein Gazprom 
agreed to a price close to what it gets from its European customers, and normal gas 
traffic resumed in January 2010. Renewed political support for Turkmenistan 
subsequently brought about a normalization of relations (Anceschi 2010:100-101), 
and a new agreement was signed, allotting the marketing of Turkmen gas to 
Turkmenistan’s state-run “Energy Trading Company“ and Gazprom exclusively 
(He/Li 2010:131).  
As China weathered the financial crisis remarkably unscathed, the balance of 
power in energy negotiations with CA countries changed like it did with the RF. The 
PRC dispensed massive investments, loans and development assistance programs and 
drastically increased its overall influence (Pirani 2011:173). In return for the 
provision of USD 13 billion in loans and credits by the Chinese government, its 
Kazakh counterpart allowed CNPC to increase its interests in Kazakhstan 
significantly in 2009 – despite Astana’s goal of retaking control of the country’s 
energy sector. The Chinese oil giant purchased oil producer “MangistauMunaiGaz“ in 
a joint deal with KazMunayGas – the Kazakh company then holding 51%. “China 
Investment Corp.“ acquired 11% of “KazMunayGas Exploration and Production 
company“ that same year (Pomfret 2010:9). In June 2010 the PRC already held a 50-
100% stake in 15 Kazakh energy companies – CNPC subsidiaries alone accounted for 
a fifth of Kazakh oil production (Pirani 2011:172) –, and out of 80 million tons of 
crude oil produced in Kazakhstan in 2010, 26 million went to the PRC. This was due, 
not least to the expansion of the partly CNPC-owned “Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline” 
by 762km in 2009. The connection from the Caspian Sea to Xinjiang was thereby 
concluded (Pomfret 2010:9-10) and the pipeline’s capacity doubled (Pirani 
2011:172). China also succeeded in opening line A of the “Central Asia-China gas 
pipeline” from Turkmenistan to the PRC in December 2009 (Pomfret 2010:10), with a 
daily transport capacity of 40 million cubic meters. Line B is to become operational 
until the end of 2011, when the pipeline’s full potential is intended to be reached 
(He/Li 2010:131). This is the first gas pipeline to connect the region to a non-CA 
country for a decade, and the biggest effort ever without using Russian routes 
(Anceschi 2010:101-102). To realize the project, the PRC granted a USD 4 billion 
loan to Turkmenistan for pipeline construction and a USD 3 billion loan for the 
development of South Yolotan gas field (Anceschi 2010:102; Burghart 2010:95). 
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Turkmenistan could use its simultaneous negotiations with Russia, the EU – trying to 
get Turkmen gas for the South Stream and Nabucco projects respectively – and China 
to play off its customers and maximize the price for its gas (Burghart 2010:95). 
 
2.4.2. Nuclear and Hydro Power: Awakening 
With respect to nuclear power – though not hydro energy –, several important 
developments have unfolded since 2008. In 2010, China already had 16 nuclear 
power reactors in operation and 7 under construction, with 54 additional ones in 
planning. Although it strove to become able to fabricate its own nuclear fuel 
assemblies, plants and equipment and to be self-reliant in design and project 
management, the PRC continued to work with international partners (World Nuclear 
Association 2011a:4).  
 As to Sino-Russian projects, a deal was struck in September 2010 between 
“Jiangsu Nuclear Power Corporation“ and ASE, providing for Russian design and 
30% of nuclear plants and equipment at Tianwan III & IV reactors. The NDRC 
approved the deal in January 2011, and construction is to start in late 2012. Already in 
October 2009, ASE was awarded the project to build a fast neutron reactor in 
Sanming city, with construction scheduled to start in 2013 (World Nuclear 
Association 2011a:23-24,44-45). However, when China called for competitive bids 
for four large third-generation reactors to be built at Sanmen and Yangjiang, ASE 
unsuccessfully bid its AES-92 power plant for these.  
 The RF made some progress in CA as well. Despite disagreements in 2009 
and 2010, the Russian ASE is likely to build the first of a series of small reactors in 
Kazakhstan (World Nuclear Association 2011b:24), the leading uranium producer in 
2009 (World Nuclear Association 2011d:1). In March 2011, the two governments 
signed stage II of their integrated cooperation program, started in 2006, and 
Kazatomprom is intent on purchasing a share of Russia's Novo 
Uralsk enrichment plant in 2011 (World Nuclear Association 2011d:2).  
 The PRC also made further inroads in Kazakhstan. CGNPG has entered into a 
JV with Kazatomprom in 2009, for the construction of nuclear power plants in China 
and the supply of 24.000 tons of uranium from Kazakhstan by 2020 (Bosbotinis 
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2010:71-72).55 A subsidiary of said Chinese company, “Sino-Kazakhstan Uranium 
Resources Investment Co“, is to invest in two Kazakh uranium mines, Irkol and 
Semizbai, through the “Semizbai-U LLP“ JV. 20% of Kazakh uranium output now 
goes to China, with the possibility of this increasing with demand, as production 
heads for 25,000 tons of uranium per year. In February 2011, CNNC signed a contract 
to buy 25,000 tons of uranium (World Nuclear Association 2011d:2-3).  
 China has concluded several agreements on joint uranium production with 
Turkmenistan, but no concrete progress has been made (Pomfret 2010:10). 
 Uzbekistan’s “Navoi Mining and Metallurgy Plant“ announced a tender for 
seven new uranium deposits in 2009, with the bidding process open to any 
international company (Kassenova 2010:229). China has subsequently initiated the JV 
“UZ-China Uran“ between Uzbekistan’s “Goskomgeology“ and the “Guangdong 
Nuclear Uranium Corporation“, with a license to explore deposits in the Navoi region 
(Kassenova 2010:230-232), and a view to commencing production in 2014 (World 
Nuclear Association 2011c:3).  
 In Tajikistan, a ban of foreign investment into the uranium industry has been 
revoked, and Chinese companies are currently exploring reserves (Kassenova 
2010:227).  
 Finally, the Australian “Monaro Mining NL“ reported that it had sold a 75% 
interest in its Kyrgyz uranium mining project to “Gate Bridge Co. Ltd.“, based in 
Hong Kong and owned by a consortium of HK and Chinese investors, in late 2009 
(World Nuclear Association 2011c:1).  
 
These developments show the reach of Chinese investors and the Chinese state to 
have grown substantially since the financial crisis, as well as the balance of power in 
Sino-Russian and Sino-CA energy relations tilting very much in Beijing’s favor. 
 Manifold energy projects between the PRC and the RF had been discussed 
since the 1990s. At first, the Chinese leadership had been reluctant to commit to 
necessary investments for pipeline construction, because it could get cheap oil on the 
world market and natural gas did not play a relevant role in its energy strategy. In a 
second stage, Moscow became hesitant to agree to Chinese proposals, believing it                                                         
55 The agreement on nuclear power plant construction followed a decision by the Kazakh government, 
to put plans to jointly market small and medium-size reactors with Russia’s ASE on hold (World 
Nuclear Association 2011d:3). 
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should make the most of its “trump card” energy, when prices were high and Russia 
and its companies flush with money. Since 2008, however, the situation has changed 
markedly in Russia. Awareness of a need for massive investments in the energy sector 
rose suddenly and the Russian economy’s weaknesses were revealed. Whereas China 
continued to favor energy imports from Russia, not least for reasons of energy 
security, the Russian leadership became convinced as well that progress on this front 
was the path to alleviate its problems. Hence, for the first time both countries are 
interested in strengthened energy cooperation. This has brought about a breakthrough 
in several projects. Most notably, the ESPO pipeline commenced operation. 
 While Russia continued to uphold a very prominent position in CA energy 
trade, its dominance has been considerably weakened by China’s entrance. Although 
several projects have been negotiated on since the late 1990s, the PRC only made real 
progress in CA when it became clear that Russia would be a difficult partner. The 
latter used its dominant position in CA in a way that made CA exporters more 
receptive to other partners. It also proved a hostile environment for Chinese energy 
companies and unwilling to finalize pipeline plans in the 2000s. This prompted China 
to double its efforts for major pipeline projects from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
and push for cooperation in the nuclear and hydro power sectors and it made CA 
agree to Chinese proposals despite Russian opposition. The financial and economic 
crisis then facilitated this overall increase in Chinese involvement in CA.  
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3. State of Research: Sino-Russian Relations Research post-1991 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of the state of (Western) research 
on Sino-Russian relations since the demise of the SU. Monographies, anthologies, 
journal articles and available master and doctoral theses will be taken into account. As 
our purpose here is to determine what has been worked out so far on Chinese and 
Russian CA energy policies’ influence on Sino-Russian relations, it is appropriate to 
additionally include studies of Chinese or Russian relations with CA.  
The first sub-chapter outlines whereupon studies on modern Sino-Russian 
relations generally focus and what the scholarly debate is thus centered on. The next 
sub-chapter examines the importance attached to energy when dealing with economic 
relations, as well as on which aspects studies zeroed in and what competing 
conclusions have been drawn. Hereafter, the prominence of CA among regional 
theatres that are considered will be discerned. 
 It becomes clear that the impact of Chinese and Russian energy policy 
regarding CA on the Sino-Russian bilateral relationship, especially the Chinese view 
on this issue, can still be considered a research gap. Consequently, this is what I 
intend to contribute to the field.  
 
According to Yu Bin (Yu 2007:49 et seq), studies of post-Soviet Sino-Russian 
relations – in general not yet exhaustively dissected – can be loosely grouped into 
three schools: “limitationists“, “alarmists“ and “identity literature“. The “limitationist 
school“ (eg Anderson 1997, Downs 2010, Garnett 2000, Hancock 2008, Herberg 
2009, Lo 2008, Lotspeich 2010, Overland/Braekhus 2009, Tsai 2003, Williams 2009, 
Wilson 2004, Wishnick 2001), which can be considered the “mainstream“ in current 
Sino-Russian relations research (Yu 2007:53), accentuates the differences and 
problematic tendencies in this relationship. It perceives a high risk of friction which is 
only going to grow. A long history of mistrust and hostility, important cultural and 
political differences and a growing gap in aggregate power (in China’s favor) are said 
to render an alliance or even a “real strategic partnership“ highly unlikely. A less 
confrontational behavior on the Russian side is ascribed to the latter’s weakness, and 
successes like a burgeoning arms trade are dismissed as a “marriage of convenience“ 
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– as higher quality goods from the West are not available due to the arms embargo 
against the PRC.  
The “alarmist school“ on the other hand (eg Donaldson/Donaldson 2003, 
Gill/Oresman 2003, Karrar 2009, Menges 2005, Ziegler 2010) – which Yu considers 
connected to the related themes of the “China threat“ and “Russia bashing“ in 
Western literature – expects a rather smooth development of Sino-Russian relations 
into a veritable (security) alliance. The latter, already seen to gradually emerge from 
sustained levels of arms transfers, is expected to alter the regional distribution of 
power and to turn against US-led alliances. Both these schools are thus mainly 
motivated by, formulate their hypotheses in the realm of and dwell on political and 
security aspects of the relationship.  
Lastly, proponents of “identity literature“ (eg Marciacq 2009, Pei 1994, 
Rozman 1992) emphasize the importance of changing socio-politico-economic 
identities in both countries, often comparing the reform processes of the two erstwhile 
communist systems. Ideational attributes are generally considered to have changed 
massively. The conclusions that are drawn, however, are markedly different. Some 
focus on the huge difference in politico-economic systems due to the end of the SU in 
the early 1990s, others on similarities that have developed, especially on foreign 
policy issues, in the 2000s (eg Marciacq 2009). Consequently, this third school’s 
focus is on the structure of the two states’ polity and economy and the impact of 
ideational convergence.  
 Yu Bin himself does not endorse any of these schools. He notes their 
respective deficiencies in explaining the recent period of relatively stable and normal 
bilateral relations and assembles arguments for the implausibility of an anti-US Sino-
Russian security alliance. Yu and some other scholars will thus be designated here as 
a separate and new “school of normalcy“ (eg Bellacqua 2010, Bosbotinis 2010, Yu 
Bin 2007), that views the Sino-Russian one as “a pragmatic relationship that is based 
on shared common interests, but is not without its fault lines“ (Bellacqua 2010:8). 
 
All studies usually do deliberate on economic and energy issues, though they place a 
clear second to political relations (eg “strategic partnership“, SCO, cooperation on the 
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international stage).56 While CA is a focus, it is slow to emerge from East Asia’s 
shadow as the theatre considered most important for the Sino-Russian relationship. 
When dealing with energy relations, most authors prioritize bilateral projects (eg 
ESPO-pipeline), over those involving CA exporters. Nonetheless, several scholars (eg 
Apelt, Dittmer, Garnett, Hancock, Khodzhaev, Laruelle, Lo, Olcott, Rumer, Schmitz, 
Sheives, Ziegler) have already discussed the importance of energy relations with CA 
countries for future relations between Moscow and Beijing. Although opinions vary, a 
general trend seems to show perceptions move from positive – the RF helping China 
to enter the region in the 1990s and then profiting from cooperation in numerous 
projects and against the US – to negative – Moscow fears losing dominance and 
Beijing, with ever rising demand as well as relative strength, respects the Russian 
intermediary less and less (cf “limitationist school“). Said scholars, however, 
oftentimes do not deal with this issue primarily or even exclusively. Furthermore, 
they reach their conclusions through analyzing the work of other Western or 
sometimes Russian scholars, together with their own deliberations. They do not, 
however, use Chinese language sources. The only exception so far, among English 
language publications, seems to be a study on Sino-CA relations by the Uzbek scholar 
Ablat Khodzhaev. 
 
3.1. Sino-Russian Relations: Politics over Economy 
Economic relations mostly play a less central role than political and security relations. 
This is surely due to the fact, that the former have been considered the “weakest link” 
(Wilson 2004) of the relationship. Some studies focus mainly on the nature and future 
of the proclaimed “strategic partnership” (eg Bellacqua 2010, Garnett 2000, Lo 2008, 
Wilson 2004), the problems China’s rise will cause for it (cf “limitationist school”), 
and the possibility of a threat to the West arising from a hypothetical security alliance 
(cf “alarmist school”). These studies are mainly rooted in realist thought.57 Others, 
who mostly draw on constructivist IRT, emphasize and compare changes in the two 
                                                        
56 Richard Lotspeich (2010:83) notes in an article from 2010 that prior research on Sino-Russian 
economic relations since 1991 has been rather scarce. 
57 See Chapters 4.1. and 4.2. 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countries’ political and economic structure, evaluating the degree of ideational 
convergence (cf “identity literature”).  
Nevertheless, there is also a number of scholars who primarily analyze the 
impact and significance of economic interaction (eg Bosbotinis 2010, Yu 2007). In 
line with Yu’s framework, scholars of the first group are usually “limitationists” or 
“alarmists”, what the second group produces is “identity literature”, and the last group 
consists mainly of proponents of what I term the “school of normalcy”. 
 
Lo Bobo (Lo 2008), a key proponent of the “limitationist school” (Yu 2007:49), 
questions the actuality of the “strategic partnership”. Lo’s main hypothesis is that the 
two countries actually form an “axis of convenience” that is neither strong nor stable 
and very much dependent on the US as an opposite pole. Weak economic interaction 
is only one among many arguments for this evaluation. Lo foresees rising tension 
between Moscow and Beijing as the latter continues to rise and the US retreats from 
CA. Demographic issues in the RFE, trade imbalances and, importantly, influence in 
the CA energy sector are listed as possible flash points. Overall, an asymmetric 
relationship to Russia’s detriment is expected to emerge and cause tension. This 
conviction is shared by Jeanne Wilson (Wilson 2004), who deals with motivations 
behind both sides’ attempt to create a pragmatic and positive relationship as well as 
past and future hindrances. Wilson considers such a relationship to have indeed been 
reached in the 1990s, though mostly due to Russia’s weakness. In the new century, 
however, a decisive shift in aggregate power and Russia’s vulnerability in the RFE 
are anticipated to lead to severe strains on bilateral relations.  
Among members of the “alarmist school“, Charles E. Ziegler is a prominent 
example. He delves mostly into political and security issues (Ziegler 2010) and 
intends to interpret implications for the US government. Ziegler perceives harmonious 
unity in this realm, but does, as many others, remind his readers of economic 
interactions and energy as a possible sore point. Hasan Karrar, a moderate proponent 
of the “alarmist school“, assigns primary significance to the developments concerning 
multilateralism (ie the SCO) and regional security. In his assessment, the early 1990s 
saw the RF facilitating China’s entry into the region and “China’s regional 
engagement [beginning] with a display of sensitivity towards lingering Russian 
interests [...] [,] an important confidence-building measure between the two countries“ 
(Karrar 2009:53). The PRC is said to have been careful not to exploit Russian 
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weakness, and the RF to have reciprocated the favor and helped the Chinese along 
through cooperation in several projects (Karrar 2009:52-53). Whereas a more 
assertive Chinese engagement is confirmed since the late 1990s, it is framed rather in 
the context of competition between the PRC and the RF on one side and Western 
powers (ie the US) on the other.  
An example for the “identity literature school”, Florent Marciacq selects three 
indicators for the validation of his assertion that a rapprochement between Moscow 
and Beijing is indeed going on: Sino-Russian convergence in polity and economic 
structure, Sino-Russian ideational convergence in international politics and Sino-
Russian economic interdependence and mutuality of interests. Marciacq uses a social 
constructivist research approach to seek out motives for cooperation. Growing 
economic interaction has a role to play, as “an important sign of growing horizontal 
density in collective identity formation“ (Marciacq 2009:133). It is the latter, 
however, traced back mainly to changes in the Russian and Chinese economic 
systems and foreign policy orientation as well as the Russian state’s political 
structure, that is this study’s focus. Economic interactions are thus not analyzed for 
their possible consequences, but rather as consequences of collective identity 
formation. The latter, Marciacq concludes, has receded in the early 1990s, but 
subsequently – especially under the Putin administration – advanced markedly and 
can therefore explain a rather smooth development of the relationship in this period, 
which the author expects to go on.  
In his article “In the Search for a Normal Relationship: China and Russia Into 
the 21st Century”, Yu Bin himself – not assignable to one of his own three categories 
– chooses multilateral cooperation through the SCO, economic and military relations 
as the three aspects of the Sino-Russian relationship, which shall serve to confirm his 
hypothesis of an essentially normal bilateral relationship (Yu 2007:69-79). Contrary 
to others, he does give ample room to economic relations (Yu 2007:72-77). Defying 
the mainstream argument of them being the “weakest link” between Moscow and 
Beijing, Yu stresses that there are tangible interests now instead of politicized trade 
(Yu 2007:73). A normal economic relationship with both cooperative and competitive 
elements is said to have been reached (Yu 2007:77). Although he does not expect 
relations to evolve along a linear path, somewhat of a “routine” has set in, in what Yu 
calls the most equal and “normal” state of Sino-Russian relations ever (Yu 2007:58). 
James Bosbotinis can be assigned to this new “school of normalcy”. In his study, 
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economic interests play a pivotal role as well. In assessing CA’s role in Chinese grand 
strategy, he considers Beijing to be seeking access to strategic raw materials and to 
both contain Russian and exclude Western influence in this region. All this is 
supposed to stabilize China’s rear to let it concentrate on the Asia-Pacific (Bosbotinis 
2010:67-68). Chinese economic interests in Cam however, lead to a need for positive 
Sino-Russian relations. Though the PRC already created a sphere of influence in CA 
independent from the RF (Bosbotinis 2010:70), which is much weaker economically, 
it remains vulnerable to a deterioration in Sino-Russian relations (Bosbotinis 
2010:69,79). Without stable relations with the RF, the PRC’s CA energy supply 
sources would not be secure, and a conflict in CA might constrain Chinese 
operational freedom elsewhere (Bosbotinis 2010:69,77). The paper finishes by 
arguing that both the cost of conflict for Beijing and the commonality of interests 
make “a shift from cooperation to pronounced competition […] unlikely. The current 
dynamic of dual cooperative and competitive relations is thus likely to continue“ 
(Bosbotinis 2010:79).  
 
3.2. Economic Interaction: Energy above all and ESPO over CA 
In discussions of Sino-Russian economic interactions energy has generally been very 
central (eg Bellacqua 2010, Lo 2008, Lotspeich 2010, Marciacq 2009, Wilson 2004, 
Yu 2007), as it is considered “the most promising avenue in economic relations” 
(Wilson 2004:82). “Limitationists” generally have a more negative view of the status 
quo and future prospects while some proponents of the other schools provide counter-
arguments. Several authors address energy relations exclusively (eg Downs 2010, 
Hall/Grant 2009). Only arms deals reach somewhat similar prominence (eg Bellacqua 
2010, Lotspeich 2010, Wilson 2004, Yu 2007). The former, as well as other aspects of 
economic relations, however, shall be excluded in the following to focus exclusively 
on energy matters. In order to gain a more detailed picture, studies on Russian and 
Chinese energy diplomacy and energy relations with CA as well as the Eurasian 
theatre of global energy competition shall be included. 
Economic interaction, as has been noted in the previous sub-chapter, has been 
widely considered the weakest link in Sino-Russian relations. Within this context, 
energy cooperation seems to be most likely to deliver meaningful progress, with a 
huge unrealized potential for cooperation (Lotspeich 2010). Erica Downs, who 
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delineates three phases of Sino-Russian energy relations58, lists several important 
“forces of convergence” (Downs 2010:147 et seq), which can also be found in other 
scholars’ argumentation. Foremost among them, a striking complementarity (ie the 
RF produces and the PRC needs huge amounts of oil and gas) (eg Downs 2010, 
Herberg 2009, Lo 2008, Poussenkova 2009), the wish to diversify (either import or 
export partners) on both sides (eg Downs 2010, Lotspeich 2010) and the geographical 
proximity (ie no third-country transit is necessary) (eg Downs 2010). Another factor 
pushing the two countries together is the focus of the Chinese leadership on energy 
security, which is thought to necessitate more overland import, possibly without third-
country transit (eg Downs 2010, Herberg 2009, Lotspeich 2010). Such a situation has 
persisted for years and tangible progress has been made, raising oil exports from 
Russia to China from 1.000 b/d in 1995 to about 300.000 b/d in 2007 (Downs 
2010:147). This number had fallen during the economic crisis, but through the 
opening of the ESPO pipeline in 2011 has again been reached – overall China imports 
15 million tons of oil per year from the RF. The second line of said pipeline, to 
commence operation in late 2012, is supposed to eventually double that number 
(Transneft 2012). 
However, several important “forces of divergence” have hindered greater 
strides toward more intensified cooperation (eg Downs 2010:154 et seq). Among 
them feature prominently, a lack of critical infrastructure (eg Downs 2010, 
Poussenkova 2009) – before the opening of the ESPO pipeline, deliveries were made 
primarily by rail – and varying interest on both sides partly due to fluctuating oil 
prices (eg Downs 2010). Russia’s volatile energy diplomacy (eg Downs 2010, 
Herberg 2009, Lo 2008, Overland/Braekhus 2009, Poussenkova 2009, Yu 2007) and 
Russian corporate infighting (eg Downs 2010, Poussenkova 2009) also slowed down 
joint projects. The RF had problems to raise production output and its energy sector 
suffered from a lack of investment (eg Downs 2010, Poussenkova 2009). 
Furthermore, energy trade has so far been narrow and overly focused on oil (eg 
Lotspeich 2010). Finally, a lack of mutual trust and understanding and certain 
commitment fears proved stumbling blocks (eg Downs 2010, Lo 2008, Poussenkova 
2009, Yu 2007). The RF perceives Beijing to be using its position to extract 
unreasonable price concessions and is therefore striving to diversify its customers (Lo                                                         
58 See Chapter 2, page 28. 
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2008:49). It is also ambivalent towards cooperation in the energy sector as it fears 
becoming a mere raw materials supplier (Wilson 2004:61-77; Yu 2007:72-73), and to 
be fuelling the surge of a possibly stronger power in Eurasia (Herberg 2009:292). The 
Chinese on the other hand resent Moscow’s maneuvering between them and Japan – 
Russia’s volatile energy diplomacy caused a loss of trust (Yu 2007:72-73) – as well as 
the constraints to the acquisition of stakes in the Russian upstream sector by Chinese 
companies (Lo 2008:49). 
Studies in the field of Sino-Russian energy relations research have taken into 
account overall developments in the realm of energy. This includes respective 
domestic developments, developments in the East Asian and CA theatres, projects 
directly linking the two countries and projects in other regions and with other 
partners. What they have been focused on, however, is very clearly the possibility of 
and problems with pipelines, oil and gas, that would link fields in Eastern Siberia with 
the Chinese market. Explicitly, it is the ESPO oil pipeline – in the end going from 
Taishet in Irkutsk Oblast to Daqing in Heilongjiang Province – and its winding path 
to completion that took about fifteen years, and the (still only) discussed gas pipeline 
from Kovykta field to Heilongjiang, which were primarily discussed (eg Downs 2010, 
Kozyrev 2008, Lo 2008, Lotspeich 2010, Marciacq 2009). Nonetheless, cooperation 
and competition in CA have been considered as well and have contributed to the 
conclusions of several authors (eg Downs 2010, Herberg 2009, Kozyrev 2008, Lo 
2008, Marketos 2009, Nanay 2009, Olcott 2007, Poussenkova 2009, Williams 2009). 
As the influence of Sino-Russian energy policies regarding CA is this study’s focus, 
argumentation on the grounds of the situation in CA will be emphasized in the 
following. 
 
Some authors reach a markedly negative conclusion. According to Lo, Russia is no 
more a strategic partner to China in energy matters than Saudi Arabia, Angola or Iran 
(Lo 2008:47) – who account for similar shares of Chinese oil imports (ie 10-15%). 
Herberg holds that the results from energy cooperation “have been mixed, if anything, 
energy has become more a source of mistrust than of closer ties“ (Herberg 2009:291). 
Williams expects that “energy security will continue to be the biggest potential 
obstacle to better Russo-Chinese relations for the short to medium term” (Williams 
2009:163). Downs too perceives energy relations as a weak link in bilateral relations. 
“Indeed, it is the stalled energy cooperation between Russia and China where Russia’s 
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ambivalence about China’s rise and China’s concerns about Russia’s fickle 
international behavior clearly manifest themselves“ (Downs 2010:164-165). Energy 
relations are thus often foreseen as a point of contention in coming years (eg Downs 
2010, Herberg 2009, Lo 2008, Williams 2009). Sometimes this prediction is qualified, 
though. Low oil prices might push the RF closer to Beijing, as might the latter’s 
willingness to pay market prices for natural gas and to exchange downstream access 
for upstream access regarding the mutual energy companies’ investments (Downs 
2010:165-167). 
On the other side, Yu asserts that the Chinese leadership understands the RF’s 
need to make use of the “energy card” (Yu 2007:75). According to Nanay, CA oil 
exports to the PRC, moreover, seem to threaten Russia much less than such to the 
West would (Nanay 2009:128) – gas exports to other customers, though, threaten 
Gazprom’s dominance and strategy in any case (Nanay 2009:128). Mutual 
expectations are considered to be pragmatic now by these authors. Differences should 
thus be manageable and the two countries “set to co-exist with one another for the 
long haul” (Yu 2007:80-81). Martha Brill Olcott also gives an optimistic outlook, 
stating that the RF could profit in two ways through Chinese energy cooperation with 
CA. It could either strive to have new CA-China pipelines partly filled with Russian 
oil and gas, which already happens with the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline (Marketos 
2009:74-75), or attempt to have CA exporters use Russian pipelines to reach the 
Chinese market (Olcott 2007:19). Relations between Moscow and Beijing in this field 
are also discussed in the context of cooperation by Sebastien Peyrouse (eg Peyrouse 
2007:145-146: Kambarata project in Kyrgyzstan) and Christopher Williams. The 
latter states on this issue, that „it is possible [...] that while Russia and China will 
eventually compete for power in Central Asia, for the time being China seems content 
to keep a low key in the region and is unwilling to challenge Moscow’s pride“ 
(Williams 2009:160). Finally, Kozyrev notes that the RF could be supportive of 
multilateral cooperation in investment in this realm (Kozyrev 2008:213). 
Nina Poussenkova, leaving open the question whether the cooperation 
potential will be realized, proceeds to analyze the implications of either scenario for 
CA. In case of a failure, she expects “even greater competition in Central Asia as 
Russia and China both battle for energy resources from these countries. The Central 
Asian countries would benefit from this situation and would be able to command 
higher prices for their exports” (Poussenkova 2009:149). Exactly to avoid such 
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tougher competition in CA, the RF decided to build the branch of the ESPO to Daqing 
first. The PRC should not be prompted to look for oil and gas supplies elsewhere 
(Perovic/Orttung 2009:141). If the Sino-Russian energy cooperation potential should 
be realized, Poussenkova expects stronger competition between Russia and CA 
exporters for the Asian market, as well as a flare-up around transit issues 
(Poussenkova 2009:151).  
 
3.3. Regional Theatres: East Asia (incl RFE and Taiwan) over Central Asia 
Regarding regional issues, CA does not really rise to higher prominence than East 
Asia, sometimes with a separate additional chapter on the RFE (eg Garnett 2000, Lo 
2008, Wilson 2004) or Taiwan (eg Bellacqua 2010). Some authors, however, do 
prioritize CA among regions where the RF and the PRC meet (eg Marciacq 2009, Yu 
2007) or deal with this theatre exclusively (eg Hancock 2008, Rumer 2006, Ziegler 
2010). Again it is “limitationist” authors that have the most negative outlook on Sino-
Russian relations in this realm.  
If the CA theatre is discussed, energy is usually an important factor (eg 
Hancock 2008, Lo 2008, Marciacq 2009, Rumer 2006, Schmitz 2008, Sheives 2006), 
though sometimes overshadowed by border demarcation, the SCO formation and 
counter-terrorism efforts (eg Cabestan 2010, Laruelle et al 2010, Wilson 2004, 
Ziegler 2010). Short-term common interests are discerned in limiting US influence 
and countering terrorism (Lo 2008:95-100, Ziegler 2010:233) – some therefore see 
CA generally as a region of strengthened cooperation (Gill/Oresman 2003:12). 
Economic interactions in this region, centered on energy, are seen as more 
problematic, as Russian influence constrains China’s advance (Grant/Hall 2009:113-
114; Khodzhaev 2009:15; Ziegler 2008:161), but is at the same time declining 
because of it (Marketos 2009:85; Schmitz 2008:6). In general, Russia fears to be 
unseated by the PRC in this region – in some respects this might have already 
happened59 –, the only player with the potential to do so (Cabestan 2010:33-34; 
Laruelle 2010:13; Marketos 2009:107). Many studies judge the respective energy                                                         
59 See Laruelle 2010:11, who states that in “the Central Asian trade sector, Russia will in all likelihood 
be overtaken by China in only a few years, if this is not already the case in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan“. It is thus said to be Moscow’s preeminent challenge in this region, “to manage Beijing’s 
inevitable competition without completely losing control of Central Asia [...]“ (Laruelle 2010:18). 
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strategies contradictory (eg Andrews-Speed/Vinogradov 2000:395; Khodzhaev 
2009:18; Lo 2008:153, Ziegler 2010:254-258). The RF wants to control CA 
resources, to exclude others from equity ownership in CA’s energy sector and to 
control all pipelines going out of this region, while preventing CA states from 
becoming international competitors (eg Blank 2007:117-118; Garnett 2000:15; 
Grant/Hall 2009:122; Hancock 2008:53-54; Kozyrev 2008:213; Lo 2008:102-
103,153; Marketos 2009:67; Perovic/Orttung 2009:119; Schmitz 2008:20,23-27). 
China should depend on it for energy security. Otherwise, Russia fears to lose the 
leverage it is convinced to have as an energy superpower over the PRC (Lo 
2008:111). Beijing on the other hand, strives to deal with CA states directly, purchase 
equity, build its own pipelines (Lo 2008:102,153), and avoid dependence on an 
unreliable Russia (Lo 2008:144-148).60 At least a certain state of competition is 
noticed, which has not yet been mitigated by the SCO (eg Apelt 2008, Blank 2007, 
Cabestan 2010, Dittmer 2007, Garnett 2000, Hancock 2008, Herberg 2009, Karrar 
2009, Khodzhaev 2009, Kozyrev 2008, Laruelle 2010, Lo 2008, Marciacq 2009, 
Olcott 2000, Overland/Braekhus 2009, Perovic/Orttung 2009, Rumer 2006, Schmitz 
2008, Sheives 2006, Ziegler 2010).  
In evaluating the likelihood of friction in this realm, Ablat Khodzhaev 
(Khodzhaev 2009) considered scholarly debates among both Russian and Chinese 
scholars. Among Russian scholars, the author attests to a certain level of mistrust, 
where China is expected to “take unfriendly decisive action”, at a certain point, 
“without paying particular attention to the signed treaties on friendship and strategic 
partnership“ (Khodzhaev 2009:18). Chinese scholars, on the other hand, are said to 
unanimously characterize the SCO as a success story, in this sense, as it is considered 
to be balancing Chinese and Russian interests in CA (Khodzhaev 2009:21).  
 
Some authors conclude that China has taken heed of Russian sensitivities – having no 
“incentive to put its relationship with Moscow at risk for the sake of changing the 
status quo“ (Olcott 2000:399) –, the SCO having improved bilateral relations and the 
possibility of a mutually advantageous accommodation (eg Dittmer 2007, Grant/Hall 
2009, Khodzhaev 2009, Kozyrev 2008, Marketos 2009, Olcott 2000,                                                         
60 See also: Lo 2008:153 “Russia sees itself as a genuinely strategic – in other words, indispensable – 
energy supplier to China. The Chinese, however, are undertaking a whole host of measures to ensure 
that they never become hostage to Russia fortune. Both sides talk up the “strategic“ character of energy 
cooperation, yet ultimately their relationship is one of strategic opposites.“ 
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Overland/Braekhus 2009, Schmitz 2008, Sheives 2006). The PRC is expected to 
rather desist from fierce competition and grant the RF a favorable compromise, as 
energy imports might be second to regional stability – and a pushback against US 
influence (Marketos 2009:85-86)61 – in the Chinese leadership’s priorities concerning 
CA (Khodzhaev 2009:16; Sheives 2006:219). Moreover, Moscow, on the other side, 
is said to strive for the image of a reliable partner for CA countries, making it willing 
to accept some diversification of CA exports (Saurbek 2008:91-92). Importantly, 
though, earlier studies did mostly expect the PRC’s likely impact on Russian trade 
with CA to be rather small (sic!) (Olcott 2000:399). Furthermore, authors often 
consciously add the caveat that open friction is judged unlikely “for now“ (eg 
Khodzhaev 2009:16; Laruelle 2010:19), as the PRC still accepts Russian political and 
strategic primacy (Laruelle 2010:19).  
Other authors (eg Hancock 2008, Lo 2008, Rumer 2006) – or sometimes the 
same ones (Laruelle 2010) –, though, infer that, while "for the time being these 
competing agendas are being managed politically, […] there are real doubts as to how 
long this can continue as China’s energy hunger grows and Russia’s oil and gas giants 
become ever more predatory“ (Lo 2008:102-103). According to Blank, “despite an 
anti-American strategic partnership on strategic issues, Russo-Chinese energy 
relations reflect mutual irritation and suspicion“ (Blank 2007:125). Should the anti-
American stimulus disappear, eg with an American withdrawal from Afghanistan, 
several underlying tensions – among them competition over CA energy sources – will 
likely lead to a decline in cooperation (Marketos 2009:85-86). The two powers are 
said to be bound to compete in CA’s gas sector – “where the interests of Chinese 
companies are in direct conflict with those of Gazprom“ (Laruelle 2010:19) –, in 
Kazakhstan’s oil sector and over CA uranium and electricity exports (Laruelle 
2010:19). The PRC would tread lightly for now, trying not to offend Moscow, but in 
the long-term would not respect Russian dominance in this region and try to expand 
its role (Lo 2008:101,103-104). It was useful so far, to play up positive aspects while 
both countries profited from stability and security (Lo 2008:114), but further down 
the line China is expected to be perfectly willing to step over certain “red lines”, such 
as previously recognized “spheres of influence” (Lo 2008:89). According to Lo, this                                                         
61 Lo answers by arguing that the swift American entry into the region did on the contrary expose 
Russia’s weakness to China. The PRC thus realized that it could not rely on the RF to “manage“ CA. 
This is said to have instigated “renewed geopolitical competition“ (Lo 2008:12). 
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will inevitably lead to growing tensions (Lo 2008:89,114), and pursuant to Laruelle’s 
research the winner in the ensuing competition is all too clear: Beijing (Laruelle 
2010:19).62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
62 “Whether Russia wants it or not, Beijing seems destined over the medium term to dominate the 
Central Asian market in many sectors, thanks in particular to its financial and banking clout, which 
Moscow lacks“ (Laruelle 2010:19).  
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4. Research Design – Theoretical Framework, Methodology and 
Hypotheses 
 
In the following a theoretical framework for this study shall be developed. I intend to 
find an approach that promises to have explanatory power63, in connection with basic 
findings concerning Chinese and Russian positions on IR and the Sino-Russian 
relationship in CA. After settling on a suitable combination of theories – IR theories 
should not be considered and generally are not considered to be mutually exclusive –, 
a corresponding methodology will be explained and several hypotheses posited. 
The examination of the current state of research – see chapter 3 – has led to 
the conclusion that Sino-Russia relations after the collapse of the SU have not been 
exhaustively researched, much less the energy aspect of the relationship as well as its 
CA theatre. I have therefore chosen to give ample room to factual information about 
this subject – see chapters 1 and 2. Only when the facts are known, can further studies 
with a deep theoretical background probe further into different aspects of the subject. 
This study, however, already aims to provide a first venture into two research gaps 
that have been detected. The first is a methodological one. Western researchers of 
Sino-Russian relations after 1991 have so far woefully neglected Chinese language 
sources. This study thus aims to make them the central basis for the verification of its 
hypotheses. The second research gap is content-related. Earlier studies on Sino-
Russian energy relations have concentrated on bilateral projects, primarily pipelines 
that would directly link Siberian resources to Chinese consumers. Studies on the CA 
theatre of Sino-Russian relations have focused on border demarcation and joint 
counter-terrorism activities as well as diplomatic developments (ie the SCO) and their 
possibly anti-American direction. What has not taken center stage yet, is the impact of 
both Chinese and Russian activities in the CA energy sector on these countries’ 
relationship, how ripe for friction the situation is and how likely it is that tensions will 
erupt into conflict. 
The first question – how ripe for friction is the situation? – leads to realist 
thought and deliberations on systemic pressures. This will be shown in the first two 
sub-chapters. Neoclassical realism, a rather new strand of realism, poses exactly this                                                         
63 A theory’s defining quality acording to Waltz 1979:69, as quoted in Marciacq 2009: 25. 
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question and offers system structure explanations similar to neorealism. The 
difference is that systemic factors only shape choices, actual state behavior then is the 
result of domestic processes (ie intervening variables) that lead to decision-makers’ 
choices among policy options. One powerful intervening or unit-level variable is 
considered to be “elite perception“64. The latter is an important path to answering the 
second question: Will a situation that is ripe for friction really erupt into conflict?. 
Perception theory – as will be shown in the third sub-chapter – strives to analyze just 
this variable, elite perception. It can therefore serve as a logical addition to a 
neoclassical realist approach to IR. Thus, I will conclude in the fourth sub-chapter – 
after adding arguments for the appropriateness of this approach to the analysis of the 
PRC’s behavior specifically – that a “neoclassical realist-perceptionist“ approach is 
best suited to assess this study’s hypotheses.  
Consequently, the methodology I choose has to reflect an effort to gauge the 
“elite perception“ in the PRC, of the Sino-Russian relationship as influenced by the 
CA energy sector. It will be shown that elites can be dissected into a “proximate elite“ 
(ie decision-makers) and “influential elites“ (ie those on whom the leadership relies 
for informational input)65. Evidence of “actual perception“ is only available to 
researches as far as it takes the form of “articulated perception“66. This means that 
written documents of something that is likely intended, at least for an important part, 
as straight-forward information for foreign policy decisions have to exist. In the PRC 
this is a difficult issue in any case, but I am convinced that the “actual perception“-
content within the “proximate elite’s“ “articulated perception“ is even harder to trace. 
Hence, I will define an “influential elite“ in China and make a selection among its 
publications that is representative of a group that promises to have the leadership’s ear 
and of the information and advice it provides. 
 Founded on my basic findings on Sino-Russian relations, my theoretical 
framework and chosen methodology, hypotheses regarding the research question will 
be posited and then assessed in the fifth chapter. 
                                                         
64 See eg Tang:2009:799 for Steven E. Lobell’s and Roth 2006:486 for Randell Schweller’s definition. 
The concept is elaborated on in sub-chapters 4.2. and 4.3.. 
65 See Putnam 1976:11 as quoted in Shambaugh 1991:21. 
66 See Shambaugh 1991:5 and Friedrich 2000:43. 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4.1. Roots of Realist Thought 
4.1.1. Classical Realism: Hans J. Morgenthau and Power 
During the formatting phase of classical realism67 in the 1940s, the experience of 
intense crises propelled scholars to harshly criticize the belief in history as a 
“continuous process towards salvation“ 68 , as held by American “idealists“ or 
“utopians“.69 Realists asked themselves mainly why states really behave the way they 
do and why some survive and some do not, trying to elucidate the dynamics of the 
international system (Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 2001:64). The central assumptions of 
classical realism developed against this foil.  
Firstly, states – all sovereign but with “gradations of capabilities“ – are the 
key actors of the international system. 70  Secondly, IR are deemed inherently 
conflictual, because of the supposed anarchic nature of the international system. 
Thirdly, states are perceived as “unitary actors“, making it unnecessary to include 
domestic factors when analyzing foreign policy. Fourthly, states are said to be rational 
actors, which always base their decisions on national interest. Finally, power is 
established as the central factor of any explanation of state behavior, as policies are 
always formulated in accordance with national interest and national interest is always 
backed by power (Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 2001:63-64, 72; Morgenthau 2006:10). Put 
differently, “states always act because they have the power and the resources to act, 
not because they have a will to do so“ (Marciacq 2009:26).  
Interestingly, “the number and variety of definitions (of power) should be an 
embarrassment to political scientists“ (Gilpin 1975:24 as quoted in 
                                                        
67 “Realism“ is an umbrella term for manifold “realist“ theories that developed after World War II 
(Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 2001:63). Those will be grouped here into three stages: Classical Realism, 
Neorealism and Neoclassical Realism. 
68 Jacobs 2010:41 (translated from German by the author); see also Barkin 2003:587: they felt the need 
“to study international politics as they are, not as we feel they should be.“ 
69 Utopian theory stated that a way from international anarchy to a world order “based on normative 
standards and global interdependence“ was possible, through the development of international law and 
international institutions such as the League of Nations. What is more, human nature would change 
with the alteration of external circumstances and a “harmony of interest in peace“ would result 
(Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 2001:65-66). 
70  E.H. Carr, important proponent of classical realism, however, made clear that this was an 
observation of the current situation and could change in the future (Barkin 2003:587). 
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Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 2001:72)71. There is, however, a most basic definition as “the 
ability of one actor to influence another actor to do, or not to do, something desired by 
that actor“ (Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 2001:72). What makes power more than influence 
though, is the “means to actually impose will“ (Morgenthau 2006:31).72 Robert Gilpin 
adds the concept of prestige, as “perceptions of other states with respect to a state’s 
capacities and its ability and willingness to express its power“, to the content of this 
loaded term. Lastly, as David Baldwin and others explored, power is situational, to 
measure it, a specific context is needed (Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 2011:73-75).  
The lighthouse figure of this school of IR is Hans Morgenthau (1904-1980), 
who wrote its central work, “Politics Among Nations“, in 1948. Morgenthau’s first 
premise is that the rules of political relations cannot be changed, because they are 
governed by objective laws rooted in human nature (Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 2001:76; 
Jacobs 2010:48-49; Morgenthau 2006:4).73 Among these laws, he argues with Hobbes 
(Morgenthau 2006:67, FN 16), is the thirst for power74, the central dominant of an 
anarchic international system where sovereign states compete for power. All one can 
strive for, is to understand the rules of the system and conduct foreign policy 
accordingly (Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 2001:77). Only this is to be considered rational 
action, and only rational foreign policy can maximize benefits (Morgenthau 2006:10). 
Therefore Morgenthau criticizes those, who claim that other motives than power 
shape politics, as only obfuscating reality (Jacobs 2010:46). The second premise is 
that political leaders always operate according to “interest defined in terms of power“ 
(Morgenthau 2006:5) and that national interest75 first of all means national survival 
(Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 2001:76-77). The third premise then holds that only when the 
consequences of one’s actions are understood – ie the rules governing politics laid out 
in the first and second premise are observed –, moral action is possible, because 
“there can be no morality without prudence“ (Morgenthau 2006:12).  
                                                        
71 See also: Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 2001:96-97, Jacobs 2010:49-50 and Waltz 1979:127 et seq. 
72 See also: Charles P. Kindleberger as quoted in Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 2001:73: Power is strength 
combined with the ability to use it effectively. 
73 See also: Barkin 2003:587. 
74 Concerning the “lust for power“ as an inseperable part of human nature see also: Tellis 1996:608. 
75 National interest is said to have been obscured by nationalism and messianic idelogies in the 20th 
century (Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 2001:78-79).  
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Morgenthau also weighs in against evaluating political actions through 
economic or other criteria which are not strictly political (Morgenthau 2006:5). The 
central question for understanding the reasoning behind a political action always has 
to be, whether it benefits the relevant nation’s power or not (Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 
2001:77). In the struggle for power there are said to be only three types of states: 
those who want to keep power (status-quo policy), those who want to increase it 
(imperialist policy) and those who want to demonstrate power (policy of prestige). 
The latter, achieved through diplomacy or a display of force, is intended to obviate 
the actual use of force (Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 2001:77-78; Morgenthau 2006:50-51). 
In an anarchic international system, where power struggles are inevitable, classical 
realism, as a normative theory, intends to provide concrete policy advice. The method 
of choice for Morgenthau is a policy of balancing power according to an international 
consensus (Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 2001:79). Such a policy is to be carried out through 
the constant and never-ending employment of diplomacy, and is to attain a state of 
“peace through accommodation“ (Morgenthau 1963:450 as quoted in Jacobs 
2010:54). 
 
4.1.2. Neorealism: Kenneth M. Waltz and the Structure of the International System 
The second stage in the development of realist IRT is neorealism, its central work 
Kenneth M. Waltz’s “Theory of International Politics“ written in 1979. This mold of 
realism again developed in opposition to another IRT, neoliberalism. Both accept the 
central role of states, national interest and power as well as the anarchic nature of the 
international system, but differ about the importance of international institutions 
(Waltz 2000:18 et seq). Neorealists see the latter as merely mirroring the structure of 
the international system (Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 2001:68-69) and serving “primarily 
national rather than international interests“ (Waltz 2000:21). The historical context of 
classical realism’s decline in the 1970s had been increasing cooperation in the bipolar 
system. The end of the decade though saw the SU invading Afghanistan, the Iranian 
revolution and a new oil crisis, all indicating an America in decline. These 
developments served as a catalyst for neorealism’s ascendance in the 1980s (Schörnig 
2010:66). The main question this new strand of realist thought sought to answer, was 
why states choose to go to war or abstain from it, and why there are similarities in 
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their behavior despite different political systems. Furthermore, the stability of the 
bipolar system and the US’s position in it were to be analyzed (Schörnig 2010:66-68). 
Waltz defined his new system as “structural realism“. The latter is, as 
Schörnig (2010:65) argues, firmly within the tradition of realism, but advances further 
in theory construction than classical realism did. Neorealists put forward a systemic 
theory of international relations, instead of a “foreign policy theory“. The level of the 
international system is now central. Its structure is said to be indicative of states’ 
behavior (Schörnig 2010:66) – hence the name – and thus to shape the political 
relationships between the system’s units (Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 2001:81-82; 
Marciacq 2009:27; Waltz 1993:45). Therefore, the structure of the international 
system replaces power as the central category of analysis (Schörnig 2010:67).76  
Neorealists discern three levels of analysis in IR: the individual, the state and 
the international system. The latter they consider ignored by both classical realists and 
liberals, wherefore these schools are deemed unable to identify regularities in IR. As 
they simultaneously strive to create a lean theory, neorealists concentrate on this 
neglected level of analysis (ie the system level) and consciously exclude the inner 
structure of states (ie sub-systemic factors) (Schörnig 2010:69-70). The international 
system is said to be made up of two elements, its “units“ (ie states) and its “structure“ 
(ie the international system). The latter is characterized by anarchy as its ordering 
principle77, a self-help system growing out of the lack of trust in an anarchic 
framework and a distribution of power that can be either unipolar, bipolar or 
multipolar (Schörnig 2010:71). In this system national survival is the highest priority, 
states’ behavior is shaped by a “means-end-rationality“, and states can be divided 
according to their “capabilities“ (Waltz 1979:195 as quoted in Schörnig 2010:72).  
A basic tendency towards a balance of power is claimed to exist in the 
international system. Growing out of their constant struggle for survival, states tend to 
pursue “balancing“-policies (eg forming alliances, military build-up) 
(Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 2001:82; Marciacq 2009:29; Schörnig 2010:75 et seq). Only 
in the context of such “balancing“-policies is voluntary cooperation seen as likely in a 
self-help system wherein war is considered the “state of nature“ (Waltz 1979:102 as                                                         
76 Schörnig (2010:67) sees neorealists influenced by economic theories, when in their thinking external 
forces (ie the structure of the international system) shape states’ behavior similar to the way the market 
shapes companies’ behavior.  
77 See Waltz 1979:102 et seq and Waltz 1993:59.  
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quoted in Marciacq 2009:27). Generally, cooperation is deemed to make states 
vulnerable through dependencies (Waltz 2000:15), as cooperation partners are likely 
to not uphold their contractual promises and gains are difficult to calculate. A 
different situation would only arise, if a hegemonic state would force others into a 
system of international cooperation (Marciacq 2009:28; Schörnig 2010:77; Waltz 
1979:102 et seq). Neorealism attests to three possible types of “changes“ in the 
international system. The nature of its units can change (eg Greek city-states to 
Medieval feudal system), specific dominant units can rise and fall and interactions 
between the units can change (eg a declining power makes concessions to a rising one 
or allies with others to counter it or goes to war) (Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 2001:84). 
Neither of those, though, would constitute a “transformation“ of the system as Waltz 
defines it (Schörnig 2010:78), meaning a transition from an anarchical nature to 
hierarchical nature.  
 
4.2. Neoclassical Realism: Systemic Pressures and Intervening Variables 
Subsequently, realist authors deviated from Waltz’s lean theory and moved to include 
“sub-systemic factors“ in their analyses. Some of these scholars form a third major 
strand of realist theory which developed in the 1990s, neoclassical realism. Prominent 
representatives are Thomas Christensen, William Wohlforth, Randall Schweller, 
Jennifer Sterling-Folker and Fareed Zakaria. The main task, building on a neorealist 
framework, was to include domestic variables and relate them to the structure of the 
international system (ie a new emphasis on the unit level of analysis is called for) 
(Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 2001:88, 91). The reason for this push was the conviction that 
foreign policy is not only shaped by power and systemic pressures, but also by 
perception, values and different domestic-level factors (Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 
2001:89).78  
A pure structural argumentation (ie decisions are solely shaped by relative 
power in the international system) had already been described as “unsatisfactory“ by 
Peter Gourevitch in “The Second Image Reversed“ (1978:900). In 1990, Jack Snyder 
and Thomas Christensen (as quoted in Roth 2006:485) emphasized that Waltz’s                                                         
78 See eg Sterling-Folker 1997:2 for the importance to consider both domestic and international reasons 
for a state’s behavior. 
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“ultraparsimonious theory must be cross-fertilized with other theories before it will 
make determinate predictions at the foreign policy level.“ Gourevitch argued that 
states always have some degree of choice in their reaction to the external 
environment. Thus, it is important to examine who defines these choices and 
correspondent policies, and through what domestic processes a final decision is made 
(Gourevitch 1978:900, 907). 
A dichotomy of sorts had developed among neorealist scholars between 
“offensive realists“ and “defensive realists“. Whereas the former perceive systemic 
factors as always dominant and prescribe a strategy of maximizing power gains 
relative to others – in the most extreme case by reaching hegemony –, the latter see 
state behavior only partly induced by systemic factors and advise to rather minimize 
relative power losses through balancing policies (Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 2001:90; 
Rose 1998:145-150). Gideon Rose explained that neoclassical realists’ oppose 
“offensive realism“, because of its inability to comprehend that leaders are 
constrained by domestic politics and that systemic pressures are translated through 
unit-level variables (Rose 1998:152). In addition, offensive realism’s predictions are 
considered “oversimplified and inaccurate“ and the theory unable to explain why 
states in similar positions often act differently (Rose 1998:150). Innenpolitik79 though, 
at the other end of the spectrum, where systemic factors are relegated completely to 
the sidelines, has a similar problem to deal with states with different political systems 
who act similarly (Rose 1998:145-146). What is more, neoclassical realists consider 
relative material power capabilities and a state’s position in the international system 
to be the most important long-term factors shaping a state’s foreign policies (Rose 
1998:146, 150). Finally, defensive realism, with its focus on threat perceptions, is said 
to not grasp that these perceptions do at least partly result from a country’s relative 
material power, thereby moving too far away from systemic factors as well (Rose 
1998:150). Another facet distinguishing neoclassical realists from offensive and 
defensive realists is, that they do not believe that the future is invariably going to be 
as conflictual as the past or that conflict hinges solely on military technology or 
domestic pathologies. Instead they “emphasize the contingency of history and the 
importance of how foreign policy is actually conducted, because they see certain                                                         
79 The Innenpolitik school represents one of several endeavors to formulate a general theory of foreign 
policy. It considers domestic factors as determining a state’s foreign policy (Rose 1998:145-146, 148). 
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situations as particularly “ripe for rivalry” “(Rose 1998:171). An example would be a 
rising power (eg China) beginning to act more assertively by challenging existing 
hierarchies (eg in CA) “to establish new arrangements that more accurately reflect 
their own conception of their place in the world” (Rose 1998:171). 
It can thus be concluded that neoclassical realism established itself as a new 
approach, to take both external and domestic variables into account when analyzing 
foreign policy. Systemic factors are therein viewed as central and unit-level factors as 
supplementary. Jennifer Sterling-Folker argues, answering to critics of realist thought 
in general, that realism has indeed always been open to domestic variables. The 
environment (ie the system structure) can only illuminate what pressures exist, how a 
state will react to these pressures, however, cannot be answered without examining 
domestic processes (1997:16-17). 80  Both Sterling-Folker and Randall Schweller 
argue, that it is the latter which shape the choices states make and therefore determine 
the eventual foreign policy outcome – eg whether to engage in balancing, as 
neorealists would expect, or not –, not the anarchic nature of the international system 
(Roth 2006:486; Sterling-Folker 1997:19). In other words, “[t]he anarchic 
environment remains primarily but indirectly causal, while process remains 
secondarily but directly causal“ (Sterling-Folker 1997:22). Writing of the complex 
relationship between power and policy, Fudan University’s Tang Shiping, held that 
the “structural impact [ie relative power in the international system] has to be relayed 
to state behavior [ie policy] via domestic politics, especially state structure and 
leadership ⁄ elite’s perception“ (Tang 2009:799).81 It is the latter on which this study is 
going to focus. 
Gideon Rose, who provided a heavily cited overview of neoclassical realism, 
stresses that “foreign policy choices are made by actual political leaders and elites, 
and so it is their perceptions of relative power that matter, not simply relative 
quantities of physical resources or forces in being. This means that over the short to 
medium term countries’ foreign policies may not necessarily track objective material 
power trends closely or continuously“ (Rose 1998:147). Viktor D. Cha makes use of                                                         
80 See even Kenneth M. Waltz (2000:24): “Structures shape and shove; they do not determine the 
actions of states.“ 
81 See also: Gourevitch 1978:881 for the description of domestic structure as an intervening variable 
regarding the impact of external/systemic pressures; and Roth 2006:486 who describes Randall 
Schweller’s selection of the most important domestic variables when it comes to balancing policies, 
among them “elite consensus about the nature and extent of the threat“ (ie elite perception). 
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this aspect of neoclassical realism for his “quasi-alliance model“ for East Asian IR, 
which privileges “unit level perceptions of objective external conditions rather than 
the conditions themselves as causal determinants of alliance behavior“ (Cha 
2000:261; italics in the original). However, changing capabilities do lead to changes 
in the perception of threats, interests and opportunities in the neoclassical realist 
system. Rose quotes the example of the US after WWII, worrying about a Soviet 
threat to its “broader environment“. In earlier times Washington would have only 
been concerned by direct threats to its physical territory. Greatly expanded 
capabilities, though had dramatically altered its perception of threats (Rose 
1998:156). The plausibility of such a change in threat perceptions by the Chinese IR 
elite regarding CA shall be addressed in the fifth chapter. 
As state behavior in general, foreign policy is to be understood as a process of 
three stages: “strategic assessment“, “strategy formulation“ and “implementation of 
strategy“ (Tang 2009:799). The perceptions of a state’s decision-makers and elites are 
situated in the first stage. To understand the foreign policy of a certain nation it is thus 
crucial “to explore in detail how [...] policymakers actually understand their situation“ 
(Rose 1998:158). Nele Noesselt explains for the Chinese case, that the domestic 
Chinese discourse among IR scholars, as part of the “strategic assessment“, is indeed 
significantly influencing eventual foreign policy decisions (ie “strategy formulation“) 
(Noesselt 2008:32). 
At least in the short to medium term a state can perceive its capabilities to be 
greater than they really are, prompting it to act differently than a mere evaluation of 
its relative power might let one to expect. “Perceptual shocks“ might be necessary to 
make “aware of the cumulative effects of gradual long-term power trends“ (Rose 
1998:159-160). This approach might indeed prove to have explanatory power for 
Russian and Chinese behavior in CA. The financial crisis of 2008 possibly having 
served as a “perceptual shock“ for a RF that proved vulnerable. 
The second “intervening variable“ (Rose 1998:161), relaying system pressures 
to state behavior, the strength of the state apparatus and the resulting capability to 
extract and direct resources, is to be located in the second and third stages of foreign 
policy, “strategy formulation“ and “implementation of strategy“. As it is not possible 
to include this further aspect of state behavior’s nascency within the confines of this 
study, intended to be a clearly delimited contribution to the understanding of Sino-
Russian relations, I shall not go into further detail regarding this issue. 
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In summary, it can be stated that neoclassical realism understands the world as 
consisting of “units“ (ie states) and a “structure“ (ie the anarchy of the international 
system). Systemic pressures, contingent on the relative power of the respective unit 
within the structure, shape the unit’s opportunities for action in IR. However, 
intervening variables on the unit level (ie domestic processes) determine which 
foreign policies are adopted in reaction to those pressures. Central among the 
intervening variables is “elite perception“. The analysis of this variable on the 
Chinese side shall be this paper’s contribution to the study of Sino-Russian relations 
in CA. 
 
4.3. Perception Theory: Perceiving Elites and Forms of Perception 
In order to determine 1) what perception is, 2) who makes up the elite whose 
perception shall be researched, 3) how this elite constitutes an intervening variable for 
foreign policy decisions and 4) how relevant sources can be sensibly selected, further 
theoretical background is needed. “Perception theory”82 can serve as a very fruitful 
supplement to neoclassical realism83, and shall thus be discussed in the following. 
 IR scholars (eg Kenneth E. Boulding, David Singer and Richard Snyder) 
became concerned with perception84 in the late 1950s and 1960s, following the 
“behavioral revolution” in social science (Shambaugh 1991:17).  Soon thereafter 
Robert Jervis, in the central work “Perception and Misperception in International 
Politics”, established the notion that state behavior is more influenced by how 
“objective factors” are perceived than by the former themselves (Jervis 1976:30 as 
quoted in Noesselt 2008:32). A second stage in “perception research” (Friedrich 
2000:33), can be seen in the identification of two groups whose perceptions would 
have to be researched, the “proximate elite”, actual decision-makers in domestic 
politics, and “influential elites”, those who have “substantial indirect or implicit                                                         
82 David Shambaugh (1991:17) notes social scientists’ concern with the reasons behind human action 
and quotes W.I.Thomas as saying, “If men define situations as real, they are real in their 
consequences.“ He then notes that IR scholars equally need to analyze perception, as they seek to 
explain state behavior and states are made up of human beings. 
83 Nele Noesselt (2008:33) observed that perception theory can complement structural explanatory 
approaches like neorealism by adding another layer of analysis. 
84 According to Allen S. Whiting (1989:18 as quoted in Noesselt 2008:35-36), perception means a 
selective intake of one’s counterpart’s actions that is based on a preconceived image. The latter, in turn, 
results from a selective interpretation of history and experience. 
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influence; those to whom decision-makers look for advice, whose opinions and 
interests they take into account, or from whom they fear sanctions” (Putnam 1976:11 
as quoted in Shambaugh 1991:21).  
Regarding “influential elites”, David Shambaugh (1991:21 et seq) and Stefan 
Friedrich (2000:33 et seq) discuss the importance of new data which was available for 
the interpretation of Soviet actions in the Khrushchev era, when several specialized 
research institutions on IR emerged in the SU and the number of publications rose 
decidedly. Studies began focusing on Soviet IR scholars, recognizing that this could 
“yield fruitful insights into what motivated Soviet behavior toward the United States” 
(Shambaugh 1991:22). In the 1980s, Gilbert Rozman carried out studies on both the 
perception of China in the SU and then of the perception of the SU in China, on the 
basis of scientific publications in the perceiving state. As Jürgen Osterhammel noted 
then, despite not demonstrating any specific influence on decision-makers, Rozman’s 
contribution was considerable, because he was the first to compile assessments on 
which leaders at least partly based their decisions, instead of analyzing the usual 
government press releases (Osterhammel 1987:412 as quoted in Friedrich 2000:34, 
FN 54).  
Around 1990, Allen S. Whiting (1989) and David Shambaugh (1991) 
followed up Rozman’s approach with two studies on China’s perception of Japan and 
the US respectively; the former considering a wide array of data, the latter focusing 
entirely on Chinese America specialists. According to Shambaugh, new possibilities 
had arisen in this field – just like in the SU before – because of the “explosion of 
publications” on IR in the late 1970s and then again in the late 1980s as less and less 
journals were restricted to internal circulation (Shambaugh 1991:27 et seq). Friedrich 
argues, that a less ideologically stringent stance in the Chinese leadership also 
contributed to the realization that the “officially prescribed perception” was not to be 
equated with the elite’s “actual perception” (Friedrich 2000:36-37). As scholars of 
perception in a Chinese context well know, it is always hard to discern “actual 
perception“, “with communication that is [often] instrumental and possibly 
multipurpose“ (Whiting 1989:18 as quoted in Friedrich 2000:40). Shambaugh 
therefore introduced the term “articulated perception“ to indicate a level of 
uncertainty whether the things written actually correspond with “cognitive beliefs“ 
(Shambaugh 1991:5). For Friedrich (2000:43), “articulated perception“ is a dependent 
variable, shaped by domestic politics and an analysis of the international situation that 
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is always favorable to the Chinese leadership’s interests. This conscious process 
intends a consolidation of the “actual state“ of IR with a “target state“ considered 
favorable to the PRC. “Articulated perception“ is thus a political device in the 
construction of reality. It serves the purpose of merging the identities of state and 
elites. 
Shambaugh proceeded to group Chinese IR publications into two schools, 
“Marxist” and “non-Marxist”, claiming to be able to assign all major venues of 
publication on IR to one of those (Shambaugh 1991:278-279). The role of the latter 
group, he argues, was to provide rather “atheoretical”, descriptive information for the 
leadership’s decisions, the role of the former to “sanctify policy decisions taken on 
other grounds in ideological terms” (Shambaugh 1991:288 as quoted in Friedrich 
2000:38). Moreover, “non-Marxist” journals were said to be less vulnerable to short-
term political needs than official statements, Chinese newspaper articles etc., and to 
show long-term tendencies (Friedrich 2000:45). Later on, as the field of political 
science developed further in the PRC, Shambaugh’s designation of certain “Marxist” 
and “non-Marxist” institutions and journals became inaccurate. A greatly expanded 
number of scholars at proliferating institutions began dealing with IR. Noesselt 
(2010:69 et seq) did not group IR scholars and journals, which all use the “common 
language of Sino-Marxism” to a certain degree85, in “Marxist” and “non-Marxist” 
ones anymore. It is rather the generational affiliation as well as the contentual and 
methodological orientation of the scholar in question, that might indicate the function 
of his work – it is still accurate that Chinese IR publications perform different 
functions – and thus the manner in which it should be approached. In Chapter 4.4.2., a 
more detailed discussion will be provided as to which scholars, journals and 
institutions promise to offer the most authoritative view of the issue, closest to the 
“actual perception” of Chinese scholars. That is a rather fact-oriented view, that seeks 
to inform the leadership, rather than integrating the country or issue in question into 
the government prescribed Sino-centric world order.86 
In any case, Friedrich explained that all of the “influential elite’s” publicly 
accessible publications – as opposed to neibu (internal materials) –, no matter what 
their function is, have a “double-character“. They certainly influence the decision-                                                        
85 Correspondence with Prof. Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, 25.03.2012. 
86 Ibd. 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makers’ “actual perception“ – Shambaugh had confirmed this through many 
interviews with scholars (eg Shambaugh 1991:6) –, and thus the PRC’s foreign 
policy, but nevertheless it is not probable that their publications are completely free of 
government influence either (Friedrich 2000:40-41). It follows that “influential elite“ 
and “proximate elite“ mutually influence each other. No matter what function a 
certain group’s publications serve, all are at least partially adapted according to the 
interests of the “proximate elite“, but these interests are in turn indirectly influenced 
by the research work of the “influential elite“ (Friedrich 2000:42). Even if it might not 
be exclusively the “influential elite’s” “actual perception“, which can be found in 
these publications, the latter can support conclusions about the “tolerated perception“ 
(Friedrich 200:42-43) and are important factors in opinion-forming processes of  the 
“proximate elite“.  
 Nele Noesselt later built on this previous work, stressing the importance of 
“self-perception”, as well as an increasing awareness of others’ perceptions of China. 
The PRC is no longer a passive participant in IR. More recent Chinese publications 
consequently do not only provide “articulated perception” in the sense of integrating 
countries in an officially envisioned world order (ie describing what should be rather 
than what is the reality), and sometimes higher degrees of “actual perception” about 
IR. They also adapt to the perception of China both by other state actors and by the 
Chinese populace and intend to favorably manipulate it. The intention is to be 
perceived as peaceful, pragmatic and responsible by other states, while not 
antagonizing the domestic populace. Thus, publications about other states, bilateral 
relationships and the international system have to be critically viewed in this regard as 
well (Noesselt 2008:178-179). 
Although it has thus been necessary to caution here against any glib equations 
of “articulated perceptions“ with the “actual perception“ of the “influential elite“, 
there has indeed been a trend recently towards more and more candor among Chinese 
IR scholars (Noesselt 2008:41). Even if there had not been, though, scholars dealing 
with the PRC have, analogous to the situation in the SU some decades earlier, made 
the point repeatedly that it is worthwhile discussing Chinese scientific publications on 
IR. At least authors performing certain functions within the IR-research community 
do form an “influential elite“, their published research does contain some degree of 
“actual perception“ and they do have some impact on decision-makers and on the 
eventual foreign policy outcome. Therefore, these works do perform as an intervening 
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variable (ie “elite perception“) in a neoclassical realist sense, and their study is 
warranted also from a realist standpoint. 
 
4.4. Theoretical Model and Methodology for this study 
4.4.1. Theoretical Model – Neoclassical Realism and Perception Theory 
 
“Conceptualizing Russian and Chinese relations with Central Asia is a 
difficult task. The leadership of these two major powers approach foreign 
policy in largely realist terms, seeking to maximize their power, jealously 
guarding their national sovereignty, and engaging in balancing against a 
superior adversary. Yet neither country fully fits the standard realist model in 
its foreign policy behavior” (Ziegler 2010:233). 
 
Of the three main schools of IRT – realism, liberalism and constructivism –, Yu Bin 
judges none adequate in explaining the current state of Sino-Russian relations. 
Realists are generally pessimistic about interstate relations (Yu Bin 2007:49, FN 5). 
This pessimism has in Yu’s eyes infused both the “limitationist school” and the 
“alarmist school”87. The former might have additionally been influenced by the 
pessimism of Russian scholars, due at least partly not to the bilateral relationship with 
China, but the RF’s historical decline (Yu Bin 2007:56). Liberalism shares a negative 
outlook on long-term cooperation, if the two countries in question are not 
democracies (Yu Bin 2007:49, FN 5). Finally, constructivists – and with them the 
“identity literature” on Sino-Russian relations – mostly do not see an “ideational” 
basis (ie cultural basis) for stable Sino-Russian relations (Yu Bin 2007:54, FN 23). Yu 
frequently (eg Yu Bin 2007:56) underlines the fact that IRT have in general been 
more at ease with conflictual relations than with cooperation. Furthermore, there is a 
trend towards allowing only a dichotomy of either rapprochement or rivalry as 
dominant pattern (Yu Bin 2007:55). Yu, however, considers the relationship to have 
become quite “normal” and consequently strives to develop a new analytical 
framework (Yu Bin 2007:59 et seq). He proceeds to provide a historical context for                                                         
87 See Chapter 3, p. 54 for an explanation to Yu Bin’s “schools“. 
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the current state of normalcy, stresses the importance of de-ideologization, gives 
several examples for cooperation (eg arms transfers) and concludes that “Russian and 
Chinese elites have finally moved away from the love-or-hate oscillation and toward 
more pragmatic mutual expectations and complex reciprocity” (Yu Bin 2007:79). 
What is not provided, however, is the promised new analytical framework.  
 In this author’s assessment, the validity of said main Western IRT has not 
been disproven. One should, however, consider refining them through the addition of 
other theory components.88 This study intends to do just that. The dominant IRT, 
realism, is revisited in the form of its latest mold neoclassical realism. The latter is 
than complemented with a perception theory approach. The resulting amalgam shall 
justify and explain the examination of one particular aspect of Sino-Russian relations: 
Chinese “elite perception” of CA energy’s influence.  
Noesselt underlines the value of perception theory approaches in contrast to, 
only superficially promising, realist models of analysis (Noesselt 2008:184). It seems, 
however, that the two could indeed be quite fruitfully combined in a “neoclassical 
realist-perception theory approach”. Such a theoretical framework would accept that 
the structure of the international system delimits a state’s room to manoeuver. 
Intervening variables on the domestic level (eg elite perception, strength of the state 
apparatus) would then determine which policy responses are possible, are recognized 
to be possible, will be enacted and how. The strength of the state apparatus 
determines which among the spectrum of possible actions, delimited by the 
international system, are feasible. The “actual perception” of “proximate elite” and 
“influential elites” leads to those policy responses that are seen to be not only feasible 
but desirable.  
Regarding the issue of a certain degree of deviation between “influential 
elites’” “actual perception” and the “articulated perception” researchers can find, 
Shambaugh pointed out that publications often depict the normative Chinese view of 
how the international system should be instead of its actual state. “Influential elites’” 
publications do, however, in turn influence the “proximate elite”, whichever form or 
degree of “actual perception” they may contain – Friedrich described this “double-
character”. To study such publications as important factors in the process that leads to 
a state’s foreign policy is therefore necessary. Nevertheless, another caveat has to be                                                         
88 Realist approaches for example are said to be in need of refinement as they can not yet explain 
cooperative patterns in international energy politics (Mayer 2007:69-71).  
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inferred from Noesselt’s work, when trying to use Chinese IR publications. “Self-
perception” (ie scholars’ perception of China) and the desire to project a certain 
perception of the PRC increasingly affect Chinese scholars’ “articulated perception” 
of a certain state or bilateral relationship, thus further obfuscating scholars’ “actual 
perceptions”. 
 
This study has consequently chosen an approach to Sino-Russian relations, which has 
realist thought as its first pillar. In part, this is due to the fact that realism is 
considered to be the dominant paradigm in IR and security studies (Hancock/Lobell 
2010:144; Stulberg 2007:2-3) – and energy security to be an important part of 
national security. On the other hand, it results from the specific object of research, the 
Chinese attitude towards the bilateral relationship in a CA context. Writing about the 
US, Stephano Guzzini claimed that one argument for the relevance of realist theory 
for explanations of US foreign policy is its prevalence in the minds of both decision-
makers and the intelligentsia. It thus inherently influences analyses and policies 
(Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 2001:96). The same can be claimed for the PRC89 and, going 
even further, it has been noted that a (neo-)realist worldview dominates in many (or 
most) foreign and defense ministries worldwide (Gyngell/Wesley 2003 as quoted in 
Schörnig 2010:68). Regarding China, Alastair Ian Johnston detects a historically 
developed “strategic culture“ that led to a particular receptiveness to realist thought 
(Johnston:1995). Many scholars have attested to the PRC being a realist country with 
a realist outlook on IR (eg Andrews-Speed/Vinogradov 2000:378; Ziegler 2010:233) 
– specifically in energy matters (Overland/Braekhus 2009:207) –, whose leaders and 
scholars often argue in accordance with realist or geopolitical arguments (eg Kozyrev 
2008:205-206). One should note, however, that a clear-cut categorization fails to 
grasp the complexity of Chinese thought and practice on matters of IR. Any equation 
of the Chinese foreign policy elite with “textbook realist” thinking and decision-
making would be a grave mistake. To name only one issue, the much touted 
theoretical approach of a “peaceful rise” is incompatible with realist thought.90 
Nonetheless, the traces of realist reasoning in the Chinese elite have been considered 
worth mentioning here.                                                         
89 Conversation with Prof. Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, 25.03.2012. 
90 Conversation with Prof. Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, 27.04.2012. 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 The strand of realism that has been concluded to have the most explanatory 
power is neoclassical realism. This is because, “[by] this point […] it should be old 
news that relative power matters. Future work in this vein should therefore focus on 
continuing to specify the ways intervening unit-level variables can deflect foreign 
policy from what pure structural theories might predict” (Rose 1998:168). Thus, 
neoclassical realism, which still underlines that the basic framework of systemic 
pressures primarily determines a state’s possible courses of action – as neorealism did 
before –, but is open to intervening variables on the domestic level, fits the 
requirements of this new line of research. Such intervening variables relay systemic 
pressures and ultimately determine the choice among said courses of action. 
Particularly important among those variables, as has been shown above, is “elite 
perception”. The latter shall thus be researched in this study. For this purpose, 
neoclassical realism will be combined with perception theory, which is particularly 
suited to this matter. Both theories are open to such an amalgamation. 
Perception theory has thus been selected as the second pillar of this study’s 
theoretical model. Firstly, because it ideally lends itself to the study of the 
“intervening variable” “elite perception”. Secondly, the selection of perception theory 
too is grounded in the Chinese object of research. The PRC uses perception theory to 
analyze others’ views of it. It then adapts to how it is perceived and strives to 
favorably influence that perception for strategic gain.91 Noesselt contends (2008:38-
39) that Chinese scholars do also consciously take up Western analyses that use 
perception theory approaches, particularly Rozman’s and Shambaugh’s. She cites the 
example of the political scientist Li Yangfan, who called on Chinese IR scholars to 
not let Western authors be the ones to interpret Chinese perceptions of IR (Li 
Yangfan 2005:443). On the other hand, Beijing is certainly no exception in being 
moved by its perceptions of other actors. Several scholars have described the 
image(s), as Whiting defines the term (1989:18), of the RF that have arisen in the eyes 
of the Chinese elite over the course of this bilateral relationship’s history – laid out in 
the first and second chapters. The perception of Russian actions that is informed by 
this image then constitutes an intervening (domestic) variable altering the impact of 
systemic pressures on Chinese behavior, as explained in the preceding sub-chapters. 
In a Sino-Russian context, Kozyrev has noted that it is indeed “each party’s                                                         
91 Conversation with Prof. Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, 25.03.2012. 
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perceptions of the others’ preferences and policies” that shape each side’s conduct 
(Kozyrev 2008:210). Laruelle held for the Russian side, that “[if] Russia reacts 
strongly to the presence of other international actors in its former Central Asian 
“backyard,“ (sic!) this reaction, although based on objective economic competition, is 
mainly due to subjective perceptions related to balance of power issues“ (Laruelle 
2010:9).  
 
4.4.2. Methodology – Analysis of the Academic Discourse 
 
“Thus, this is a study of United States – China relations as seen through one 
medium – China’s America Watchers and their articulated perceptions of the 
United States. In my view, we can only understand China’s increasingly 
complex behavior toward the United States during this period as a function of 
the increasingly complex images the America Watchers hold and the 
perceptions they articulate to those policy makers who shape and guide 
China’s America policy” (Shambaugh 1991:35).  
 
According to Gideon Rose, a “distinct methodological perspective flows from 
neoclassical realism's theoretical argument: analysts wanting to understand any 
particular case need to do justice to the full complexity of the causal chain linking 
relative material power and foreign policy outputs. Realism, in this view, is a 
theoretical hedgehog: it knows one big thing, that systemic forces and relative 
material power shape state behavior. People who ignore this basic insight will often 
waste their time looking at variables that are actually epiphenomenal. Yet people who 
cannot move beyond the system will have difficulty explaining most of what happens 
in international relations” (Rose 1998:165). Tang Shiping explains further that 
neoclassical realism considers structure to delimit a state’s goals, while domestic 
politics contribute heavily to the strategies a state adopts in order to reach those goals 
(ie actual state behavior). To understand the latter one has to deal with a state’s 
specific interests (ie deal with intervening variables), which are not given by the 
system structure, “but constructed by elites through a discourse” (Tang 2009:802).  
Moving beyond the system and the consequences of its pressures, as Rose 
demands, means dealing with intervening variables. Among these, “elite perception” 
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and state structure (or strength of the state apparatus) have been considered the most 
prominent (see Chapter 4.2.). Their place in the process of forming state behavior 
shall therefore be noted. Tang outlines three stages of state behavior: “strategic 
assessment”, “strategy formulation” and “implementation of strategy” (Tang 
2009:799). “Elite perception” is clearly a part of the “strategic assessment” stage and 
will then to a certain degree inform “strategy formulation”, “whereas state capacity 
features more prominently in strategy implementation” (Tang 2009:801). Of these 
two variables I have chosen to contribute a study on “elite perception”, as I intend to 
gage Chinese evaluations of the CA energy game and its impact on Sino-Russian 
relations, not state capacity regarding the implementation of certain strategies later on. 
The process of including intervening variables is dealt with by neoclassical 
realists as the concrete application of the theory’s generally valid concepts. Such will 
often require significant area expertise (incl foreign language capabilities); especially, 
but not only, when analyzing the function of perception (Rose 1998:166). 
Neoclassical realism thus lends itself to area studies and the latter on the other hand is 
of worth to the study of international relations. Consequently, this master’s thesis in 
Chinese Studies will deal with the Chinese perspective on Sino-Russian relations, 
because this author’s area expertise (including language skills) point to this side of the 
relationship. Furthermore, China’s role in CA is seldom openly talked about in 
official Russian publications “and it is only off the record that experts dare to raise the 
issue of Chinese potential to dethrone Russian dominance in the region. […] The 
perception of Beijing as a powerful and ambitious competitor in Central Asia is a 
recent phenomenon in Russia and remains difficult to analyze, since diplomatic 
relations between the two countries are fraternal (Laruelle 2010:18). Finally, I posit 
the hypothesis that Russian perception of an ever looser grip on its “backyard” will 
definitely lead to certain overreactions vis-à-vis China. Then, however, the latter’s 
decision on how to deal with the volatile neighbor will ultimately determine the fate 
of Sino-Russian relations. Therefore, I consider the Chinese perspective on bilateral 
relations more instructive regarding the question of whether a certain potential for 
friction will actually lead to a notable deterioration in relations. 
 
Having justified the analysis of “elite perception”, on the Chinese side, as this study’s 
contribution to Sino-Russian relations research, it should be explained how this is to 
be done. As has been discussed above (Chapter 4.3.), one can either strive to evaluate 
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the perception of the “proximate elite” (ie actual decision-makers) or of a certain 
“influential elite” (ie those from whom decision-makers expect and take advice). This 
study chooses to discuss the latter in the form of China’s IR elite’s scholarly articles 
on the subject, because these manifestations of “articulated perception” are deemed 
closer to their authors “actual perception” than any publicly accessible speeches or 
press releases of the PRC’s decision-makers.  
 It has been argued here (Chapter 4.3.) that Chinese IR scholars do in fact 
influence decision-makers and thus actual state-behavior. Among the pertinent 
publications and scholars, influence does of course vary, as do functions (cf Friedrich 
2000:37 et seq; Noesselt 2010:69-80; Shambaugh 1991:278-279). Hence, a further 
delimitation for this study is required. As has been explained in Chapter 4.3., 
Shambaugh’s classification of “Marxist” and “non-Marxist” publications is no longer 
accurate. While Friedrich still made use of Shambaugh’s categories ten years later 
(Friedrich 2000:43-45), Noesselt had to break with them another decade thereafter 
(Noesselt 2010:69-80)92. She posited that Chinese IR scholars and their functions 
could be divided along generational lines as well as according to their contentual and 
methodological proclivities. Scholars of each generation and contentual and 
methodological proclivity, however, are dispersed among a large number of 
institutions and publish in a variety of journals. Thus, it is no longer possible to follow 
Shambaugh’s indications as to which institutions and which publications have what 
explicit function and are more or less likely to provide something close to their 
“actual perception”. 
 The oldest group of scholars, Noesselt contends, holds on to Marxist 
cognitive modeling, is integrated into political structures and does not stray far from 
officially prescribed interpretations.93 This group’s most important members are said 
to be Liang Shoude, Fan Lianqing (both Peking University), Feng Tejun and Li 
Jingzhi (both Renmin University) (Noesselt 2010:69-70). A second (and younger) 
group of Chinese IR scholars is mainly oriented along Western IR research, is mainly 
fact-driven – basic research and theory development are relegated to the sidelines –                                                         
92 Noesselt mainly bases her classifications on Fang 2005 and Li, Bin 2006. 
93 For the purposes of this study, scholars that graduated before the period of reform and opening that 
began in 1978 will be considered members of the older generation of IR scholars. Although she does 
not specify any time periods, this author considers such a delimitation to be in conformity with 
Noesselt’s argumentation. 
  82 
and said to be very influential in the PRC’s foreign policy formulation (Noesselt 
2010:70). The third and youngest group, is also building on Western macro-theories. 
However, it is striving to Sinicize them, or use them to argue in favor of China’s 
particularity. Noesselt lists several members of this youngest generation and the 
respective macro-theory they build on. Some examples are Li Bin (Nanjing 
University) (modern, Western Marxism), Wang Yizhou (CASS) (liberalism), Yan 
Xuetong (Qinghua University) (realism), Qin Yaqing (Diplomatic Academy Beijing) 
(constructivism) and Li Shaojun (CASS) (eclectic mix of Western IR macro-theories) 
(Noesselt 2010:70-71).  
Among the second and third group of scholars there are varying degrees of 
adherence to ideological provisions. Some do indeed go as far as to criticize political 
interference in sociological research (eg Pan 2006:89 as quoted in Noesselt 
2010:74).94 Noesselt cites this as a sign of a more professional IR research in China 
that does have unprecedented breathing space. This has actually been encouraged by a 
Statement of the CCP’s Central Committee in 2004 (Noesselt 2010:75, FN 54), and is 
the expressly declared goal of Chinese IR scholars themselves (cf Noesselt 2010:132). 
Consequently, a group of journals and scholars befitting the scope of this 
study will be consulted that complies as far as possible with Noesselt’s second and 
third group, ie that is as independent from officially prescribed interpretations as 
possible. Articles in these journals and by these authors that mention the CA energy 
dimension of Sino-Russian relations shall provide insights into Chinese “influential 
elites’” perception of Russia in this realm. Conclusions will be drawn on how 
conflict-prone the situation is viewed and how Chinese elites intend to deal with it. 
 
After a series of interviews with scholars and in accordance with Shambaugh’s work, 
Friedrich chose three journals for his study on EU-China relations: Guoji Wenti 
Yanjiu (?????? – International Studies), Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (?????
? – Contemporary International Relations) and Xiou Yanjiu / Ouzhou (???? / ?
? – Western European Studies / Europe; the name changed during the period                                                         
94 See also: Friedrich 2000:66-67 who cites Song Yimin of the CIIS and Zhou Hong and Chen Lemin 
of the CASS as having publicly written on and criticized government interference in their research. 
Through several interviews (cf Friedrich 2000:77, FN 29), he confirmed that Chinese scholars do 
acknowledge a certain gap between their research and their publicly accessible publications, due to 
“sensitivities“. 
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researched by Friedrich). The first two are considered the most authoritative journals 
on international politics and the last one the most important exclusively devoted to 
Western Europe (Friedrich 2000:43-44,81). In her study of EU-China relations from 
2008, Noesselt endorsed Friedrich’s selection, underlining the lasting prominence of 
said three journals, despite a proliferation of publications in recent years (Noesselt 
2008:23 et seq). 
In keeping with previous insights, this study will therefore also make Guoji 
Wenti Yanjiu and Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, as well as the scholars working at the 
respective publishing institutions, its point of departure. The former is published by 
the Zhongguo Guoji Wenti Yanjiusuo (????????? – Chinese Institute for 
International Studies (CIIS)), which has become the most important think tank of 
China’s foreign ministry (Friedrich 2000:73-74 as quoted in Noesselt 2008:25). The 
latter is a publication of the Zhongguo Xiandai Guoji Guanxi Yanjiuyuan (????
???????  – China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations 
(CICIR)), a think tank affiliated to China’s Ministry of State Security and the CCP’s 
Central Committee.  
Neither of the previous studies in this vein dealt with Sino-Russian relations. 
Therefore, the most authoritative journals on Russia and CA have to be identified 
here. As this is only a first foray into the direction of research that is proposed here 
for Sino-Russian relations studies, it will suffice to say that only five journals on 
Russia and Central Asia have so far been included in the catalogue of the dominant 
“China Academic Journals” database. Eluosi Zhongya Dongou Yanjiu (??????
??? – Russian, Central Asian and Eastern European Studies) and Eluosi Zhongya 
Dongou Shichang (????????? ? Russian, Central Asian and Eastern 
European Market) are published by the “Institute of Russian, Central Asian and 
Eastern European Studies“ at the CASS. The latter in turn is an institution of the 
PRC’s State Council. Xiboliya Yanjiu (?????? – Siberian Studies) is edited by 
the “Heilongjiang Provincial Academy of Social Sciences“, a branch of the CASS. 
Zhongya Xinxi (?????– Central Asian Information) is released by the “Central 
Asian Science, Technology and Economy Centre” (?????????? ), 
affiliated to the Ministry of Science and Technology, and the “Xinjiang Science and 
Technology Report Research Institute” (?????????), under the Xinjiang 
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provincial government. Finally, Eluosi Yanjiu (????? – Russian Studies) is 
published by the East China Normal University in Shanghai. All these journals will be 
scanned for pertinent articles by second- and third-generation authors (cf Noesselt 
2010:69 et seq). Together they should provide an array of (potentially) influential 
articles on the subject matter, as close as possible to their authors’ “actual 
perception”.  
In addition to journals on international (political) relations as well as Russia 
and CA, some articles from journals on international economic and energy relations 
will be consulted. Three examples of such journals are Guoji Jingji Hezuo (????
?? – International Economic Cooperation), affiliated to the PRC’s ministry of 
commerce (MOFCOM – ???), Guoji Shiyou Jingji (?????? – International 
Petroleum Economics), edited by the “CNPC Economics and Technology Research 
Institute“95, and Zhongwai Nengyuan (???? – Sino-global Energy), released by 
the “China Energy Research Society“ (CERC)96. 
Within the selected journals, articles will be chosen for their relevance to the 
issue at hand (ie CA energy’s influence on Sino-Russian relations), there will be no 
complete review or analysis of these journals’ work in the delimited period. Certain 
authors will be primarily consulted.97 Those are “Russia Watchers”, a term defined by 
Shambaugh for “America Watchers”, as “an individual whose full-time professional 
occupation it is to study and interpret events in the United States or American foreign 
relations for China’s concerned elite or mass public” (Shambaugh 1991:5). Zhang 
Wenjin, an America Watcher, told Shambaugh at the time that although leaders now 
read materials on the US themselves – contrary to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai – 
“they still need us to help interpret the United States for them” (Shambaugh 1991:6). 
Twenty years later, leaders and officials in general can be considered to be much 
                                                        
95 As CNPC has the bureaucratic rank of a ministry, this journal is technically also published by a 
ministry-affiliated research institute. 
96 The CERC is a subsidiary of the “China Association for Science and Technology“ (CAST), which is 
a non-governmental, non-profit organization priding itself on the ability to give neutral policy 
recommendations on the basis of objective observations. 
97 One tool that was used to find relevant authors – next to scanning the journals listed in the foregoing 
– was www.irchina.org, which is sort of a “database” of relevant Chinese IR scholars, compiled by the 
Nankai University’s “Academy of International Studies”. It is, however, not exhaustive, is rather 
concentrated on IR theory development and considered by this author to not be up-to-date. 
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more acquainted with other major powers, with information being much more 
accessible. Nevertheless, experts on a certain region still have an influential role.  
Lastly, the time period for eligible articles has to be delimited. Shambaugh 
chose the about twenty years from Nixon’s visit to the PRC in 1972 to 1990. Friedrich 
set out to analyze the fifteen years from the first publication of Guoji Went Yanjiu and 
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi in 1981 to 1995. Though this thesis is an effort on a much 
smaller scale and much more material has become available since the 1990s, a rather 
similar period will be examined. The period of investigation will be the time between 
China’s entry into the CA energy market in the outgoing 1990s and the drafting of 
this thesis. However, a clear emphasis will be set on recent evaluations, taking into 
account a much smaller number of more dated articles. 
This study correspondingly aims to primarily provide indications as to the 
PRC’s current view of CA energy in the context of its relationship with Russia. 
Tracing different stages in “articulated perception” on this issue since the onset of 
Chinese engagement in the CA energy sector is secondary.  
This endeavor will serve to critically review two research hypotheses that can 
be formulated on the basis of Western research on this topic so far (see Chapter 3). 
Firstly, that Chinese and Russian interests collide in the CA energy sector. Secondly, 
that conflict will erupt between Beijing and Moscow because of these colliding 
interests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  86 
5. Empirical Research – Shifting Sands: Bulwark against the US or 
“Coming Replacement” 
 
It has been pointed out in the foregoing that researching a certain “influential elite’s” 
“articulated perception” of another country is a viable exercise, as it constitutes an 
intervening variable that impacts strategy formulation and thus foreign policy. This – 
and the use of perception theory –, as has been explained, is perfectly in keeping with 
neoclassical realism’s axioms, holding that systemic pressures frame certain policy 
alternatives and domestic intervening variables determine which of them will be 
selected in the end. In Chapter 4.4.2. it has been determined that certain Chinese IR 
scholars do in fact perform as an “influential elite” in the PRC and that their 
publications contain a certain degree of “actual perception” (or “tolerated 
perception”). Therefore, these articles can be considered to have a certain amount of 
influence on the “proximate elite” and Chinese foreign policy. Furthermore, certain 
journals have been found to be of particular importance and scholars of younger 
generations (ie those that graduated after 1978, see FN 93) and certain methodological 
proclivities (cf Noesselt 2010) to be more promising regarding a search for policy 
advice rather than policy justification. 
 In the following, certain observations on this “influential elite’s” analyses of 
CA energy’s impact on Sino-Russian relations shall be pointed out. These 
observations on the Chinese scholarly debate will be structured in three chronological 
phases, beginning in 1997. Chinese engagement in the CA energy sector can be 
considered to have begun in earnest that year, as the Sino-Kazakh oil pipeline was 
agreed upon and Chinese NOCs made several acquisitions in Kazakhstan (cf eg Li 
Ning 2009:22). The first two phases will be set according to Liu Fenghua’s98 
structuring of Chinese engagement in CA since the end of the SU (Liu Fenghua 
2007:63-64). Liu notes that there was a first phase of “forming neighborly 
relations“ (jianli mulin youhao guanxi – ????????) from December 1991 to                                                         
98 Born in 1972, the CASS scholar Liu Fenghua clearly belongs to the younger generations of IR 
scholars. Working at the “Institute of Russian, Eastern European and Central Asian Studies“ at the 
CASS, he can be considered a “Russia Watcher“. Information on age, employer and position of the 
authors considered in this study has partly been indicated in articles written by them and partly been 
gathered from their employers’ websites. Eventual notes on methodological proclivities have been 
inferred from the pertinent articles. 
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September 1997, a second phase of “strengthening cooperation in the fields of 
energy99, trade and security“ (jiaqiang nengyuan, jingmao he anquan lingyu de hezuo 
– ???????????????) from September 1997 to June 2001, and a 
third phase since June 2001, of “developing comprehensive cooperative relations 
under bilateral and SCO frameworks” (zai shuangbian he shanghai hezuo zuzhi 
kuangjia xia fazhan quanfangwei hezuo guanxi – ??????????????
????????) (Liu Fenghua 2007:63-64). Liu’s second and third phase will be 
the first and second in this study. A third phase shall be introduced here, beginning 
with the financial crisis in 2008. Framing these remarks on the central research 
question of this thesis will be the “influential elite’s” discussion of the role of energy 
cooperation and the CA theatre in Sino-Russian relations, as well as of both countries 
engagement in CA. 
 
It will become clear that the issue at hand was only scarcely treated in the beginning 
of China’s engagement in the CA energy sector in the late 1990s. At the time, 
implications for the Sino-Russian relationship were not problematized at all. In a 
second phase, authors increasingly dealt with the ongoing status of the region as 
Russia’s ”backyard” and portrayed the PRC as a most valuable partner against 
impertinent US incursions, while expressing their hope for both Sino-Russian and 
Sino-CA energy cooperation to bear fruits.  
In recent years, scholars shifted to prominently discuss Russia’s misgivings 
about China’s presence in CA – and especially in CA’s energy sector – directly. They 
are perfectly aware, as they were in earlier stages, of the wariness in Moscow about 
any major power entering its “backyard”. Now, however, the major power in question 
is not only the US, but also China itself. After many years of emphasizing only an 
increased cooperation potential, many scholars came to a more mixed view and admit 
to colliding interests in the CA energy sector. While many call for greater patience 
and understanding for the Russian position, a growing number of authors spell out 
their conviction that it is Moscow, who deserves the blame for any friction over the 
CA issue. The PRC’s relations with CA countries are described as natural and as both 
a result and a requirement of the “good neighborliness”-policy (mulin youhao zhengce                                                         
99 This author’s determination of the onset of Chinese engagement in the CA energy sector is thus 
consistent with Liu Fenghua’s research. 
  88 
– ??????). It is only due to the prevalence of the “China threat theory” 
(zhongguo weixie lun – ?????), propagated by “extreme nationalists” (jiduan 
minzu zhuyizhe – ??????? ) that the Russian leadership still fails to 
understand China’s “peaceful rise”-policy (heping jueqi zhengce – ??????) 
and misconstrues its intentions.  
Nonetheless, a certain level of friction is not predetermined to result in open 
clashes. The Chinese foreign policy elite is all too aware of Russia’s concerns, as well 
as Western projections of a drastic deterioration in relations due to the CA theatre. 
Pertinent articles deal extensively with options to dissolve tension and dispel Russian 
fears and misgivings. Above all, the SCO shall be used to coordinate interests, reach 
compromises on energy matters and remind both parties of long-term common 
interests, such as stabilizing regimes, combatting terrorism and drug trade and making 
a common stand against Western influence. Accordingly, this author does not expect 
any open conflict in the short-term. Firstly, because both countries value their 
cooperation on diplomatic and regional matters highly. Secondly, because the Chinese 
leadership perceives Russia to be a nostalgic “ex-super power” and a fickle partner 
that is expected to overreact to a Chinese presence in its “backyard”. The PRC is 
ready to be patient with its important neighbor and to actively seek compromises to 
calm matters. 
 In the long-term, however, proliferating statements on CA’s centrality to 
Chinese energy security and the naturalness and inevitability of Sino-CA energy 
relations make it seem rather unlikely that China will back down completely and 
deliberately reverse a trend that will continue as long as the Sino-Russian economic 
balance continues to shift in its favor. Eventually, it still seems destined to replace 
Russia as the dominant economic force in CA – as it already has in Kyrgyzstan – and 
will at least match its role in CA energy. Two major steps have already been taken in 
this regard, with the Sino-Kazakh oil pipeline and the CA-China gas pipeline from 
Turkmenistan. In addition to that, the PRC begins to match Russia in uranium trade 
with Kazakhstan and in its engagement in Kyrgyz and Tajik hydro power. Moscow 
may come to view the PRC in CA much as it views EU activity in Moldova – where 
Russian economic importance has been marginalized –, Ukraine and Belarus. 
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5.1. All Quiet on the Western Front: 1997-2001 
In Liu’s first phase, this study’s concrete research object, Sino-Russian relations in 
the context of CA energy, was not yet discussed in Chinese IR journals, neither 
regarding cooperation nor possible friction.  
When opportunities for deepened relations were discussed, energy typically 
was not yet at the forefront and neither was the CA region when the energy topic was 
dealt with (eg Feng Yujun 1997a100; Qi Wenhai 1998101; Shi Ze 1996102; Ye Zicheng 
1997103; Zhao Huasheng 1999104; Zhao Huasheng 2000). CA was only generally 
mentioned as a neighboring region whose stability and development are in both 
countries interest (eg Shi Ze 2000), and where multilateral security and economic 
cooperation would be mutually beneficial (eg Feng Yujun 1998). 
Energy relations and the CA theatre did not feature prominently as potential 
challenges to the relationship either (eg Feng Yujun 1998; Shi Ze 1996;?Shi Ze 2000; 
Zhao Huasheng 1999). Among such challenges were instead, Russian presidential 
elections (Zhao Huasheng 1999:5), an unsettled Russian foreign policy (Zhao 
Huasheng 1999:5), cultural and “civilizational“ differences (Zhao Huasheng 1999:5), 
differences in the political system (Feng Yujun 1998:[5]), an imbalance in political 
and economic relations (Feng Yujun 1998:[4-5]), border demarcation (Shi Ze 1996:7), 
Russian economic relations with Taiwan (Shi Ze 1996:7) and the popularity of the 
“China threat theory“ among Russian scholars and some officials (eg Feng Yujun 
1997a:[3]; Feng Yujun 1998:[5]; Shi Ze 1996:7; Zhao Huasheng 1999:5).  
                                                        
100 Feng Yujun, who was born in 1970, is the director of the “Institute of Russian Studies“ at the 
CICIR. He is a member of the younger generations of Chinese IR scholars and clearly a “Russia 
Watcher“.  
101 Qi Wenhai is a 1999 graduate and thus belongs to the younger generations of Chinese IR scholars. 
He works at the “Northeast Asia Research Center“ at Heilongjiang University. 
102 A 1973 graduate, Shi Ze is a member of the older generation of IR scholars, his methodological 
proclivities did, however, not seem to make him irrelevant for the purposes of this study. Working at 
the “Department for SCO Studies“ at the CIIS, he can be considered a “Russia Watcher“. 
103 Ye Zicheng, professor at Peking University, is a 1985 graduate and a member of the younger 
generations of Chinese IR scholars.?
104 Zhao Huasheng is the director of the “Center for Russia and Central Asia Studies“ at the CASS, the 
director of the “Center for SCO Studies“ at Fudan University and the vice chairman of the “Chinese 
Society for the Study of Sino-Russian relations“. Having graduated in 1983, he is to be classed with the 
younger generations of Chinese IR scholars and clearly is a “Russia Watcher“.  
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Interestingly, the PRC was mostly not yet discussed as one of several major 
powers vying for position in the geopolitically important region of CA (eg Feng 
Yujun 1997b:78). The latter was described as Russia’s “backyard“ (houyuan – ??) 
(ie a zone of traditional comprehensive military, political, economic and cultural 
influence), which Moscow intended to use as a base for retaking its former position as 
a great power (eg Feng Yujun 1997b:81-82). Several authors mentioned that CA 
energy exporters remained completely dependent on the Russian pipeline network. 
Their economies were still controlled by the RF, who feared that “more 
sovereignty“ in CA and less Russian influence could harm the Russian economy (eg 
Shi Ze 1998:2). It was also problematized that the US was starting to intrude into the 
wider CA/Caucasus region – eg through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline –, thus 
arousing Russian ire (eg Deng Hao 2000:11-12105; Feng Yujun 1997b:79-81).  
From the CA republics’ perspective, though, the need to break away from 
Russian control was noted. Russia was said to levy excessive transit fees and to set 
volume limits for CA exports, thereby “endangering CA’s economic safety“ (Yu 
Cuiping 2000:35)106. The need for a regional market for CA energy was described, 
with the global market (ie any port) said to be too far away to be viable. Moreover, 
more foreign assistance and capital should reach these countries within regional 
cooperation (Fan Lijun / Yu Cuiping 2000 / Li Yushun:[2-3]107; Yu Cuiping 2000). 
However, the conclusion from this was not articulated, China’s role was not expressly 
discussed108, nor was any impact this might have on Sino-Russian relations. 
In short, if CA was discussed it was not in the realm of mutual activities in the 
energy sector. Aside from that, the overall outlook on the impact of both energy 
cooperation (eg Qi Wenhai 1998) and the CA theatre (eg Feng Yujun 1997a) 
separately on the bilateral relationship, if mentioned, was very positive.?                                                        
105 Having graduated in 1987, the CIIS scholar Deng Hao is a member of the younger generations of IR 
scholars.  
106 ????????????????????????????????(Zhe bujin gei 
zhongya guojia zaocheng le yanzhong de liyi sunshi erqie hai weihai dao tamen de jingji anquan. – 
This not only greatly harms Central Asian countries’ interests, but also endangers their economic 
security.) 
107 All three are economists and energy experts respectively. 
108 See Deng Hao 2000:12 for an exception to that rule. Quite unusually, Deng already discussed Sino-
US-Russian triangular relations in CA in 2000. He mentioned that the PRC could be of political use for 
the CA states through balancing both Russian and US influence, and of economic use through eg 
energy cooperation. 
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5.2. US Intrusion and Sino-Russian Defense: 2001-2008 
In a second phase, beginning around the events and aftermath of 9/11, many articles 
on Sino-Russian relations continued to ignore CA (eg Cui Qiming 2007109; Feng 
Lianyong / Zheng Yu 2004110; Li Xiangdu 2002111; Yu Sui 2003112; Zhao Huasheng 
2001; Zhao Mingwen 2003113). When energy relations between the two Eurasian 
giants were analyzed, their overall impact on the relationship was still viewed 
consistently optimistic114 (eg Diao Xiuhua 2005a115; Diao Xiuhua 2005b; He Shinian 
2006116; Xia Yishan 2007117; Yang Cheng 2007118; Zhang Jingcheng 2003119). CA 
oftentimes was not included in these deliberations either (eg Feng Yujun / Ding 
Xiaoxing / Li Dong 2002120; Feng Yujun 2007; He Shinian 2006; Li Xing 2005121; 
                                                        
109 Cui Qiming is a political science professor and Russia scholar at Central China Normal University. 
110 Both scholars work at “China University of Petroleum“. 
111 Li Xiangdu is a “Russia Watcher“ at the CASS and a member of the older generation of Chinese IR 
scholars, being a 1965 graduate. His article on Sino-Russian relations did not include anything on 
either energy or CA and was highly optimistic. 
112 Working at the “China Center for Contemporary World Studies“, Yu Sui is a member of the older 
generation of Chinese IR scholars. He has taught at several elite universities in the PRC and dealt with 
the SU and the RF for a long time. His optimistic article did not contain anything on CA. 
113 Having graduated in 1993, Zhao Mingwen is to be classed with the younger generations of IR 
scholars. Working at the “Department for SCO Studies“ at the CIIS, he can be considered a “Russia 
Watcher“. 
114 Confirming this, is a review of relevant Chinese journals from 2006 by Friederike Wesner and Anne 
J. Braun that states: “China’s energy relations with Russia are considered to be very good; Russia is 
predominantly viewed as a partner“ (Wesner / Braun 2006:5). 
115 Born in 1973, Diao Xiuhua, who works at the “Heilongjiang Academy of Social Sciences“ in the 
Russia Department, is among the PRC’s younger IR scholars. 
116 He Shinian works for Zhongguo Shihua Baoshe?(“China Petrochemical News“). 
117 Xia Yishan is an energy expert and worked at the CIIS for some time. 
118 Born in 1977, Yang Cheng, who works at the “Center for Russian Studies“ at East China Normal 
University, is a member of the younger generations of Chinese IR scholars and a “Russia Watcher“. 
119 Zhang Jingcheng is a statistician and energy expert. 
120 Like Feng Yujun, (the younger) Ding Xiaoxing and Li Dong both work at the CICIR, where the 
former serves as director of the “Division for Central Asian Studies“. 
121 Li Xing is a professor at Beijing Normal University’s Political Science and IR Department.?Being a 
1993 graduate he belongs to the younger generations of Chinese IR scholars.?He mostly deals with 
Eurasia and the CIS. 
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Diao Xiuhua 2005; Yang Cheng 2007; Zhou Yanli 2006a122; Zhou Yanli 2006b), 
while the focus was on the ESPO and Kovykta projects, as well as nuclear 
cooperation and potential electricity imports from the RF (eg Zhou Yanli 2006b).  
Among noted problems in energy relations, one can find the interference of 
other actors such as the US and Japan (eg Han Lihua 2006:4-5123; Hao Ruibin / Wang 
Weiyi 2006:8124), a lack of mutual political trust and coordination (eg Han Lihua 
2006:6), and also still the “China threat theory“ (eg Li Xing 2005:5). The latter was 
said to remain a factor both in Russia and in the CA republics, where some apparently 
feared to leave Russia’s shadow only to enter the PRC’s (Liu Fenghua 2007:69). 
Some Russian scholars are quoted as writing that Chinese energy companies do not 
want to contribute to production and refinement in Russia when seeking to enter the 
Russian upstream market in oil and gas. Instead they supposedly only seek to lock up 
secure imports for China, which would run counter to Russian strategy (Li Xing 
2005:5).  
Such fears are either not commented on or immediately discounted. Liu 
Fenghua (2007:63) ascribes them to those countries’ scholars’ failure to understand 
China’s “peaceful development“-strategy and neighborly diplomacy. “Cold War-
thinking“ (lengzhan siwei – ????) and “extreme nationalism“125 were said to be 
responsible for the inability to comprehend that Beijing does not want to threaten 
Russia, nor to create a sphere of influence for itself. Li Xing (2005:5) emphasized that 
China would indeed want to produce and refine in Russia and – as is generally done – 
underlined the PRC’s principled and comprehensive push for mutually beneficial 
relations with all its partners. In Moscow’s direction, however, a reminder follows 
that in market economy times, one has to be pragmatic, political relations should not 
be implicated by such things, it should be avoided that “a lack of forbearance in small                                                         
122 Zhou Yanli works at the “Liaoning Academy of Social Sciences’“ “World Economy Research 
Institute“. 
123 Han Lihua is a 1982 graduate and thus a member of the younger generations of Chinese IR scholars. 
She works at the “Institute of International Economy“ at the “University of International Business and 
Trade“ and has been specializing in the RF, CIS and SCO and can be considered a “Russia Watcher“. 
124 Hao Ruibin works at the Geography Department at “Tangshan Teacher’s College“ and Wang Weiyi 
at Nankai University’s Business School. Both deal with issues of resource management and energy 
economy. 
125 Such ideological motives were also seen to be behind one-sided views of border treaties and illegal 
immigration (Liu Fenghua 2007:63). 
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matters upsets great plans“ (xiao bu renze luan damou – ???????) (Li Xing 
2005:5). This reminder and others like it should be read as a preparation for further 
economic inroads Chinese companies will likely make both in Russia and in CA. The 
Russian leadership should be reminded of the “strategic partnership’s“ worth and 
called upon to not blow examples of a further shift in the Sino-Russian economic 
balance out of proportion.  
Discussions of CA dealt increasingly with US-Russian relations. After a 
certain initial uptick, the “turn from cooperation to competition“ (mei’e guanxi you 
hezuo zhuanxiang jingzheng – ???????????) (cf Shi Ze 2005:37) and 
the ensuing scramble for CA was extensively described (eg Liu Fenghua 2007; Liu 
Xiaoling 2006126; Shi Ze 2005; Xia Feng 2007127). Next to military issues – the US 
military entering the former Soviet space (ie “Russia’s traditional sphere of influence“) 
with bases to support the war in Afghanistan (Liu Xiaoling 2006:18) – and efforts for 
democratization – culminating in the “color revolutions“, eg in Kyrgyzstan (Liu 
Fenghua 2007:71-72) –, energy was central in these deliberations (eg Shi Ze 2005:38-
39). The US, the world’s largest customer and in the process of diversifying its energy 
sources, was said to have broken the Russian monopoly on CA (defined wider here to 
encompass the Caucasus) energy. Thereby challenging the Russian position, the 
Americans were claimed to have become the RF’s main competitor in the region (eg 
Liu Xiaoling 2006:18; Xia Feng 2007:9). A competitor that was welcomed as a 
counterweight to Russia by CA governments (Liu Fenghua 2007:70). Regarding the 
PRC’s place in the CA power struggle, repeated calls to fend off 
“unilateralism“ (danbian zhuyi – ????) and “hegemonism“ (baquan zhuyi – ??
??) (eg Shi Ze 2007:49) as well as the “Westernization“ (xifanghua – ???) of 
CA (eg Liu Fenghua 2007:72) made clear the proposition of a common Sino-Russian 
stance against the US presence in the region. 
 
Analyses of Sino-CA relations mostly ignored implications for the relationship 
between Moscow and Beijing (eg Deng Hao 2002; Shi Ze 2006; Shi Ze 2007; Song 
                                                        
126 A 2004 graduate of Beijing Normal University’s “Institute of Political Science and International 
Relations“, Liu Xiaoling is to be grouped with China’s younger IR scholars. 
127 Xia Feng is a younger IR scholar at the CICIR. 
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Weiping 2005128; Zhao Huasheng 2005). The picture painted for Sino-CA relations 
was generally one of a very solid political and economic basis and favorable 
conditions for a further deepening of ties (eg Feng Yujun 2007; Shi Ze 2006; Shi Ze 
2007; Song Weiping 2005). The rapid construction of roads, railways and pipelines 
was emphasized and molded into a general infrastructural edge of the PRC (eg Shi Ze 
2007:50). Common interests in securing and stabilizing the region, as well as 
geopolitical and geographical advantages of Sino-CA partnerships were underlined 
(eg Shi Ze 2006:16) and energy cooperation described as a “mutual necessity“ (Zhang 
Jingcheng 2003:36-37). 
When Russia was discussed as a factor in Sino-CA energy cooperation it was 
often in a rather neutral way (eg Wang Haiyun 2006129). Some authors, though, were 
more explicit. Liu Fenghua, distinguishes the two phases of Sino-CA relations before 
and after 2001 partly with reference to Russia. He claims that Sino-CA relations did 
not only hinge upon mutual interests and benefits before 2001, but were rather heavily 
shaped by the “Russia factor“ and the wish to not attract Russia ire (Liu Fenghua 
2007:69).130 Thereafter, though, a definitive and active Chinese engagement was 
finally established, with the SCO cooperation process only one sign of that (Liu 
Fenghua 2007:72).  
Moscow’s ongoing geopolitical and strategic intentions concerning the CA 
region, were said to prominently involve energy (eg Feng Yujun 2007). Moscow’s 
strategy still was to get CA exporters to keep using the Russian transport system, 
while securing the biggest share of the region’s resources for itself and trying to block 
unfavorable projects involving other powers (eg Sun Lingyun 2004:19131). Not only 
in this context, had Chinese authors discussed Russia’s usage of energy as a foreign 
                                                        
128 Song Weiping is a journalist at Zhongguo Shihua (“Sinopec Monthly“). 
129 Wang Haiyun is a former military attaché to Russia, a professor at National Defense University and 
a senior advisor at the “Chinese Society for International Strategy“. Born in 1945, he is to be classed 
with the older generation of Chinese IR scholars. As for his methodological proclivities, however, he 
does not seem to simply reiterate officially prescribed phrases and shall be included here. 
130 „?????????????????????????,??????????????
???????“ (Zhongguo yu zhongya guojia de guanxi zhuangkuang bujin qujue yu shuangfang de 
liyi he jiaowang, erqie zai xiangdang da de chengdu shang shoudao eluosi yinsu de yingxiang. – The 
condition of China’s relations with Central Asian countries did not only hinge on mutual interests and 
contacts, but to a quite considerable extent was influenced by the Russia factor.) 
131 Sun Lingyun works at Jiamusi University in Heilongjiang. 
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policy tool (eg Huang He 2007:5132). Moreover, this and a general improvement in 
Russia’s economic situation (eg Yan Hong 2007:32133) were cited as evidence for a 
resurgent and stronger RF.  
The CA republics, however, were said to have drastically changed since the 
end of the SU, to have developed ethnic and state identities and a strong wish for self-
determination (eg Feng Yujun 2007:14). Chinese scholars deemed the presence of 
several major powers advantageous from the CA states’ perspective, as the former 
could be balanced off each other (eg Feng Yujun 2007:14). Interestingly, among 
factors made out to be decisive for the future of RF-CA energy relations, was – next 
to the lasting role of the current CA elite (eg Feng Yujun 2007:14) and whether or not 
national interest on both sides and globalization would let CA and Russia drift apart 
(eg Feng Yujun:14) – the development of non-CIS powers’ strategic interests in CA 
and vice versa (eg Feng Yujun 2007:14). Although this formulation should primarily 
imply US and other Western engagement in the region, it fits the PRC as well. 
 
The PRC’s reaction to this situation should be a multi-layered effort to dispel Russian 
fears. Close friendly relations with the government in Moscow should be forged, 
helping the Russian government, among other things, to nationalize its energy sector, 
which is considered to be in China’s interest as well (eg Yu Yang 2007:35), and to 
counter the US intrusion (eg Liu Fenghua 2007:72). Additionally, the role of the SCO 
should be enhanced, and it should be used as a framework for bi- and multilateral 
energy cooperation (eg Han Lihua 2006:7; Wang Haiyun 2006:21; Xia Yishan 2007:8; 
Yu Yang 2007:35134). Energy cooperation with Russia and with the CA states should 
thus be dealt with together (eg Xu Xiaojie / Cheng Jian / Wang Yeqi 2007:58135). 
Furthermore, larger investments in the Russian energy sector are recommended (eg 
Han Lihua 2006:7), after creating favorable conditions for Chinese companies (eg Yu                                                         
132 Huang He is an assistant professor and resident fellow at the “Johns Hopkins University – Nanjing 
University Center for Chinese and American Studies“ and a member of the younger generations of 
Chinese IR scholars. 
133 Born in 1967, the “Liaoning University Institute for International Relations’“ Yan Hong is amoung 
the PRC’s younger IR scholars. 
134 Yu Yang is an economist at Jilin University. 
135 Xu Xiaojie works both at East China Normal University and CNPC’s “Research Institute for 
Economics and Technology“, counseling the company on foreign investment climates. Cheng Jian is a 
colleague at the former and Wang Yeqi one at the latter institution. 
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Yang 2007:35). Generous investments in the regions of Eastern Siberia and the RFE 
might also help dispel the “China threat theory“ (eg Hao Ruibin / Wang Weiyi 2006:8; 
Yu Yang 2007:34).  
 
5.3. ”Natural Relations” with CA and Chinese Confidence: The Financial Crisis 
and Beyond 
This author considers a third phase of the CA energy factor in Sino-Russian relations 
to have begun around the financial crisis of 2008. The RF and the CA republics were 
hit hard and in need of massive infusions of capital, which considerably worsened 
their bargaining position vis-à-vis Beijing. Several projects that had been delayed 
before for manifold reasons, prominent among them, though, a desire to keep 
negotiating and maximize benefits, were now swiftly realized (cf eg Feng Yujun / 
Zhao Chunchao 2009:3-4136). Accordingly, the PRC’s presence in the CA energy 
sector assumed a new quality. Chinese companies effected acquisition after 
acquisition, the last section of the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline was built and the 
Central Asia-China gas pipeline from Turkmenistan was constructed and inaugurated 
in record speed. The Russian leadership’s consent with Chinese activities in the 
region’s energy sector was thus tested in an unprecedented way. 
 
5.3.1. Sino-Russian (Energy) Relations: The Set-up (I) 
The outlook on Sino-Russian relations remains positive and the proclaimed 
importance of the strategic partnership ostensibly high (eg Su Fenglin 2008137; Wang 
Haiyun 2009; Wu Dahui 2011138; Zhou Yanli / Wang Bingyin 2009139). Although 
energy and the CA arena became much more central to studies of Sino-Russian 
relations in this most recent phase – which will become obvious in the following –,                                                         
136 Zhao Chunchao works at “China Great Wall Industry Corporation“. 
137 Su Fenglin was born in 1947 and works at the “Heilongjiang Provincial Academy of Social 
Sciences’“ “Russian Studies Institute“. Thus a “Russia Watcher“, but a member of the older generation 
of IR scholars, this scholar’s work has only been included here because of its peculiar emphasis on 
opinion polls in Russia. There is nothing on CA or energy, only a confirmation of a positive outlook.  
138 Wu Dahui is an assistant researcher at the CASS’s “Institute of Russian, Central Asian and Eastern 
European Studies“, a “Russia Watcher“ and a younger Chinese IR scholar. 
139 Wang Bingyin is a researcher from Boye in Hebei Province that mainly deals with the RF. 
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several studies continued to ignore energy relations (eg Chen Yurong 2011140; Su 
Fenglin 2008; Wang Lijiu 2010141) or to ignore CA when dealing with the energy 
realm (eg Chen Sixu 2011142; Chen Xianliang 2010143; Feng Yujun / Zhao Chunchao 
2009; Han Lihua 2008; Jian Ai 2009144; Xing Guangcheng 2011145; Zhu Guangqiang 
2009146). Interestingly, Feng Yujun (2011b) did not include energy cooperation or CA 
in his overview of the topics of current Russian Studies research in China. In another 
article on how to promote Russian Studies in the PRC, he only dealt with Sino-
Russian energy cooperation involving Eastern Siberia and the RFE (Feng Yujun 
2011a).  
If discussed, however, the importance of and positive effect of energy 
cooperation for bilateral economic relations is underscored (eg Chen Xianliang 2010; 
Jian Ai 2009; Xu Derong / Wang Yan 2009147). Economic factors are, moreover, seen 
as ever more dominant in the relationship, because an economically weakened Russia 
relies ever more on the PRC, to which the global economic center of gravity is said to 
be shifting (Liu Yongwei 2010:35148) – not least because it successfully weathered the 
financial crisis (Zhao Mingwen 2010b:66).  
Generally, authors note that progress in energy cooperation has received a big 
boost from the financial crisis (eg Li Ziguo 2010:50149; Liu Yongwei 2010; Sun                                                         
140 Having graduated in 1986, Chen Yurong, the director of the “Department for SCO Studies“ at the 
CIIS, is a member of the younger generation of IR scholars and a “Russia Watcher“. 
141 A graduate of 1978 Wang Lijiu, a “Russia Watcher“ at the CICIR, can still be classed with China’s 
older generation of IR scholars. His optimistic article did not reveal anything on CA or energy. 
142 Born in 1984 and working at Heilongjiang University’s Russian Studies Department, Chen Sixu is a 
“Russia Watcher“ of a younger generation. 
143 Harbin Normal University’s Chen Xianliang was born in 1972 and is a member of the younger 
generations of Chinese IR scholars. He works at the Politics and Law Department. 
144 Jian Ai is an assistant professor at Xi’an Peihua University, is to be grouped with China’s younger 
IR scholars and specializes in Sino-Russian relations (ie is a “Russia Watcher“). 
145 Xing Guangcheng is the deputy director of the CASS’s “Research Center for Chinese Borderland 
History and Geography“. 
146 Zhu Guangqiang is a Master’s degree student at the East China Normal University’s Political 
Science Department. 
147 Xu Derong, born in 1964, is a professor at Harbin Normal University’s Political Science and Law 
Department. Wang Yan, born in 1984, is an assistant professor at Harbin University of Finance. 
148 Liu Yongwei is a PhD student at East China Normal University. 
149 A 1998 graduate, Li Ziguo is a “Russia Watcher“ and a member of the younger generations of IR 
scholars. He is the assistant director of the “Department for SCO Studies“ at the CIIS.
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Yongxiang 2010150; Wang Haixun 2009:7-8; Zhao Mingwen 2010c:1; Zhou Yanli / 
Wang Bingyin 2009:5), although overall trade initially went down (Zhao Mingwen 
2010c:1). Before the crisis concrete progress is described as having been slow despite 
emphatic declarations of intent (Jian Ai 2009:2). Energy relations are, though still 
lagging behind political cooperation (eg Yang Wenlan 2010:9-10151), seen to be 
decidedly more efficient now. Lower oil and gas prices make the RF more receptive 
to Sino-Russian long-term projects and a cash-starved and debt-laden Russian energy 
industry is much more open to Chinese loans and investment (eg Liu Yongwei 
2010:35-36; Sun Yongxiang 2010:[1]). In addition to that, Western consumers want 
to shift to renewables (Zhao Mingwen 2010b:66), the EU’s demand goes down on 
account of the crisis and it and CIS countries want to lessen their dependence on 
Russia (Sun Yongxiang 2010:[1]). At the same time, China’s demand for hydrocarbon 
energy sources only soars to further heights. Long-term loans to Russia have been 
agreed upon and will be repaid in oil, while a gas supply framework treaty was 
signed. LNG from Sakhalin promises to reach China soon, as is the case for 
hydropower from the RFE (Sun Yongxiang 2010:[2-3]). The Russian government is 
more likely now, however, to bind requirements to its oil and gas supply, most 
prominently agreements to nuclear cooperation (eg Liu Yongwei 2010:35-36; Wang 
Haiyun 2011:7). 
Next to the effects of the financial crisis, several other incentives for closer 
cooperation are mentioned. First, economic complementarities and geographical 
advantages (eg Chen Xianliang 2010; Jian Ai 2009:1; Wang Haiyun 2011:8). Second, 
China’s centrality to Russian energy diplomacy (eg Jian Ai 2009:1). Third, Russia’s 
centrality to Chinese import diversification and energy security (eg Chen Xianliang 
2010:26-27; Jian Ai 2009:2; Wang Haiyun 2011:8). Fourth, China’s position as a 
possible gate to the Asia-Pacific market (eg Jian Ai 2009:2). Fifth, a common stance 
against US control of the international market. Sixth, a common stance against wild 
price fluctuations (eg Fu Yong 2009:40-41152; Jian Ai 2009:2). Russian pragmatism in 
energy relations is said to be good on the one hand, because old conflicts are cast                                                         
150 Sun Yongxiang works at the “Development Research Center of the State Council“. 
151 Yang Wenlan is an assistant professor and “Russia Watcher“ at the Inner Mongolia Finance and 
Economics College and a member of the younger generations of Chinese IR scholars. 
152 Fu Yong is a “Russia Watcher“ and assistant researcher at the Shanghai Academy of Social 
Sciences. He is to be classed with the younger generations of Chinese IR scholars. 
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aside, but bad on the other, as Moscow tends to disregard earlier arrangements if a 
possibility for profit maximization comes along (eg Jian Ai 2009:2). 
Concerning constraining factors, those admitted to be found on the Chinese 
side are clearly the minority and only seldom discussed. Xu Derong and Wang Yan 
(2009:19-20) listed missing the opportunity in the 1990s when the RF would have 
been very receptive to the quick realization of pipeline projects and in the process 
falling behind Western IOCs in Russia and CA. Furthermore, they detect a lack of 
internationalization and experience on the part of Chinese NOCs and of an efficient 
energy administration in the PRC. The latter should be apt to deal with the 
competition on the international market and should grant energy companies enough 
autonomy and support. On top of this, the PRC is said to still lack talent in the related 
areas and to not understand the Russian investment climate well enough. 
Internationally, Japan, the US, Korea and India, in that order, are said to interfere with 
at least some projects, lobbying for alternatives, and thus to block a more rapid 
progress (Xu Derong / Wang Yan 2009:20-21). 
The majority of restraining factors, limiting the volume of cooperation, are 
mostly located on the Russian side. First, the uncertainty about the stability in energy 
supply (eg because of diminishing production capacities153) (eg Sun Yongxiang 
2010:[4]; Wang Haiyun 2011:7-8; Yang Wenlan 2010:12). Second, the inhospitable 
investment climate in Russia (eg Pan Guang 2011:66154; Wang Haiyun 2011:7; Xu 
Derong / Wang Yan 2009:18) combined with the influence of oligarchs and interest 
groups (Xu Derong / Wang Yan (2009:19). Third, the inability to conclude price 
negotiations with the RF (eg Sun Yongxiang 2010:[3-4]; Yang Wenlan 2010:12; Zhu 
Guangqiang 2009). Fourth, Russia’s wish to dominate the Chinese natural gas market 
(eg Chang Yan 2010:21155). Fifth, Russian volatility in pipeline questions (eg Jian Ai 
2009:2; Xu Derong / Wang Yan 2009:17; Yang Wenlan 2010:12; Zhu Guangqiang 
2009). Sixth, the continued prominence of rail transport in Russian strategy (eg Jian 
                                                        
153 Due to the Russian energy industry being still in transition, with a lack of funds, lagging 
modernization and low exploration levels (Xu Derong / Wang Yan (2009:19). 
154 Pan Guang is the director of the “Center of SCO Studies“ at the Shanghai Academy of Social 
Sciences and a member of the younger generations of Chinese IR scholars. 
155 Chang Yan is a “Russia Watcher“ at Heilongjiang University. Born in 1972, she is to be grouped 
with the younger generations of IR scholars. 
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Ai 2009:2)156. Seventh, the RF’s maneuvering between Beijing and Tokyo157 (eg Jian 
2009:2-3; Sun Yongxiang 2010:[3]). Eighth, insufficient diversification of the oil- and 
gas-heavy energy cooperation (eg Yang Wenlan 2010:12-13) and ninth, Russia’s 
alleged prioritization of relations with the West (eg Wu Dahui 2011:13). 
On the last point, Shi Chunyang (2011:51158) elaborates that in the RF’s 
energy strategy Asia (including the PRC) only places fourth in importance after the 
CIS, Europe and the US.159 That is a very unusual public vote of no-confidence in 
Russia’s earnest efforts to develop Sino-Russian energy cooperation.160 It is, however, 
seconded by Wang Haiyun (2011:7), who calls Moscow’s prioritization of Europe 
“hard to change”161 and claims there is insufficient motivation for Sino-Russian 
energy cooperation. Shi Chunyang goes further and posits that Russia, despite the 
strategic partnership with Beijing, always plays all its customers against each other to 
maximize benefits. In response, China should thus “appropriately evaluate Sino-
Russian strategic oil and gas cooperation [and] view correctly, the position and 
function of Sino-Russian oil and gas cooperation in Russia’s overall external 
cooperation framework“ (qiadang pinggu zhong’e youqi zhanlüe hezuo, zhengque 
kandai zhong’e youqi hezuo zai eluosi zhengge duiwai hezuo goujia zhong de diwei yu 
zuoyong – ????????????Ｚ?????????????????
????????????). It should conduct a neighborly energy diplomacy in 
the region and cultivate multilateral energy cooperation (Shi Chunyang 2011:51). 
This very much seems like a reminder of Russia’s unreliability and non-committal 
behavior towards China, as well as a call to ignore Russian objections and go ahead                                                         
156 Partly due to lobbying by Russian Railways and its influential head Vladimir Yakunin. 
157 See also Xu Derong / Wang Yan 2009:19 who talk about Japan’s “money diplomacy’s“ detrimental 
effect to Sino-Russian energy cooperation; According to Fu Yong (2009:46), however, it was clear that 
maintaining a certain balance between the Chinese and Japanese markets is an integral part of Russia’s 
Far Eastern energy strategy and thus expectable and acceptable. 
158 Shi Chunyang works at Heilongjiang University’s Russian Studies Institute. 
159 The Russian Duma’s Vice-Chairman and Chairman of Russia’s Natural Gas Society Valery Yazev 
is quoted as saying: “In energy cooperation, Europe is our past, present and future, and Asia is only our 
future“ (Shi Chunyang 2011:51). 
160 See Fu Yong 2009:46 for a contrary opinion. The author states that Russia clearly shifts its energy 
strategy towards Asia, because of growing markets there and falling demand in Europe. 
161 ?????????????????????????(Youxian baozheng dui ouzhou youqi 
gongying shi e nengyuan zhanlüe nanyi gaibian de xuanze. – To first of all secure the oil and gas 
supply to Europe is a choice in Russian energy strategy that is hard to change.) 
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with Sino-CA energy cooperation. Furthermore, the possibility that the RF’s conduct 
might change again with economic circumstances and Moscow’s comportment vis-à-
vis completely dependent customers like Ukraine and Belarus are cited as reasons to 
be cautious and prepared (eg Yang Wenlan 2010:12; Zhou Yanli / Wang Bingyin 
2009:9)162.  
In addition to the foregoing, the growing trade deficit in relations with China 
is something still relatively new (since 2007) for the RF. Trade frictions are predicted 
if Russia does not manage to change the structure of its exports (eg Liu Yongwei 
2010:32-33). This leads to another and still prominent stumbling block – the tenth and 
most important restraining factor on the Russian side163 –: ongoing reservations about 
China among the Russian populace, as well as Russian scholars and officials. A lack 
of mutual trust is lamented, in connection with Russian nationalism and the “China 
threat theory’s” prevalence (eg Pan Guang 2011:66; Wang Haiyun 2009:8; Xu 
Derong / Wang Yan 2009:18; Yang Wenlan 2010:12; Zhou Yanli / Wang Bingyin 
2009:9). Some in Russia fear that their country could become the PRC’s “raw 
material dependency” (yuanliao fuyong – ????) (Sun Yongxiang 2010:[3]) or 
“resource colony” (nengyuan zhimindi – ?????) (Wu Dahui 2011:13), its 
resources being “plundered” (lüeduo – ??) (Chen Xianliang 2010:27), and that 
energy (and military) cooperation with the PRC only exacerbates the growing 
imbalance between the two countries (Shi Chunyang 2011:50). There are voices 
claiming Putin gives away Siberia to the Chinese and sells gas too cheaply (eg Chen 
Xianliang 2010:27). Some “extreme nationalists“ supposedly even want to make the 
government abandon the gas pipeline project to China and are contributing to a lack 
of cooperation between China’s Northeast and the RFE (Wu Dahui 2011:13).  
 
                                                        
162 See also: Chang Yan 2010:21, who holds that China’s history has taught it to not become dependent 
on any other country, and that the Ukrainian gas crisis has taught it to not become dependent on this 
particular supplier; and Shi Chunyang 2011:50 and Sun Yongxiang 2010:[3], who note that some in 
China fear that Moscow might go back on its word, as well as Wang Haiyun 2011:7, who states that 
Russia often exerts pressure on strategic partners and that “China needs utmost toughness and 
flexibility if it wants to deal with the RF” (???????????????????– Woguo yu 
e dajiaodao xuyao jida de renxing yu linghuoxing). 
163 According to Shi Chunyang (2011:50), all setbacks in Sino-Russian energy relations so far were 
caused by Russian wariness of China.?
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What is proposed to counter these hindrances, is comprehensively planning energy 
relations, clarifying goals and then actively pursuing them (Wang Haiyun 2011:8). 
The scope of cooperation should be deepened (eg oil exploration, pipeline 
construction and processing) and broadened (eg to coal and electricity trade) (eg Yang 
Wenlan 2010:13), while increasing the level of technological cooperation (eg Wu 
Dahui 2011:13). Russian energy companies should be made to have an economic 
interest in the PRC’s energy security and Chinese NOCs should find ways to invest 
more in the Russian upstream sector (eg Yang Wenlan 2010:14). Both goals might be 
achieved by trading access to the Chinese downstream sector for access to the Russian 
upstream sector (Wang Haiyun 2011:8). Moreover, China should continue to employ 
the “loans for oil”-strategy (Fu Yong 2009:47). 
“Narrow-mindedness” (xia’ai guannian – ????) in Russia (cf “China 
threat theory”) should not be underestimated. The “China threat theory“, which has a 
traditional base in Russia, might spread. Chen Xianliang (2010:26-27) recommends 
countering this tendency by “striving to make our northern neighbors understand 
China’s “peaceful development“-strategy“ (jinli shi women de beifang linju liaojie he 
renshi zhongguo de heping fazhan zhanlüe – ????????????????
????????), increasing cultural exchanges and thus mutual understanding, as 
well as increasing communication between the two societies and scholars and media 
on both sides.164 
On another note, Russian export diversification should be answered by 
Chinese import diversification, avoiding overly dependence on Russia and thus any 
potential for the RF to threaten Chinese energy security (eg Chang Yan 2010:21; 
Chen Xianliang 2010:26-27; Yang Wenlan 2010:14). Continued worldwide energy 
diplomacy by the Chinese leadership should keep the pressure on Moscow to do more 
for energy cooperation with the PRC (eg Qian Juan 2011:86; Yang Wenlan 2010:14). 
Finally, if NOCs cannot bid at auctions (cf Slavneft), private capital should be 
allowed into China’s energy companies (eg Yang Wenlan 2010:14). 
 
                                                        
164 See also: Shi Chunyang 2011:50 who calls for more exchanges between academic and business 
elites as well as societal representatives in order to increase mutual understanding. 
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5.3.2. The PRC and the RF in CA: The Set-up (II) 
Regarding Sino-CA relations, progress is viewed generally positive and the outlook is 
accordingly (eg Feng Shuiping 2010:61; Shi Ze 2008:57-58; Zhang Yao 2009:116165; 
Zhao Mingwen 2010a:64). This is described as a natural result of China’s “good 
neighborliness”-policy – which some Russian scholars are said to have acknowledged 
(Zhao Mingwen 2010a:65)166. CA’s important place in Chinese energy security, an 
ever more pressing issue (Zhang Yao 2009:116), is underscored with manifold 
arguments.  
The region helps the PRC to diversify sources and to get the initiative in 
energy price politics (eg Qian Juan 2011:86167; Wang Xiaomei 2008:46168). Energy 
cooperation there is described as geopolitically important (Zhang Yao 2009:116)169 
and even “an inevitable choice in China’s energy strategy” (Wang Xiaomei 
2008:43).170 In general, the development of relations with “peripheral neighboring 
countries” in CA is described as “inevitable” (Zhao Huasheng 2010:38)171 and 
                                                        
165 Zhang Yao is a PhD student at East China Normal University. 
166 ????????????Ｚ???????????????????Ｚ???????
?????????????(Ye zhengru eluosi youde zhuanjia suoyan, “zhongguo yu zhongya 
guojia ge lingyu hezuo nenggou buduan shenru, zhuyao chenggong zai zhongguo de mulin zhengce yu 
hexie de linian“. – This corresponds to what some Russian scholars are saying, “China manages to 
ceaselessly deepen cooperation in every field with the Central Asian countries, the main success stems 
from China’s “good neighborliness“-policy and the concept of harmony.) 
167 Born in 1983, Qian Juan, who works at Nanjing Normal University, is among China’s younger IR 
scholars. She focuses on international politics. 
168 Wang Xiaomei is an economist at the University of International Business and Economics. 
169 ?????Ｚ???????????????????????Ｚ??????????
?????Ｚ?????????????????????(Cong changqi laikan, zhe zhong 
hezuo bingbu jinjin shi zhongguo yu zhongya zhijian jingji huli de xuyao, gengyou diyuan zhengzhi liyi 
shang de kaoliang he xuyao. – From a long-term perspective, this kind of cooperation is not only a 
necessity of mutual economic benefits between China and Central Asia, it is, moreover, a necessity on 
the basis of geopolitical benefits, having enormous significance for China’s future energy security.) 
170 [...] ???????????????????????([...] Jiaqiang yu zhongya de nengyuan 
hezuo shi zhongguo nengyuan zhanlüe de biran xuanze. – [...] Strengthening energy cooperation with 
Central Asia is an inevitable choice in Chinese energy strategy.) 
171 ???????????Ｚ??????????(Zhongguo zeshi zhongya wie zhoubian 
linguo, biran yao yu zhi fazhan guanxi. – [After stating that Russia sees the region as in its sphere of 
influence, where it wants to exclude other powers:] China, though, sees Central Asia as its peripheral 
neighbor with whom it will inevitably develop relations.)?
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required by the “good neighborliness”-policy (Zhao Huasheng 2010:41)172. CA is a 
more secure source than the Middle East because it is less volatile, neighboring and 
over land transport is possible (eg Qian Juan 2011:86; Zhang Yao 2009:126). It can 
serve better to relieve dependence on the Middle East than Africa or Southeast Asia, 
because the former is in turmoil and the latter’s resources are wearing thin (Wang 
Xiaomei 2008:44). In addition to that, imports from CA are said to be cheap and 
convenient (Wang Xiaomei 2008:44). Engaging in CA, which borders both the RF 
and the Middle East, will supposedly also help foster relations with energy exporters 
there (!) (eg Qian Juan 2011:86) – maybe resources from there will even be 
transported through CA to China (eg Chen Xiaoqin 2011:90; Lang Yihuan / Wang 
Limao 2008:1781-1782173; Qian Juan 2011:86; Wang Xiaomei 2008:44). Energy 
cooperation with CA could, moreover, reinvigorate the opening and development of 
the PRC’s West and stabilize the Western periphery (eg Chen Xiaoqin 2011:90; Qian 
Juan 2011:86; Wang Xiaomei 2008:44; Zhang Yao 2009:128). Finally, using CA 
resources is better than exploiting China’s own, because the latter are more expensive 
to exploit and this way strategic reserves are kept and more strategic choices are 
available later on (eg Qian Juan 2011:86; Wang Xiaomei 2008:44).  
On the other hand, the PRC’s potential benefits to CA economies are touted. 
For one thing, it constitutes a directly adjacent, big and long-term market for energy 
(eg Feng Shuiping 2010:60; Zhang Yao 2009:120) that has the additional advantage 
of possibly performing as a gateway to other Pacific customers (eg Wang 
Xiaomei:46; Zhang Yao 2009:121). Secondly, the Chinese state can provide massive 
financial assistance, important expertise and help in modernizing the CA energy 
industry (eg Feng Shuiping 2010:60; Zhao Mingwen 2010a:65). Zhao Mingwen 
(2010c:8) adds that China is the only country able and willing to make big 
investments in CA – he writes about Tajikistan, but this can be extrapolated – at the 
moment, as the West has been hit hard by the financial crisis and Russia’s                                                         
172 ????????????????????Ｚ????????????????Ｚ??
????????(Zhongguo fazhan yu zhongya de guanxi shi mulin youhao zhengce de yaoqiu, 
zhongguo cong zhongya  jinkou youqi shi chuyu guonei xuyao, dou bushi zhendui eluosi de. – China’s 
development of relations with Central Asia is a requirement of its “good neighborliness“-policy, 
China’s import of oil and gas from Central Asia springs from domestic needs, it is not at all directed 
against Russia.) 
173 Lang Yihuan works at the “Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research“ in 
Beijing and specializes in the oil industry and energy security. 
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investments eg in Tajikistan have been disappointing (!)174. According to Chen 
Xiaoqin (2011:91), this has led to the PRC being viewed, much more than before, as a 
main trading partner and strategic investor across CA. Thirdly, the PRC promotes 
infrastructural connections (rail- and highway links, pipelines, electric grids) between 
the CA states, thus linking up the region and speeding up development (Chen Xiaoqin 
2011:93; Zhao Mingwen 2010a:65). Fourthly, the PRC is said to perfectly fit these 
countries’ diversification strategies (ie Sino-CA energy cooperation is “natural” in 
this sense as well) (eg Zhang Yao 2009:120-121; Zhao Mingwen 2010a:64; Zhao 
Mingwen 2010c:8; Zhao Mingwen 2011:40). Kazakhstan supposedly has only one 
option to diversify its export routes, China in the East. It wants to diversify away from 
Russia in the North, and Afghanistan and Pakistan in the South, as well as the 
Caucasus in the West are described as too volatile to be viable options (Zhang Yao 
2009:121). Fifthly, the PRC can help balance other major powers in the region (Zhao 
Mingwen 2010a:64). According to Zhao Mingwen (2010a:65) the fates of CA and 
China will get “even more inseparably linked” (?????? – gengjia jinmi 
xianglian) and relations will be deepened much further in the future. 
A first restraining factor might be found in the US military presence, as the US 
is claimed to feel uneasy about China’s inroads in CA, particularly its energy sector 
(Zhao Mingwen 2010c:6). Second, US and EU efforts to introduce “Western 
democracy” and a Western value system in order to pull the region into the West’s 
sphere of influence also work against Chinese interests (eg Feng Shuiping 2010:60). 
Third, versions of the “China threat theory” – talk of a supposed “economic 
colonialism” (jingji zhimin zhuyi – ??????) – being espoused by some CA 
scholars slow cooperation (eg Pan Guang 2011:66; Zhao Mingwen 2010a:65). Zhao 
Mingwen (2010a:65; 2010c:7), though, claims that these have receded since the 
financial crisis.175 As they should, because the PRC is not seeking dominance in the 
                                                        
174 ??????????????Ｚ?????????????????????????
??????????????????????(Youqi shi zai xifang jingji shangwei zouchu 
digu, “eluosi dui ta touzi lingren shiwang qingkuangxia zhongguo shijishang shi weiyi yige nenggou 
touzi ta jingji bing zai nali zuo daxing xiangmu de guojia“. – Especially in a situation where Western 
economies are still in the doldrums and “Russian investments in Tajikistan are disappointing, China is 
really the only country able to invest in the Tajik economy, in any case in large scale projects there.“) 
175 ????????????????????(Jinrong weiji shi zhongya guojia duihua fangfan 
xintai dawei jianruo. – The Financial Crisis has greatly weakened the guarded attitutde towards China 
in the Central Asian countries.) 
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region, only mutually beneficial relations in a stable neighborhood. This, he claims, 
will be shown by China’s actions and will win the trust of CA peoples and 
governments, which will want to develop closer ties with their Eastern neighbor.  
?
Concerning RF-CA relations, Russia is said to still be “irreplaceable” (wufa tidai – ?
??? ) in the region (Zhang Ye 2009:15 176 ), to command a historical and 
geopolitical advantage in the competition for CA (Feng Shuiping 2010:57), which is 
within its traditional sphere of influence (Wu Enyuan 2009:33177) and is viewed as a 
“strategic backyard” (zhanlüe houyuan – ????) and “resources storage” (ziyuan 
cunchu – ????) (Fu Yong 2009:45). Moscow, it is held, has “a special 
relationship” with CA (eg Zhao Huasheng 2008c:5; Zhao Huasheng 2011:15), its 
position a historical fact (Zhang Ye 2009:15). What is more, some authors claim that 
it strengthened its position since the mid-decade “color revolutions” (eg Zhang Ye 
2009:15), while pushing hard for (at least economic) unification of the former Soviet 
space (eg Pan Guang 2011:63). Control over CA energy exports (eg Zhang Yao 
2009:116; Hu Bin 2009:35 178 ) is only one of many aspects of the manifold 
interdependence that Russia intends to keep. It is, however, essential to realizing 
Moscow’s geopolitical energy strategy (eg Fu Yong 2009:45), its modernization 
process (Chen Xiaoqin 2011:90) and its long-term intention of economic reintegration 
of the CIS (ie both economically and politically vital (Fang Yixian 2008:3)179). To 
attain these goals Russia does not shy away from using oil and gas as weapons (Xu 
Derong / Wang Yan 2009:17). 
According to Chinese scholars, the CA republics, on the other hand, want to 
loosen their dependence on Russia, though they try not to offend it and still take its 
interests into account in the process (eg He Lunzhi / Amuti / Zhang Xinhua 
2008:41180; Yang Lei 2010:36181). The RF cannot absorb all their exports (eg Li                                                         
176 Zhang Ye is a PhD student at the Xinjiang University. 
177 Wu Enyuan is the director of the CASS’s “Institute of Russian, Central Asian and Eastern European 
Studies“, a “Russia Watcher“ and a member of the older generation of Chinese IR scholars. He did not 
say anything specific on the impact of CA energy on Sino-Russian relations. Still one article was 
included, which did show a rather balanced appraisal of Russia’s position in the region. 
178 Hu Bin is a journalist that discusses issues of energy security. 
179 Fang Yixian is a Master’s student at Xinjiang University. 
180 This has been a collaborative study from Xinjiang University. 
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Shiqun / Yan Hongyi 2011:120-121182) and they fear a return of Russian imperialism 
(eg Wu Enyuan 2009:32).183 Consequently, governments throughout CA have decided 
to diversify184 their energy exports. Yang Lei even postulates that Kazakhstan is 
destined to compete with Russia in energy and mineral exports as well as transit 
pipeline routes, and that it was Astana that has broken the RF’s monopoly on exports 
from the region (Yang Lei 2010:34).185  
Some consider Russia’s position as dominant actor in the CA energy sector 
too have been severely challenged (eg Hu Meixing 2010:4186), by CA governments’ 
push to regain control of their energy sectors and to diversify exports (eg Hu Meixing 
2010:4-6). Deficiencies in technology development and financial capital have also 
weakened the RF’s position (eg Hu Meixing 2010:4-6). The US is still described as 
the second main contender for the region (eg Feng Shuiping 2010:57-58), even the 
EU’s emergence in the CA theatre is noted (Feng Shuiping 2010:58). Although 
Moscow has succeeded in securing participation in manifold projects and further 
expanding its pipeline network, its monopoly on export from Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan has been broken by pipelines to the PRC and Iran (eg Hu Meixing 
2010:6). It is acknowledged in this context that particularly energy cooperation 
between CA exporters and China is expanding continuously (eg Hu Meixing 2010:6). 
Zhao Huasheng already wrote in 2008, that every major power involved in the 
CA energy game – naming Russia, the US and China (!) – cannot just retreat from this 
crucial area, reiterating its importance for energy security and geopolitics. According 
to him the competition there is likely to be “fierce” and “protracted” (Zhao Huasheng                                                                                                                                                               
181 Yang Lei works at Nankai University’s “Zhou Enlai School of Government“ and focuses on Russia 
and CA, as well as international organizations and international law. 
182 Both authors work for energy companies that belong to CNPC. 
183 ????????????????????Ｚ??????????(Zhongya geguo 
danxin eluosi huifu diguo de sixiang genshen digu, yu e hezuo shi gulü jiaoduo. – Each country in 
Central Asia worries about Russia’s idea of a restoration of the empire being deep-rooted, there is a lot 
of anxiety when cooperating with Russia.) 
184 Though Kazakh President Nazarbayev did still “guarantee“ in bilateral negotiations in 2007 that „if 
not all, than most of Kazakhstan’s oil will continue to be exported to or transported through 
Russia“ (Zhao Huasheng 2008a:2). 
185 Through its support for and supplies to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and in the uranium 
sector by getting in French firms. 
186 Hu Meixing is a “Russia Watcher“ working at the CICIR. The “Assistant Research Officer“ is a 
member of the younger generations of Chinese IR scholars. 
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2008c:6).187 Chen Xiaoqin (2011:89)188 notes that this geostrategic space is necessary 
for both Russia’s and China’s future development and some competition over it can 
thus not be avoided. This competition could even intensify in the wake of Russia’s 
modernization process, as its need for both energy resources and a geopolitical power 
base will grow (Chen Xiaoqin 2011:90). Zhao, however, notes some common 
interests and challenges for all major powers in the region – most prominently 
terrorism – (Zhao Huasheng 2008c:6-7) and Chen underlines that the cooperation 
potential between Beijing and Moscow is expanded as well. Regarding Sino-Russian 
relations Zhao quotes Russian politicians as saying that CA is certainly no “hereditary 
dominion“ (shixi lingdi – ????) of the RF, that others are invited to profit from it 
and that Russia can cooperate with other major powers there (Zhao Huasheng 
2008c:6). Zhao Huasheng thus seems to expect an amicable solution of this rather 
friction-prone situation as well. He reiterates that opinion in 2010 (41-42) when he 
calls Sino-Russian competition in CA “benign“ (liangxing – ??), emphasizing the 
possibility to orderly resolve present and avoid future conflicts. The two countries, it 
is claimed, are most importantly no security threat to each other and even have 
common security interests in the foreseeable future.?
 
5.3.3. Encounters in the Steppe (I): Problems and Fears 
This leads us back to the question of what influence mutual activities in the CA 
energy sector are perceived to have on the Sino-Russian relationship by Chinese IR 
                                                        
187 ?????????????????Ｚ???????????????Ｚ??????
????????Ｚ????????Ｚ????????Ｚ??????????????
????Ｚ?????????????Ｚ  ????????? (Zhongya nengyuan ye 
yinhanzhe yinqi daguo chongtu de fengxian, dui zhongguo, eluosi, meiguo deng daguo laishuo, 
zhongya nengyuan de yiyi bujin shi jingji shang de, ye shi nengyuan anquan shang de, haishi diyuan 
zhengzhi shang de, suoyou daguo dou bu hui cong zheyang chang nengyuan jingzheng zhong tuichu, 
dui nengyuan de jingzheng bujin jiang shi jilie de, ye jiang shi kuangrichijiu de. – Central Asian energy 
also implies the risk of causing big power conflict[;] for China, Russia and the US Central Asian 
energy’s significance is not only economical, but also a matter of energy security and geopolitics[;] all 
major powers can not retreat from this arena of energy competition[;] the competition for energy is not 
only going to be fierce, but also protracted.) 
188 ????????????????????????Ｚ???????????????
???????(Zhongya diqu shi zhong’e liangguo weilai fazhan buke huoque de diyuan zhanlüe 
kongjian, xianghu jingzheng yiji youci keneng dailai de fumian yingxiang buke bimian. – The Central 
Asian region is an indispensable geostrategic space for the future development of China and Russia, 
mutual competition and averse affects that might be brought about by this can not be avoided.) 
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scholars (ie the “influential elite” that has been delimited for this study’s purposes), 
and what policy measures they subsequently recommend. In addition, the two 
hypotheses that have been posited on the basis of the Western state of research should 
be kept in mind. Those are, that Chinese and Russian interests collide in the CA 
energy sector and that this collision of interests will lead to the eruption of open 
conflict. 
Though sporadically, notions of Russian misgivings about the Chinese 
influence in CA and the SCO being more prominent in economic cooperation than 
EurAsEC do appear189 (eg Pan Guang 2011:66; Zhao Huasheng 2011:20-21; Zhao 
Mingwen 2010a:64; Zhao Mingwen 2010b:66; Zhao Mingwen 2011:40). Russia is 
also claimed to feel the threat of marginalization in energy projects and to strive 
fervently to convince Beijing to rather take its resources than those of Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (Zhao Mingwen 2010b:66). Zhao Mingwen notes 
“continuous complaints” (2011:40)190 and holds that the RF had always tried to hinder 
the development of energy cooperation between the CA countries and other 
partners191.  
Now, Zhao claims, and cites Russian sources, many in the Russian elite have 
reached the conclusion that China has already become Russia’s principal competitor 
in the region, trying to envelop it in its economic sphere of influence (Zhao Mingwen 
2010a:64; Zhao Mingwen 2010c:7192; Zhao Mingwen 2011:40). Xu Derong and 
Wang Yan (2009:18) even quote President Putin’s former National Security Advisor 
Kartonov as calling China a “geopolitical opponent” (diyuan zhengzhi duishou – ??
????).193 Russia fears that the PRC will attempt to displace it as the region’s                                                         
189 This does not mean that other articles see Russia enthusiastically endorsing a larger Chinese 
presence in CA, as something that would benefit its interests. The issue is simply ignored. 
190 ?????????????????????(Zhongguo yu zhongya guojia de nengyuan 
hezuo buduan yinfa efang baoyuan. – The energy cooperation between China and the Central Asian 
countries continually prompts complaints from the Russian side.) 
191 See also: Wang Haiyun 2009:4. 
192 See eg Viktoria Panfilova of “Nezavisimaya Gazeta“ (Zhao Mingwen 2010c:7, FN 3), who is 
quoted in this vein: ?????????????????????????????????
???(“Zhongguo chengle women de zhuyao jingzheng duishou. Zhongguo ba zhongya guojia zhiyu 
ziji de jingji yingxiangli zhi xia. – “China has become our principal competitor. China places the 
Central Asian countries under its economic influence.“) 
193 ??????????????? ???????? ,????????????????
???(“Zhongguo keguanshang shi eluosi de diyuan zhengzhi, jingji he junshi duishou, dui ezhong 
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dominant actor (eg Fang Yixian 2008:4; He Juan / Li Pengcheng 2010:131194; Zhang 
Ye 2009:15-16). Its worries only grow with increasing trade and especially energy 
cooperation between China and CA, as many in the RF think that China will 
eventually use its economic influence to acquire political influence (Zhao Mingwen 
2010a:64; Zhao Mingwen 2010c:6-7). The theory goes, that CA elites might turn 
from Russia to China, if economic relations continue to develop as staggeringly as 
they have done recently (Zhao Mingwen 2010c:7)195. For now, some in Moscow’s 
leadership worry that “[…] China establishes an even more direct and convenient 
pipeline network in Central Asia’s Eastern part, leading Central Asia’s oil and gas 
resources to be drained off to the East and West [this implies the cross-Caspian 
pipeline projects to Europe], the share of the northwards Siberian pipeline-network 
will be less and less.” ([…] ???????????????????????
?,???????????????????,??????????????
?????????– [...] Zhongguo zai zhongya dongbu diqu xingcheng gengjia 
zhijie bianjie de nengyuan guandao wangluo, shi zhongya youqi ziyuan zai xixiang ge 
dongxiang liangge fangxiang liushi, er beixiang de xiboliya guanxian wangluo 
suozhan de fene jiang yuelaiyueshao.) (Fu Yong 2009:46).  
In response Moscow tries to outdo Beijing in investment and economic 
cooperation, while pushing those multilateral organizations (ie EurAsEC) where 
China is not a member (eg Zhang Ye 2009:16). Contrary to the PRC, the RF is said to 
have a complicated relationship with the SCO, where its scholars and media fear it 
will be overshadowed by China (Zhao Huasheng 2011:15,21). The (credible) political 
stance is one of an active participant, though Zhao Huasheng (2011:15-17) points to 
the fact that political statements, actual behavior and public opinion are not all the 
same thing. The claim to not invest through the SCO framework on account of a lack                                                                                                                                                               
guanxi sihao ye buneng lixianghua he jiandanhua.“ – Objectively viewed, China is Russia’s 
geopolitical, economical and military opponent, Russia-China relations can not in the slightest be 
idealized and simplified.)?
194  Both He Juan and Li Pengcheng work at Lanzhou University’s “Institute of Politics and 
Administration“. 
195 ????????????????????????????????????????
??? (Zhongguo yu zhongya guojia jingji hezuo de fazhan weilai keneng daozhi difang jingyingzhe 
gaibian zhengzhi he anquan quxiang cong eluosi zhuanxiang zhongguo. – The future development of 
Sino-Central Asian economic cooperation might lead to the local elites changing their political and 
security orientation from Russia to China.) 
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of funds is discounted as a political strategy, because Russian investments to CA keep 
flowing, only outside SCO channels (Zhao Huasheng 2011:21). Furthermore, Russia 
supposedly treats the SCO as her organization when it chooses to make use of it. This 
fits into a wider trend, where Moscow – Zhao Huasheng quotes Lo Bobo here and 
agrees with him (Lo 2008:4 as quoted in Zhao Huasheng 2011:17) – still has a global 
power’s foreign policy although it is a declining power and China still has a regional 
power’s foreign policy although it is already ascending to global power status.196 
   
On account of its fears, the RF is now expressly named as a limiting factor to China’s 
economic advance in the CA region (eg Pan Guang 2011:63; Zhang Ye 2009:16). 
Consequently, it is to be determined what these fears could be based on, whether or 
not they contain a grain of truth and what is to be done to resolve this issue. 
Some Chinese experts admit that the CA-China gas pipeline did in fact break 
the Russian monopoly on gas exports from the region (Zhao Mingwen 2010c:7), that 
this did influence Russian efforts regarding its own gas pipeline network197 and that 
CA countries could garner a better negotiating position in energy disputes with 
Russia, because of the Chinese alternative (Chen Xiaoqin 2011:91; Zhao Mingwen 
2011:40). On top of that, China already controls about 21% of Kazakh oil 
production198 – a figure two and a half times that of Kazakhstan’s “strategic partner” 
Russia – and it recently acquired 49% of the important Kazakh oil and gas company 
MMG, although Russia had intensively pursued this purchase (Zhao Mingwen 
2010c:7). Zhao Mingwen, again quoting Russian sources, concludes that “[the fact 
that] Central Asia’s energy-rich nations continually broaden and deepen cooperation 
with China in energy and other fields, “will inevitably weaken the strength of the 
Kremlin’s energy diplomacy, and could even lead to a huge political crisis” (???                                                        
196 [...] ????????Ｚ????????????????????????Ｚ????
?????????????????Ｚ????????????????([...] Eluosi 
jinguan shuailuo le, dan diguo he chaoji daguo de ishi reng shi ta xiguan yu quanqiuxing waijiao 
sixiang, er zhongguo shi zhengzai cong diqu daguo xiang quanqiu daguo zhuanbian de guojia, ta de 
waijiao siwei reng gengduo shi diqu de shiye. – [...] Russia, although it declined, is still made by its 
imperial and super-power history to be used to global foreign policy thinking, China is currently 
turning from a regional to a global power, [however] its foreign policy thinking is still more of a 
regional view.)?
197 See also: Fang Yixian 2008:4 and Zhao Mingwen 2010a:64. 
198 According to Chen Xiaoqin (2011:91), however, it is not oil (nor coal or water) that the RF is 
worried about. What it needs for its energy reforms to work, is natural gas and uranium. Here Chinese 
inroads in CA sting most. 
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?????????????????????????I?????????
?????????I????????????????– Zhongya nengyuan 
fuji guo buduan kuoda he shenhua tong zhongguo de nengyuan he qita lingyu de 
hezuo, “biran hui xueruo kelimulingong ziyuan waijiao de shili, shenzhi you keneng 
yinqi judade zhengzhi weiji.“) (Zhao Mingwen 2010b:66). Zhao Huasheng explained 
that China’s policy of opening up the former Soviet space as a new market for its 
goods and as a resource base might indeed harm Russia’s intentions of unifying these 
countries under its banner (Zhao Huasheng 2011:21-22). The same author even 
explicitly called China’s presence in the CA energy sector “a challenge to Russia“ and 
stated that the RF and the PRC are both partners and competitors in CA energy (Zhao 
Huasheng 2011:22). This statement is confirmed by Shi Chunyang (2011:50) and Wu 
Enyuan (2009:33), the latter expanding it to posit that Russia, China, the US and the 
EU are all in a state of cooperation and competition in the region, which will endure 
in the foreseeable future.199  
Nonetheless, according to Zhao Huasheng the “crux of this problem does not 
lie in China’s attitude towards Russia, but in Russia’s response to China, because 
China has entered a region that used to belong to Russia“ (???????????
????????Ｚ????????????Ｚ????????????
????? – Zheli wenti de zhengjie buzaiyu zhongguo dui eluosi de taidu, er zaiyu 
eluosi dui zhongguo de fanying, yinwei shi zhongguo jinrule yuanshu eluosi de 
kongjian.) (Zhao Huasheng 2010:38). Moscow’s fears are often judged as misplaced, 
because the PRC, unlike the West, is said to respect Russia’s sphere of influence, not 
seeking any privileges, much less regional hegemony. What it wants is simply a 
peaceful, stable and safe neighborhood and vital energy imports (eg He Juan / Li 
Pengcheng 2010:131; Zhao Mingwen 2010a:65). It understands that Russia quite 
naturally feels hurt when other powers enter this former Soviet territory and 
envisioned pillar of a Russian resurgence (Zhao Huasheng 2010:40). However, Sino-
CA gas cooperation is claimed to not interfere with Russian interests (eg He Juan / Li 
Pengcheng 2010:131) and the priority of a common stance against the West – wherein 
the two depend on each other (Chen Xiaoqin 2011:91) – is reiterated (eg Fang Yixian 
2008:4; He Juan / Li Pengcheng 2010:131; He Lunzhi / Amuti / Zhang Xinhua                                                         
199 For CA that is deemed to be good, because the struggle contributes to the expanded development of 
the region’s resources and thus to its stability and overall development (Wu Enyuan 2009:33). 
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2008:43; Wang Haiyun 2009:4).200 Some claim that in the end energy cooperation 
with CA will even benefit Sino-Russian energy cooperation (eg He Juan / Li 
Pengcheng 2010:131; Wang Xiaomei 2008:43). Zhao Mingwen explains that China’s 
successes in CA energy will eventually make the RF realize its “energy cards” 
(nengyuanpai – ???) are not as strong as it thought and it might be prompted to 
settle on projects with China. The CA producers did so earlier on and now some in 
Russia might regret having missed an opportunity (Zhao Mingwen 2011:42)201. In any 
case, the positive trend of deepened cooperation in every field in Sino-Russian 
relations is deemed impossible to derail (Zhao Mingwen 2010b:67). 
Some, though, sound quite differently, when they say that “no country can 
monopolize Central Asia’s energy production and export” ([...] ?????????
??????????????– [...] Renhe yige goujia dou bu keneng longduan 
zhongya de nengyuan shengchan yu chukou.) (Feng Yujun 2008:66). It seems as if 
China’s claims are thereby staked out, although authors might add that this is due to 
CA producers’ diversification efforts. Friction, it is held, could arise between Beijing 
and Moscow, if Russia’s “sphere of influence-thinking” (shili fanwei siwei – ???
???) takes hold (Wang Haiyun 2009:8). This idea of control and exclusiveness in 
a certain region is said to conform with Russia’s traditional security thinking, but not 
with today’s world (!). Resistance from the envelopped smaller countries is 
supposedly bound to occur. A very interesting parallel is drawn, when it is stated that 
there are currently ever more conflicts with the US and the EU202 because of this 
thinking and that friction between China and Russia in this region could very well be 
brought about as well (Wang Haiyun 2009:8).203 This does not seem as if any                                                         
200 Zhao Mingwen (2010a:64) talks about the change in the US’s view of China in the CA energy 
realm. According to him it used to think that the PRC could be a partner in dividing up Russia, but now 
considers it an important competitor. 
201 See also: Ma Jianxin 2009:20 and Zhou Yanli / Wang Bingyin 2009:8 who similarly describe the 
“promoting function“ of Sino-CA energy cooperation regarding Sino-Russian relations. 
202 See also: Hu Bin 2009:35 for the struggle for Caspian energy between Russia and the West. This 
study does not discuss China’s role. 
203 ????????????Ｚ???????????????????????????
Ｚ?????????????????? (Eluosi huifu shili fanwei de nuli, zhengzai 
waigaojiasuo he zhongya yinfa yu diqu goujia ji mei, ou yulaiyuduo de chongtu, cunzai daozhi zhong’e 
zai zhongya fasheng moca de weixianxing. – Russia’s efforts to recover a sphere of influence currently 
lead to more and more conflicts with regional countries, the US and the EU, the danger exists that this 
could [also] lead to Sino-Russian friction in Central Asia.) 
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deference to Russia’s traditional position in the region is called for. Interestingly, 
Wang Haiyun only discusses CA in the context of possible obstacles to the Sino-
Russian relationship, not among the development opportunities he lists (Wang Haiyun 
2009). Nevertheless, he reiterates the more than dominant persuasion that the positive 
aspects and opportunities in the relationship clearly outweigh all obstacles, that 
difficulties will be resolved and the huge cooperation potential eventually realized 
(Wang Haiyun 2009:9)204.  
 
5.3.4. Encounters in the Steppe (II): Remedies and Expectations 
In short, several Chinese studies have concluded that Russian and Chinese interests do 
indeed collide in the CA energy sector (eg Zhao Huasheng 2010:41; Zhao Mingwen 
2010c:6 et seq). This fact should be acknowledged and dealt with; “to ignore or deny 
this would be neither objective nor wise” (????????????????? 
– hushi he fouren zhe yidian shi bu keguan he bu mingzhi de) and could harm the 
entire relationship (Zhao Huasheng 2010:41). Chen Xiaoqin (2011:91) spells out that 
the PRC as a major importer trying to keep up a stable supply needs to diversify, 
while the RF as a major producer strives to control the upper reaches of energy export 
channels to maximize its influence on consumer countries. Regarding the 
consequences, as exemplified by an article of Zhao Huasheng (2008c:6), Chinese IR 
scholars are well aware of Western analysts’ opinion that the CA region is what will 
most likely cause a clash between China and Russia. They do, however, as in the cited 
article, tend not to comment explicitly on whether they think the same.  
In an article from 2010, though, Zhao Huasheng (2010:42) answers directly. 
He notes Western expectations of Russian resistance policies as a response to the 
changing power balance and then lists counter-arguments. First, Sino-Russian 
relations in CA are said to be based on equality. Second, the RF had a greater overall 
influence in CA so far and that did not prompt China to adopt policies of containment. 
Third, Russian national strength has grown again since the late 1990s. Fourth, 
Russia’s deep roots in CA could not possibly be surpassed by the PRC, much less 
could the latter expel the RF “in the foreseeable future“ – which of course it does not 
want to either. Another Western theorem, the deterioration of relations with the loss                                                         
204 See also Zhao Mingwen 2010c:6 et seq. 
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of the common antagonist should the US withdraw from the region, is discounted as 
well (Zhao Huasheng 2010:42). The?“America Factor“ in Sino-Russian relations in 
CA is acknowledged. It is argued, however, that this is not the root cause for regional 
cooperation; relevant structures were in place before the US entered and the 
cooperation is not directed against any third party. Consequently, Zhao does not 
expect a tremendous impact should the US withdraw.205 He hopes for creative 
solutions, like merging the SCO with the EurAsEC, and expects the current balance in 
CA to roughly be maintained in the future. 
?
In any case, Chinese scholars (eg Chen Xiaoqin 2011:92) remind their audience that 
Sino-Russian long-term interests for CA are congruent. They list maintaining stability 
and security, promoting economic and societal development and countering the US 
presence in the region. A negative turn in the relationship is expected to be to both 
countries’ detriment, economically and regarding the stability of their neighborhood 
(cf terrorism, drug trade, etc). Authors generally recommend to always prominently 
consider the Russian position and handle the RF with care (eg He Lunzhi / Amuti / 
Zhang Xinhua 2008:43), to give it time to adapt to China’s rise (Fang Yixian 2008:4), 
which certainly puts “geopolitical pressure” on the “former superpower” Russia (Shi 
Chunyang 2011:50).206 They advocate a proactive policy of including Russia in 
Chinese deliberations and projects, reiterating that China only pursues a defensive 
policy and that it is always interested in investing in and cooperating with the RF (eg 
He Juan / Li Pengcheng 2010:131). Such investments should be generously made and 
the leadership should make sure that treaties are always mutually beneficial and 
balanced, thus dispelling Russian mistrust (eg He Juan / Li Pengcheng 2010:131; 
Wang Haiyun 2011:8).  
                                                        
205 ???????Ｚ???????????Ｚ???????????????????? 
(Cong zhege qianti chufa, wulun meiguo yinsu de cunzai yufou, dou bu keneng dui zhong’e zai zhongya 
de hezuo chansheng duoda yingxiang. – Setting out from this presupposition, no matter whether the 
America factor is there or not, this can not have a major impact on Sino-Russian cooperation in Central 
Asia.) 
206 ??????????????Ｚ?????????????????????????
?????(Cong yige xiri chaoji daguo de jiaodu chufa, zhongguo jingji shili de kuaisu shangsheng 
buke bimian de hui dui eluosi xingcheng diyuan shang de yali. – From the point of view of a former 
super-power, the rapid increase of Chinese economic strength inevitably puts geopolitical pressure on 
Russia.) 
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On the issue of mistrust and suspicions Wang Haiyun (2011:8) elaborates on 
prominent versions of the “China threat theory“ that have to be carefully countered 
and lists the “Chinese migrants threat theory“ (??????????zhongguo yimin 
weixielun), the “Chinese territorial claims theory“ (???????? ?? zhongguo 
lingtu yaoqiulun), the “Chinese economic expansion theory“ (???????? ??
zhongguo jingji kuozhanglun) and the “China engulfs resources theory“ (?????
????? zhongguo ziyuan tunshilun). Accordingly, the PRC has to be prepared to 
patiently and repeatedly make clear that it will work with Russian authorities to avoid 
a massive demographic influx into the RFE from China’s North-East, that it will 
never make any territorial claims concerning Russian territory (ie the comprehensive 
treaties of the last twenty years will be upheld), that it will not try to economically 
dominate Russia or CA and, importantly, that it will not try to monopolize CA energy 
resources or plunder those of Russia. Wang Haiyun (2011:9) discusses the 
mechanisms needed to accomplish this and says that a “small-group“ (xiaozu – ??) 
should be constituted, with the participation of every related governmental department 
and business leaders – both officials and businessmen in the group being specialized 
in energy and knowledgeable of IR – from both sides to coordinate Sino-Russian 
energy cooperation, thus pooling efforts for the promotion of Sino-Russian energy 
relations. In the same vein, the interests of the different energy companies should be 
coordinated to avoid “unorderly competition“207 (wuxu jingzheng – ????). As 
this issue has far reaching implications, trust has to be solidified and one should be 
prepared and plan meticulously, because “the road ahead might be bumpy“ (???
??????? – daolu hen keneng shi bu pingtande). ?
Whenever possible, Russian and CA export potentials should be integrated in 
an SCO framework (eg Pan Guang 2011:66) and as a general rule Chinese and 
Russian interests in CA energy should be coordinated within the SCO to find 
mutually beneficial solutions (eg Chen Xiaoqin 2011:89,93; Fang Yixian 2008:4; 
Feng Yujun 2008:66; Wang Haiyun 2009:4). Within the SCO framework, standards 
and practices are claimed to have been developed which are respected and will help 
“buffer” and solve problems (Zhao Huasheng 2010:38). In addition to that, the actions 
of the SCO and the EurAsEC should be coordinated (Chen Xiaoqin 2011:90). Zhao                                                         
207 See also: Chen Xiaoqin 2011:93. 
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Huasheng (2010:37) emphasizes that the SCO is a product of Sino-Russian 
cooperation not competition. Since the SCO is to be more or less equated with Sino-
Russian relations in CA in his eyes, the competitive element there consequently has to 
be secondary. He admits, however, that from a “traditional geopolitical perspective” 
China and Russia are in a competitive structure in CA (Zhao Huasheng 2010:38).208  
Russia’s participation in the SCO is portrayed as beneficial to it, not only 
because it ups its international status and creates a more secure neighborhood (Zhao 
Huasheng 2010:38), but also as a way to monitor, take part in and influence Chinese 
activities in CA (Zhao Huasheng 2011:20). Zhao Huasheng notes that Russia now 
wants to use the SCO as well, in order to regulate energy exports from CA 
(2011:22)209. The Russian side claims that this would be a good mechanism to bring 
countries together, and markets closer and to make prices more stable (Zhao 
Huasheng 2011:22). The Kremlin might actively pursue the idea of an energy club in 
order to avoid clashes with China, on the other hand Russia could also just want to 
partake in and control China’s activities in the CA energy sector (Zhao Huasheng 
2011:22).210 In any case, this scheme is admitted to certainly have other functions too, 
eg making the US “queasy“ (Zhao Huasheng 2011:22).  
According to Feng Yujun (2008:66), a SCO energy club could indeed be used 
to avoid competition for CA resources. Within such a framework, strategies would be 
formulated and pipeline construction, oil and gas production and so forth coordinated. 
Multilateral energy cooperation mechanisms such as the one under the European 
Energy Charter should be learned from and experiences in establishing a joint energy 
storage and working out transport and transit issues should be made use of (Feng 
Yujun 2008:66). The end product should be beneficial to producer, transit and 
consumer states (Chen Xiaoqin 2011:93). In Fu Yong’s analysis (2009:46), this issue 
is expected to remain difficult, even though a certain allocation and price for 
resources might be agreed upon in the SCO framework. Nonetheless, he comes to the                                                         
208 ???????????Ｚ?????????????? (Cong chuantong de diyuan 
zhengzhi jiaodu kan, zhong’e zai zhongya cunzai jingzhengxing jiegou. – From a traditional 
geopolitical perspective, China and Russia are in a competitive set-up in Central Asia.) 
209 See also: Chen Xiaoqin 2011:93 who holds that Moscow wants to use the SCO to share burdens, 
resolve common concerns and seek international support. 
210 Such a tendency to watch over and control Chinese activities is not even viewed as necessarily 
negative, because more contact, more communication and maybe more understanding and compromise 
as a consequence (Zhao Huasheng 2010:38). 
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conclusion that “in comparison with the stability of Sino-Russian strategic energy 
cooperation, the differences in interests are only partial and latent ([...] ??????
?????????,???????????????– [...] tong zhong’e 
nengyuan zhanlüe hezuo de wendingxing xiangbi, zhexie liyi fenqi shi jubude, tizaide.). 
  
In the future, the RF is expected to remain central to CA for various reasons. 
Uzbekistan cannot stray too far, just in view of vital energy and electricity supply 
(Yang Lei 2010:36-37). The RF could threaten Kazakhstan’s unity, because 30% of 
the latter’s population are ethnic Russians that live mostly on the border to Russia and 
in the capital (Yang Lei 2010:37). Tajikistan has tens of thousands of workers in the 
RF, whose remittances make up a good part of the economy (Yang Lei 2010:37)211 
and all CA states depend too much on Russia to turn fully to the West (!) (Yang Lei 
2010:37). On the other hand, Russia is expected to intensify reunification efforts in 
CA (Chen Xiaoqin 2011:92), which might very well have the opposite effect and lead 
to centrifugal trends being exacerbated.  
Aside from establishing Russia’s lasting position and the futility of the West’s 
efforts, several scholars comment on the PRC’s role. Concerning Beijing’s 
motivation, Chen Xiaoqin (2011:90) notes the urgency of China’s push for energy 
security, claiming that the PRC has a two-decade window in the 21st century to realize 
its “peaceful rise” (ie industrialization, urbanization, development of economy and 
society). This can only be done on the firm basis of stable, secure and long-term 
energy supply (ie diversified, pipeline-based and overland supply). Consequently, CA 
exporters perfectly fit the requirements of Chinese energy strategy. 
On the current geopolitical balance, Wang Haiyun notes that Russia and China 
are now both important and hard-to-ignore factors in CA (Wang Haiyun 2009:4)212, 
with Zhao Huasheng adding that the region is not under any “definitive geopolitical 
jurisdiction” (Zhao Huasheng 2008c:5)213. What is more, Moscow is said to need                                                         
211 See also: The Economist, April 21st 2012, 55 where transfers from the “million or so“ Tajiks living 
abroad (ie mostly Russia) are said to be equivalent to 45% of GDP. 
212 ?????????????????????(Liangguo zai zhongya diqu xianghu dou 
shinanyi raokai de zhongda yinsu. – Both countries are hard-to-go around major factors in the Central 
Asian region.) 
213 ???????????“????”Ｚ???????????????Ｚ???????
???????????(Zhongya zai diyuan zhengzhi shang shi yige “zhongjian didai“, suiran 
eluosi yu zhongya baochizhe teshu guanxi, dan reng ke renwei zhongya meoyou queding diyuan 
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China in order to stem Western influence (Wang Haiyun 2009:4). Talking about the 
latter and US-RF competition in the region, Fang Yixian (2008:3) interestingly held 
that, though even the powerful US could not “push Russia away”, there will not be a 
“permanent winner” regarding the route-map of CA energy.214 If Russia’s position is 
not viewed as permanent, this leads to intriguing questions about the PRC’s respect 
for a Russian sphere of influence and eventual thoughts of a Chinese “moment in the 
sun” as non-permanent winner (over Russia) in the CA energy game. 
According to Zhao Mingwen (2010a:64) many think that the CA republics 
could in the future indeed look to Beijing instead of Moscow in political and security 
issues as well (!). Some even hold that Tajikistan already considers the PRC to be a 
more attractive economic partner – a “strategic defeat” (zhanlüe shibai – ????) 
for Russia – (Zhao Mingwen 2010a:64), while Russia is complaining that current 
Chinese projects in Tajikistan do not make any economic sense, but are rather a thinly 
veiled attempt to buy political influence (Zhao Mingwen 2010c:7). Zhao (2010c:7) 
quotes Russian scholars as considering their country to have already suffered a 
strategic defeat with the loss of its monopoly on gas exports, due to the CA-China gas 
pipeline from Turkmenistan to the PRC. 
Yang Lei (2010:37) outlines three scenarios for the future situation in CA, 
depending on the outcome of NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan. The third scenario, 
where the country is split up in a Taliban-ruled south and a NATO-controlled north, 
however, is called an only temporary one. Eventually, the US and its allies will either 
succeed in pushing Hamid Karzai and the Taliban in some sort of joint government – 
which constitutes a win in Yang Lei’s eyes – or they will pull out and the Taliban will 
retake power. In the first scenario, a lasting US presence in the region is expected, 
which would likely hurt US-RF relations and induce closer Sino-Russian cooperation. 
In the second scenario, though, Yang Lei argues, “in a situation of constantly growing 
Chinese influence in Central Asia, an American withdrawal would very likely bring 
about a sharpening of friction between China and Russia, if not handled appropriately                                                                                                                                                               
zhengzhi guishu. – Geopolitically Central Asia is a “middle region“, although Russia is keeping up a 
special relationship with Central Asia, one can still deem Central Asia to not have definite geopolitical 
jurisdiction.) 
214  ?????????????????????? [...]? (Keyi kending de shi zhongya 
nengyuan de luxiantu bu hui you yongyuan de yingjia [...]. – What is certain, is that the “route-map“ of 
CA energy will not have a permanent winner.) 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this could endanger the strategic partnership” (???????????????
?Ｚ????????????????I???????I?????????
?????xKKKz??Zai zhongguo dui zhongya yingxiang buduan kuoda de 
qingkuang xia, meiguo de tuichu jiang hen keneng shi zhong’e maodun jihua, yidan 
chuli budang, jiang hui weiji zhong’e zhanlüe huoban guanxi [...]). 
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Conclusion 
 
This study had the purpose of contributing to the reevaluation of Sino-Russian 
relations in the 21st century. It had been posited that the PRC’s relations with other 
big powers were necessarily renegotiated during China’s rapid ascension to global 
power status. One of these other powers, an important neighbor, is the RF. As the 
latter constitutes a crucial resource base in a time of ever growing Chinese energy 
hunger, energy relations are understandably among the central aspects of this 
relationship. The Chinese leadership, though, has decided to seek energy imports 
from CA as well and has progressively expanded its influence there. As the PRC 
thereby entered Russia’s traditional sphere of influence, the region has become a focal 
point of the relationship. These two narrative strands have led to this study’s research 
question, as to which influence CA energy has on Sino-Russian relations. 
 The first chapter, a historico-political contextualization, should first provide 
readers with a basic understanding of the image of each other that has taken shape 
over time, as it underlies mutual perception. Especially the post-Soviet period had not 
yet been discussed to a point, where this would have been deemed redundant. Both 
countries initially perceived each other as an oppressor. Though the Russian 
perception of a “yellow threat” was based on the Mongolian (!) invasion of the 13th (!) 
century, it is this perception of being oppressed that might be reinforced now by the 
unfamiliar reality of being the weaker part. Since the 17th century and up until recent 
years, an image of China had taken hold in the Russian populace as that of a weaker 
and culturally inferior country to be more or less dominated. In China, the image of 
the northern neighbor shifted from that of a colonial oppressor to that of a communist 
“big brother” to that of a traitor to Marxism-Leninism, and gradually that of a partner 
in opposing American unipolarity. Regarding this partner – a “strategic” one since 
1996 –, two conflicting image strands have developed in the last decade. One of a 
former global power descending to regional power status, and one of a resurging 
Russia under a new strongman. While the two are alternately emphasized and exist in 
parallel, the northern neighbor is universally seen as rather fickle and unreliable. The 
growing contradiction between reality and Russia’s described notion of China might 
lead to certain overreactions on its side. Importantly, though, China expects its partner 
to be difficult to handle. 
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 The second chapter was devoted to a factual narration of Chinese and Russian 
energy projects involving CA, as well as Sino-Russian bilateral projects. It was 
considered expedient to first establish the factual background for later deliberations, 
especially because not much had yet been written on the subject and most studies had 
focused on a particular aspect of this issue instead of a comprehensive overview. This 
study found that post-Soviet Russia upheld a central position in the CA energy sector, 
despite the entrance of (mostly Western) international energy companies in the 1990s. 
In the last decade, however, despite ongoing successes like the agreement on the Pre-
Caspian gas pipeline, the RF’s dominance has been considerably weakened by the 
PRC. The Chinese leadership found Russia to be a difficult partner (cf first chapter) in 
bilateral projects such as the ESPO oil pipeline, and decided to push for energy 
cooperation with CA exporters instead. The latter had become more receptive to other 
partners, because Moscow repeatedly misused its dominant position (partly even a 
monopsony). This led to a development where China became an important factor in 
the Kazakh oil and uranium, the Uzbek oil, the Turkmen gas and the Kyrgyz and 
Tajik hydro power industries. It also got involved in connecting the region’s power 
grids and electricity export. Most importantly, though, the Sino-Kazakh oil pipeline 
(from Atyrau at the Caspian Sea) and the Central Asia-China gas pipeline (from 
Turkmenistan) were constructed and brought on stream. 
 In the third chapter, the current state of research was discussed. It became 
apparent that in Sino-Russian relations research of the post-Soviet era, political 
relations were prioritized over economic relations. Concerning the latter, energy was 
indeed critical in earlier studies as well, they did, however, focus on bilateral projects 
and neglected the CA factor. CA as a region was continuously overshadowed by East 
Asia, which in this authors’ opinion does not reflect the significance for future 
relations. When discussing the CA theatre, its impact on the relationship was 
generally judged more negative in recent years. Earlier on, authors described how 
Russia helped the PRC enter the region and the latter took heed of Russia’s 
sensitivities, how multilateral cooperation took off, and how both profited from 
combined efforts against US influence in the region. In recent years, though, and this 
is very much due to the energy issue, the Russian leadership is said to increasingly 
fear losing dominance and Beijing, with ever rising demand as well as relative 
strength, to respect the Russian intermediary less and less. The mainstream 
“limitationist school” (cf Yu Bin) of Sino-Russian relations research does not only 
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detect a collision of interests in the CA energy sector, it expects this situation to (at 
least in the long-term) result in open conflict and to seriously damage the “strategic 
partnership”. Maybe the disappearance of the “anti-American stimulus”, with a 
withdrawal from Afghanistan, could serve as a trigger. Building on previous Western 
research, two hypotheses regarding the research question could be posited. First, 
Russian and Chinese interests collide in the CA energy sector. Second, this will lead 
to open conflict and damage the overall relationship. Regarding methodology, it 
became apparent that previous Western research on this issue has not made use of 
Chinese language sources. To do just that has therefore been found to be a sensible 
contribution to the field. 
 The fourth chapter built on previous insights to determine a suitable 
theoretical model and methodology for this study. According to Yu Bin, all three 
main schools of IRT – and with them the “limitationist school” – are too pessimistic 
about IR in general (realism), relations between non-democracies (liberalism) or 
relations between countries that do not share an ideational basis (constructivism). 
They are thus deemed inadequate to explain the current state of normalcy in Sino-
Russian relations. Yu Bin, however, did not yet provide a new analytical framework 
and the validity of Western IRT is not considered to have been disproven here. One 
should, however, consider refining them through the addition of other theory 
components. This study revisits the dominant IRT, realism, in the form of its latest 
mold neoclassical realism. This is due to realism’s dominance in IR studies, certain 
proclivities in the Chinese elite and the proximity of energy security and national 
security. The conviction that historically developed images (cf first and second 
chapters) influence perception and that “elite perception” influences foreign policy 
made neoclassical realism the suitable mold of realism. Neoclassical realism posits 
that among several policy choices resulting from systemic pressures, domestic 
variables determine the eventual outcome. One of the most important domestic 
variables is “elite perception”. With the help of perception theory – making this 
study’s theoretical approach a “neoclassical realist-perception theory”-amalgam –, an 
“influential elite” regarding the PRC’s foreign policy was found in IR scholars of a 
younger generation and certain methodological proclivities. Those authors 
“articulated perceptions” often come rather close to their “actual perceptions” and are 
at least partly intended to inform the Chinese leadership – increasingly so in recent 
years (cf Noesselt). A corresponding methodology, setting out to gage opinions and 
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recommendations to the leadership, was found in the analysis of Chinese academic 
debate. In conformity with the goal to make use of Chinese language sources (cf third 
chapter), the most influential journals and scholars were drawn upon to find 
representative articles. 
 The fifth and final chapter was devoted to carrying out the proposed research. 
The methodology, which had been justified with the two-pronged theoretical model, 
should be employed and the two hypotheses, which had been posited on the basis of 
previous Western research, tested. The period of investigation was structured in three 
chronological phases, one from 1997 to 2001, one from 2001 to 2008 and one from 
2008 to 2012. Articles were primarily selected from the most important IR- and 
Russia Studies-journals, as well as several journals on economics and energy issues. 
Their authors, among them the most important “Russia Watchers“ (cf Shambaugh) in 
the PRC, work at crucial think-tanks as well as universities. During my research, it 
became apparent that the issue of CA energy was not yet problematized in the context 
of Sino-Russian relations in the first phase. In the second phase, authors primarily 
dealt with the emergence of the US as a major power in CA and the ramifications of 
its intrusion into Russia’s “backyard”. While China was depicted as an important 
partner in countering this intrusion and Western influence in the region, indications as 
to what impact China’s presence in the energy sector would have were still scarce.  
In the third phase, a major shift occurred. Scholars now prominently discuss 
Russia’s misgivings about China’s presence in CA’s energy sector. Often analyzing 
Russian and Western sources, Chinese IR scholars are aware that their country is now 
viewed as an intruder as well and they increasingly confirm that Chinese and Russian 
interests collide regarding CA energy. There is a group of authors that thinks that 
Sino-CA energy cooperation will be good for Sino-Russian relations, because the RF 
will be pressured to settle on some Sino-Russian projects and because Russia can (and 
already does) transport its hydrocarbons through Sino-CA pipelines as well. 
Nonetheless, voices that view CA energy as a potential problem for the relationship 
grow louder. 
 Concerning the question of how this collision of interests came about, several 
scholars point to the natural development of relations with a neighboring region on 
China’s part. They mention requirements of the PRC’s “peaceful rise” and “good 
neighborliness” policies. On the other side, they see a partner that fails to understand 
these policies and that is unduly influenced by “extreme nationalists”, who propagate 
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the “China threat theory”. Although the RF is thus perceived as responsible for a 
certain degree of friction that is not denied, scholars still call for patience and 
understanding for the Russian position. They reiterate the image of a “nostalgic ex-
super power” that is rather unstable in its foreign policy behavior. The multi-faceted 
importance of the “strategic partnership” and still enormous prospects of energy 
imports from Russia lead them to argue for active efforts on the part of China, in 
trying to dispel Russian fears and dissolve tension. Above all, the SCO should be 
employed to regulate energy activities and broker compromises. Massive investments 
in and loans to Russia and its energy companies according to Moscow’s rules shall 
build up good will. Additionally, the Russian government should be constantly 
reminded of common interests in stabilizing regimes, combatting terrorism and drug 
trade and making a common stand against Western influence. If such measures are 
taken, Chinese scholars generally expect amicable solutions in issues connected to 
CA energy, the “strategic partnership” is viewed as secure. 
 
The foregoing has shown that the Chinese IR elite is aware of colliding interests and 
of Russia’s concerns. As for the first hypothesis that has been posited here – there is a 
collision of interests regarding CA energy – it can be confirmed. Concerning the 
consequences – and thus the second hypothesis, positing that colliding interests will 
result in open clashes – the answer is twofold.  
While Western projections of an ensuing drastic deterioration in relations do 
feature in the Chinese discourse, scholars in the PRC do not share this Western line of 
reasoning. They are instead convinced that a wide array of recommended counter-
measures will prove successful and that the “strategic partnership” in its current 
positively viewed state will endure. To this author, geopolitical and economic benefits 
connected to this status quo certainly constitute a tremendous incentive to not let 
conflicting interests erupt into open clashes. Additionally, influential scholars are 
keenly aware of Russian fears and engage in concerted efforts to elaborate careful 
strategies to calmly resolve the issue. This constitutes another powerful reason to 
think that serious damage to the relationship will indeed be successfully avoided in 
the foreseeable future. Earlier Western research might very well have underestimated 
Beijing’s resolve to be patient with its important neighbor and to repeatedly make 
compromises to calm matters. It can be expected, on the basis of the here delimited 
“influential elite’s” “articulated perception” of the issue and corresponding 
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recommendations, that the rest of this decade will not see a crisis that truly challenges 
the “strategic partnership”. 
 In the long-term, however, considering the results of this author’s research, a 
different situation might still evolve. Proliferating statements on CA’s centrality to 
Chinese energy security and the naturalness and inevitability of Sino-CA energy 
relations make it seem rather unlikely that China will back down completely and 
deliberately reverse a trend that will continue as long as the Sino-Russian economic 
balance continues to shift in its favor. Statements like Zhao Mingwen’s (2010c:7), 
who held that all of Russia’s frustrations fail to change the fact that Sino-CA energy 
cooperation both results from a natural complementarity and is mutually beneficial 
and will thus go ahead although the issue with Russia might not be solvable in the 
short-run. The PRC still seems destined to eventually replace Russia as the dominant 
economic force in CA – as it already has in Kyrgyzstan – and to at least match its role 
in CA energy. Two major steps have already been taken in this regard, with the Sino-
Kazakh oil pipeline and the CA-China gas pipeline. In addition to that, the PRC 
begins to match Russia in uranium trade with Kazakhstan and in its engagement in 
Kyrgyz and Tajik hydro power.  
Ultimately, despite all efforts to mitigate tension, it is hard to imagine that the 
RF will accept a situation where it plays second fiddle to the PRC, even if it might be 
in an elaborate multilateral framework, purposefully designed by the Chinese to be 
most accommodating to its neighbor. Depending on domestic political developments, 
Russia will sooner or later “overreact“ when confronted with a reality that does not 
match its imaginations of a Russia-led “Eurasian Union“. As Yang Lei (2010:37) 
explained, an American withdrawal from the region – according to recent plans to be 
expected in two stages in 2014 and 2024 – might accelerate this development. The 
ensuing backlash against China will test the relationship repeatedly and force Beijing 
to make fresh compromises. The biggest compromise, however, an acceptance of a 
Russian “sphere of influence“ comprising the former Soviet space in CA combined 
with a rather drastic retreat from the region as compared to where China will then 
stand, will not be made. Chinese IR elites might then claim that Russia had enough 
time to adjust to China’s rise and to learn to understand its “peaceful rise“-strategy 
and that enough compromises have been made.  
A Chinese government that has marginalized Russia in trade and energy 
cooperation with the CA republics, refuses to make further concessions to the RF and 
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makes a confident stand – maybe first in Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan – might very well 
be viewed by the Kremlin similar to an EU that does the same in Ukraine or Belarus. 
It does not seem plausible that the current notion of a “strategic partnership“ – often a 
framework for a common stance against the West and thus other major powers – and 
ever closer cooperation within the SCO would survive such a development. 
 
 
 
 
?
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Annexes 
Annex 1 – Abstract 
 
In this time of China’s rise to global power status, its relations with other major 
powers are constantly renegotiated. This includes the relationship with Russia, which 
is an important neighbor and a crucial resource base in a time of ever growing 
Chinese energy hunger. This study finds that energy figures prominently in both 
countries’ foreign policy and, moreover, that CA has become a focal point of the 
relationship. The region’s considerable energy reserves prompt both the RF and the 
PRC to seek imports from there. This has evolved into quite a sensitive issue and the 
impact of CA energy on Sino-Russian relations is therefore examined. 
 Among the rather few studies that have discussed this issue so far, the 
majority consider Chinese and Russian interests to be colliding and expect a conflict 
that is damaging to the “strategic partnership”. Those studies do not draw on Chinese 
language sources and are predominantly informed by a pessimist realist outlook on 
IR. This study intends to compliment earlier research in two ways. First, by refining 
the theoretical background to a two-pronged neoclassical realist-perception theory 
approach. Second, by analyzing the Chinese academic discourse on this subject. 
 The perception of Russia in the Chinese foreign policy elite is considered to 
influence strategy formulation. This perception rests on an image that has arisen over 
time, of a RF that is a fickle and unreliable partner in opposing American unipolarity. 
Both a historico-political contextualization and a factual narration of mutual energy 
policies and projects involving CA lead to this conclusion. The latter also shows that 
China has become massively involved in CA energy, thereby severely weakening the 
Russian position. A wide array of articles from the most influential journals and by 
the most eminent scholars is drawn upon to evaluate how the “influential elite” of 
Chinese IR scholars perceives this situation and its impact on Sino-Russian relations.  
Within a research period of fifteen years (1997-2012), three chronological 
phases are delimited. The issue was not problematized in the first phase up to 2001. In 
the second one from 2001 to 2008, authors primarily dealt with US-Russian 
competition and depicted China as an important partner in countering Western 
influence. The third phase since 2008, however, saw prominent discussions of 
Russian fears regarding the PRC – losing dominance in CA to the new “geopolitical 
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opponent” – and Western expectations of open conflict. Chinese scholars increasingly 
confirm a collision of interests regarding CA energy. Nonetheless, severe damage to 
the relationship is not expected. Instead, touted counter-measures, such as using the 
SCO to regulate energy activities and broker compromises, are expected to dissolve 
tensions. Earlier Western research might have underestimated Beijing’s resolve to be 
patient with its important neighbor and to repeatedly make compromises to calm 
matters. It can be expected that the rest of this decade will not see a crisis that truly 
challenges the “strategic partnership”.  
In the long-term, though, predictions of open friction might still hold true. 
Chinese scholars repeatedly underline the centrality of CA to Chinese energy security 
and describe Sino-CA energy relations as “natural” and “inevitable”. In all likelihood, 
the PRC will not deliberately reverse the current trend and will eventually replace 
Russia as the dominant economic force in CA – at least matching its role in the 
energy sector. Russian “overreactions“ to a reality that does not conform with the 
imagined Moscow-led “Eurasian Union“ will force the patient Beijing to make ever 
new compromises. The Chinese leadership will not, however, accept a Russian 
“sphere of influence“ that involves a rather drastic economic retreat from the region, 
as compared to where China will then stand. In turn, a PRC that makes a confident 
stand in CA might be viewed by the Kremlin much like an EU that would do the same 
in Ukraine or Belarus. It does not seem plausible that the current notion of a “strategic 
partnership“ and ever closer cooperation within the SCO would survive such a 
development. 
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Annex 2 – Zusammenfassung (Abstract in German) 
Während China zur Weltmacht aufsteigt, werden seine Beziehungen zu anderen 
Großmächten ständig neu verhandelt. Dazu gehört auch die Beziehung zum 
benachbarten Russland. Letzteres ist ein bedeutender Lieferant natürlicher Ressourcen 
in einer Zeit in der Chinas Energiehunger unablässig wächst. Im Rahmen dieser 
Studie wurde festgestellt, dass Energiefragen die Außenpolitik beider Staaten prägen. 
Außerdem hat sich ergeben, dass Zentralasien zu einem Brennpunkt dieser Beziehung 
geworden ist. Die umfangreichen Energiereserven der Region haben Russland wie 
China dazu veranlasst stetig größere Importe aus dieser Region anzustreben. Dies hat 
sich zu einer sensiblen Problematik entwickelt, weshalb hier die Auswirkungen des 
zentralasiatischen Energiesektors auf die Sino-Russischen Beziehungen untersucht 
werden. 
 Unter den bisher eher wenigen Studien zu diesem Thema, vertritt eine 
Mehrheit die Position, dass chinesische und russische Interessen nicht vereinbar sind 
und in der Folge ein Konflikt entstehen wird, der die “Strategische Partnerschaft” 
ernsthaft schädigt. Diese Studien verwenden keine chinesisch-sprachigen Quellen und 
sind mehrheitlich von einer pessimistischen “realistischen” Sicht der Internationalen 
Beziehungen geprägt. Die vorliegende Studie strebt an, die bisherige Forschung in 
zweifacher Hinsicht zu ergänzen. Erstens wird der theoretische Hintergrund durch die 
Enwicklung eines auf zwei Säulen ruhenden Ansatzes verfeinert. Neoklassischer 
Realismus und Perzeptionstheorie werden dazu kombiniert. Zweitens wird eine 
Analyse des chinesisch-sprachigen akademischen Diskurses zu diesem Thema 
durchgeführt. 
 Diese Studie geht davon aus, dass die Wahrnehmung Russlands durch die 
außenpolitische Elite Chinas die Ausgestaltung von Strategien beeinflusst. Diese 
Wahrnehmung beruht auf einem Bild, dass sich über die Jahre entwickelt hat, das 
eines unbeständigen und unzuverlässigen Partners in der Gegnerschaft zur 
gegenwärtigen unipolaren Weltordnung. Sowohl eine historisch-politische 
Kontextualisierung, als auch eine Untersuchung der Energiepolitik beider Staaten und 
der konkreten Projekte mit Bezug zu Zentralasien deuten auf solch ein Bild hin. 
Letztere Untersuchung zeigt auch auf, dass China in ganz bedeutender Weise in den 
zentralasiatischen Energiesektor eingestiegen ist und die russische Position dabei 
erheblich geschwächt hat. Eine breite Auswahl an Artikeln aus den einflussreichsten 
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Fachzeitschriften und von den angesehensten Experten wurde herangezogen, um 
einzuschätzen wie chinesische Experten für Internationale Beziehungen, in der 
Funktion einer “einflussreichen Elite” in der Volksrepublik, diese Situation beurteilen 
und welche Auswirkungen für die Sino-Russischen Beziehungen sie erwarten. 
Innerhalb des fünfzehnjährigen Untersuchungszeitraums von 1997 bis 2012 
wurden drei chronologische Phasen festgelegt. In der ersten Phase bis 2001 wurde das 
Thema dieser Studie nicht problematisiert. In der zweiten Phase von 2001 bis 2008 
widmeten sich die Autoren vor allem dem amerikanisch-russischen Gegensatz. China 
stellten sie als einen wichtigen Partner Russlands in der Bemühung westlichen 
Einfluss einzudämmen dar. In einer dritten Phase allerdings, welche mit dem Jahr 
2008 angesetzt wird, beschäftigten sich chinesische Experten immer stärker mit 
russischen Ängsten vor China – die Macht in Zentralasien könnte an den neuen 
“geopolitischen Gegner” verloren gehen – und mit Erwartungen westlicher Experten, 
dass ein offener Konflikt folgen wird. Zunehmend wird bestätigt, dass es im Bereich 
zentralasiatischer Energieressourcen tatsächlich einen Interessenkonflikt gibt. 
Dennoch geht man davon aus, dass ein ernsthafter Schaden für die Beziehung 
vermieden werden kann. Eine Vielzahl an Gegenmaßnahmen wurde vorgeschlagen, 
vor allem die Nutzung der Shanghaier Organisation für Zusammenarbeit zur 
Koordinierung der jeweiligen Energieinteressen und zur Erarbeitung von 
Kompromissen. Diese Bemühungen, so erwartet man, werden die Lage entspannen. 
Frühere westliche Studien könnten die Entschlossenheit Pekings, Geduld mit seinem 
wichtigen Nachbarn zu haben und immer wieder Kompromisse zur Beruhigung der 
Lage einzugehen, durchaus unterschätzt haben. Es ist davon auszugehen, dass in 
diesem Jahrzehnt keine Krise die “Strategische Partnerschaft” ernsthaft in Frage 
stellen wird. 
Auf lange Sicht, allerdings, könnten genannte westliche Studien dennoch 
Recht behalten. Chinesische Experten unterstreichen in den letzten Jahren vermehrt 
die immense Bedeutung Zentralasiens für die chinesische Energiesicherheit und 
beschreiben chinesisch-zentralasiatische Energiebeziehungen als “natürlich” und 
“unausweichlich”. In aller Wahrscheinlichkeit wird die Volksrepublik nicht bewusst 
den derzeitigen Trend umkehren, und wird über kurz oder lang Russland als 
dominierende Kraft in der zentralasiatischen Wirtschaft ablösen. Seiner Rolle im 
Energiesektor wird sie zumindest gleichkommen. Mit einer Realität konfrontiert, die 
keinesfalls mit seiner Vorstellung von einer “Eurasischen Union” unter russischer 
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Führung in Übereinstimmung zu bringen ist, wird Russland “überreagieren”. Es wird 
die Geduld Pekings strapazieren und ihm immer neue Kompromisse abverlangen. Die 
chinesische Führung wird allerdings nicht bereit sein, eine russische Einflusszone zu 
akzeptieren, die ihm einen drastischen wirtschaftlichen Rückzug auferlegen würde. 
Andererseits, wird ein China das in Zentralasien selbstbewusst Stellung bezieht und 
russische Forderungen ablehnt möglicherweise vom Kreml nicht anders gesehen 
werden, als eine EU die das Gleiche in der Ukraine oder Weißrussland machen 
würde. Es ist nicht davon auszugehen, dass die momentane Vorstellung von der 
“Strategischen Partnerschaft” und einer immer engeren Kooperation im Rahmen der 
Shanghaier Organisation für Zusammenarbeit so eine Entwicklung überleben würde. 
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